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Abstract 
What explains trust in public institutions in Zanzibar? The study's main objective was to 
examine the significance of identity and perceptions of performance in explaining citizens' 
political trust in Zanzibar. Using a mixed method approach, the study utilised the strength of 
each method to interrogate, clarify, and compare findings to derive meaningful 
interpretations of the data. The Afrobarometer round 6 survey data from Tanzania, the main 
quantitative data source of the study, was supplemented by qualitative data from 8 focus 
group discussions with ordinary citizens, 10 in-depth interview with key informants, 
documentary review, and researcher's direct field observation to make powerful analysis. 
 
The study employed two dominant theories of trust, namely, the identity theory, and the 
institutional theory of trust in guiding the analysis and interpretation of findings. An 
interactive conceptual framework, which depicts multiple interaction effects between 
variables, was developed to engage identity and performance theories as complementary to 
each other in understanding trust in public institutions. 
 
The study findings reveal that perceptions of institutional performance, especially political 
performance and satisfaction with social service delivery, have the most strongest and 
pervasive effect on citizens' trust attitudes, while party affiliation and historical legacies 
among were also found to have powerful influences on citizens trust in their government. The 
three together- perceptions of performance, party affiliation, and historical legacy-  have the 
most interactive and trust eroding effect on political trust in Zanzibar. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
This research work examines the significance of identity and performance in explaining 
popular trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. The study is a contribution to a body of 
scientific literature on institutional trust. This chapter introduces the study's background, the 
case study, the rationale of the study, the scope of the study, and the guiding research 
questions.  
1.1 Background to the study 
Trust 'makes democracy work', a famous statement by Putnam (1993) has been amplified by 
a vast literature on trust that have produced new evidences showing the significance of trust 
in effective functioning of democracy. This refers to the extent to which public governments 
enjoys legitimacy to continue to rule a society in a democratic way. The puzzle lies with the 
African regimes characterized by various forms of authoritarianism, single party legacies, 
deep rooted corruption, week institutions, poverty, ethnic, and religious divisions 
(Chikwanha: 2005). Do the African regimes of this nature lack people's trust? Definitely not. 
What then explains the trust patterns present in these countries? In emerging democracies, 
identity and institutional theories have been argued to offer an explanatory alternative of 
regime support instead of Putnam's social capital theory.  
 
Zanzibar shares some common features like most of African countries although is also 
different on a number of characteristics. Of importance to note is the central place of identity 
in Zanzibar's social and political history. Also Zanzibar, a multi-ethnic society, is highly 
politicized. The incumbent regime has been in power for 52 years since the popular 1964 
revolution. Could identity be the explaining factor for the continued support of the 
government in power? 
1.2 A Brief Description of the Case 
Zanzibar comprises of two major islands of Unguja and Pemba with their surrounding 
archipelago and is part of the United Republic of Tanzania. It is located about 35km from the 
coast of Mainland Tanzania with a total land area of 2,232 square kilometers. The island of 
Unguja, where the capital city is located, occupies 63% of the total area, whereas Pemba, a 
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predominantly rural region makes up the remaining 37%. According to the 2012 Census 
(URT, 2013), Zanzibar had a population of 1,303,569 projected to be around 1,411,722 by 
2015 (URT, 2015), of which 68.8% live in Unguja and 31.2% in Pemba. About 53.7% of the 
population lives in rural and 46.3% in urban areas. The number of eligible voters (18 years or 
above), a target population of this study, is around 720,491 people.  
 
Zanzibar had been under a long period of colonial rule under the Arab administration from 
1780s until the eve of the revolution in 1963. Although from 1890 Zanzibar became a British 
Protectorate, the Sultan (Arab ruler) continued as the symbolic head of state (Bakari, 
2001:47). Having been a famous commercial center for centuries, and later the main slave 
trading market in East Africa during the slave trade era, the islands accommodated 
immigrants and traders from various places such as Asia, Arab Middle East, and African 
mainland (Lofchie, 1963). There is no current statistics of ethnic and racial composition of 
Zanzibar community, the last being that of 1948 Census shown in Table 1 below
1
. The Arab 
colonial government made the racial categories more pronounced and antagonistic with 
discrimination in land ownership, employment, and access to civil rights across racial lines. 
The Arab minority were on top, followed by Asians and Shirazi (the indigenous) in the 
middle, and Africans of Mainland origin at the bottom of the pyramid (Lofchie, 1965). Since 
this study also examines identity, this historical development of ethnic relations is very 
important to understand. 
 
Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Zanzibar in 1948 
Ethnic 
category 
Unguja Pemba Zanzibar 
Number Percentage     
Shirazi 81,150 54.3 67,330 58.8 148,480 56.2 
Africans 37,502 25.1 13,878 12.1 51,380 19.5 
Arabs 13,977 9.3 30,585 26.7 44,560 16.9 
Asians 13,107 8.8 2,104 1.8 15,211 5.8 
Comorians 2,764 1.8 503 0.4 3,267 1.1 
Goans 598 0.4 83 0.07 681 0.3 
Europeans 256 0.2 40 0.03 296 0.1 
Others 221 0.2 66 0.05 287 0.1 
Total 149,575 100.0 114,587 100.0 264,162 100.0 
Source: Adopted from Bakari, M. (2001) The Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded 
Transition, p.64. 
                                                 
1
 The table is used to give a rough picture of the three politically significant racial groups in the isles. The racial 
composition of the present population, however, has changed drastically and there is no up to date statistics. The 
1964 bloodshed revolution wiped out a large number of the Arab population (Sheriff, 2001:314), while forced 
inter-marriage policy of the revolutionary government made the racial boundaries closely interwoven. 
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The nationalist struggles for independence was characterized by fierce competition among 
political parties that were roughly divided along racial lines of three politically active ethnic 
groups- Arabs, Shirazi and Africans (Lofchie, 1965). The independence on 10 December 
1963 was granted to the coalition government between the 'Zanzibar Nationalist Party' and 
'Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party' (ZNP-ZPPP) supported mainly by the Shirazi and Arabs, 
respectively, at the expense of the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), which drew its support from 
Africans of Mainland origin and some sections of Shirazi people. The ASP staged a 
successful revolution on 12 January 1964 and institutionalized an authoritarian one party 
regime which shaped the racial relations just opposite to that of the colonial period by 
privileging Africans over Arabs (Mamdani, 2005). Following the Union with Tanganyika on 
April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania, ASP later merged with Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, which ruled 
the country under a single party system until the re-introduction of multi party system in 
1992. In Zanzibar, the post-revolutionary political development witnessed the killings, 
expulsion, and discrimination of Arab Zanzibaris and uneven regional development where 
Pemba became marginalized politically and economically (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 2001). 
 
Since the re-introduction of multiparty politics, Zanzibar has endured series of violent 
political conflicts which culminated in various short lived peace accords between the ruling 
party (CCM) and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front-CUF (see, Anglin, 2010). 
The latest peace accord between the two parties known as Maridhiano (reconciliation) in 
2010 resulted into the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) following a 
referendum. On the one hand, it has been argued that the GNU has managed to create a 
peaceful political environment and relatively harmonious political relations (Matheson, 2012; 
Nassor & Jose, 2014), whereas others suggest that the modality of its formation and scope is 
flawed as the deep seated polarity problem remains unresolved (Bakari & Makulilo, 
2012:214). Indeed, analysis of Zanzibaris political behavior is very much contested among 
scholars. With all these political dynamics, it is extremely important to examine the factors 
influencing trust attitudes in Zanzibar with a particular focus on nuanced aspects of identity 
and performance. 
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1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
Scholarly research on political trust in Tanzania tends to treat Zanzibar within the Union 
framework, hence overlooking the peculiarities within Zanzibar's political dynamics that 
deserve an independent analysis. Having its own autonomous government
2
, Zanzibar presents 
an interesting case that differs on a number of characteristics from Mainland Tanzania. 
Interestingly, Zanzibaris’ assessment of the Union government is reported to be very critical 
and they depict high level of political awareness compared to Mainlanders (Chaligha, et al., 
2002). For example, recent findings have also depicted that awareness was high in Zanzibar 
on the issue of taxation and the Union question compared to Mainland Tanzania (Aiko, 2013; 
Manda, 2013), though there is no comprehensive study examining Zanzibar's popular trust 
patterns in particular. Therefore, this leaves the question ‘what explains these political trust 
attitudes within Zanzibar’ almost unanswered. 
 
Nearly 52 years since Zanzibar's independence and the revolution, with a completely 
different political environment, the interpretation of the political behavior of Zanzibaris is 
still highly contested among scholars. Some political analysts describe identity politics 
shaped by a distinct political history of Zanzibar as a key explanation. They view political 
attitudes as influenced by the legacy of the past and antagonism that emanates from this 
background, which is further fueled by continuing politicization and polarization of identities 
in terms of race, political affiliation, and regionalism (Killian, 2008; Maliyamkono, 2000; 
Mapuri, 2006). These scholars claim that the present party support reflect the pre-
independence patterns where CUF, the main opposition party, represent the ZNP-ZPP 
influence with strong support in Pemba, whereas CCM represents the ASP influence and the 
black African revolution influential in Unguja. Others view the present political 
developments as a result of post-revolutionary socio-economic policies of ASP and CCM, 
with nothing or little to do with ethnic identities (Bakari, 2001, 2011; Matheson, 2012; 
Sheriff, 2001). This group of scholars contends that the political support and social classes in 
Zanzibar cut across all ethnic categories, and thus they point to issues of governance, 
representation, livelihood conditions of people, and distribution of resources in terms of 
social services as factors of concern. Such issues of economic marginalization, 
                                                 
2
 the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar (SMZ) has all the three arms of government- Executive, Legislature 
(House of Representative), and the Court (except court of Appeal) and enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over non-
union matters, which include education (bar higher education), health, land, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, 
civil service, finance, tourism and natural resources, employment, and sports, among others. These are critical 
aspects for a daily livelihood of an ordinary Zanzibari. 
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discrimination, and low performance in terms of high rate of unemployment, poverty, poor 
infrastructure and household services are cited as important in understanding people's 
political attitudes in the islands.  
 
Given the history of a contested identity politics in Zanzibar, this study contributes to wider 
discussions on political attitudes by examining citizens' trust in public institutions to 
determine the significance of identities and perceptions of institutional performance.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
1.4.1 Central Research Question 
How significant are identities and perceptions of performance on individuals' trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? 
 
1.4.2 Specific Questions 
1.  What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in 
Zanzibar? 
2.  Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? 
3.  What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The study examines the roles of identities and perceptions of performance in shaping citizens' 
trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. Basically, the study focuses on individual level 
political attitudes in explaining institutional trust. Several other studies have used individual 
level characteristics in explaning institutional trust with great effectiveness (see Robinson, 
2009; Rose & Mishler, 2010). Mishler and Rose (2001) rather argued that institutional trust 
can be best explained at an individual level factors. Thus in this study, the measure of 
assessment are the perceptions of ordinary citizens about public institutions, policies, and 
leaders and the influence of their social, political and demographic attributes. Only citizens 
above 18 years of age participated in the study. The study was conducted with a primary 
focus of central government institutions and only looked briefly on how people rate the local 
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governments. According to Hutchison and Johnson (2011:739), individuals' trust in 
government is largely associated with state-level factors more than the local level and 
individual level characteristics. One notable limitation of focusing on state-level factors is 
that government services and the quality of its institutions may vary within a country and so 
are peoples' experiences and their perceptions (Sacks and Levi, 2010:2326). For instance, this 
could be so in relation to rural-urban discrepancies on various aspects of country's 
development. However, the possibility of studying the impact of local level government 
depends on the structure and development of the local government in particular country. In 
the case of Zanzibar, the government is highly centralized in terms of service provision and 
probably due to its small population size the impact of the central government is quite visible 
(see Bakari, 2011).  
 
In assessing government performance, on the one hand, the study focus on citizens' 
satisfaction with the conduct of public institutions and leaders, and the achievements of 
public policies in economic, political and social service delivery sectors. On the other hand, 
the study's investigation of identity is inclusive and encompasses a wide range of variables, 
namely, personal demographic attributes (age, gender, and education), social group 
similarities (rural-urban location, occupation, race, and region), and common political 





















This chapter reviews both theoretical and empirical academic literature on the topic of trust in 
public institutions with a particular focus on the African context. The chapter first defines the 
concept of trust, its various dimensions, and its significance for the effective functioning of 
the state. Next, it offers a critique of the inapplicability of 'social capital' theory in explaining 
trust in the case study context, and then presents the identity and performance perspectives of 
trust, which have been preferred to guide the study. The variables posed by the proposed 
theories are then elaborated in line with the hypotheses to depict a conceptual framework of 
the study. Finally, the conclusion revisits major arguments of the review and show the 
contribution the study makes in the academic literature. 
2.1 Defining Trust: Conceptual Clarifications 
Throughout academic literature, trust is defined from specific disciplinary standpoints. For 
economists, trust is related to economic transactions; psychologists place trust on individuals' 
background and their dispositions; whereas sociologists focus on the social factors and 
relationships among people (Askvik & Bak, 2005:5). Despite these diverse approaches to the 
study of trust, there is a general interdisciplinary agreement on the essential elements of trust 
and trustworthiness as embracing concepts of "risk, positive expectations, reliance, 
suspension of watchfulness and granting of discretionary powers" (Askvik & Bak, 2005:5-
10). In this sense, the truster is said to build 'positive expectations' on the possibility of the 
trustee to do the 'right thing', by suspending 'suspicious watchfulness' and giving the 
necessary 'discretionary powers' to the trustee to act. Consequently, the truster relies on the 
'future contingent action' of the trustee to bring about the desired outcome, and hence 
‘trusting’ implies making a decision to take 'risk' and become 'vulnerable' in case the trustee 
decide to act contrary to the expectations. 
 
This understanding brings us to a classical debate about 'what constitutes the object of trust? 
Basically, it is widely accepted that the primary target of trust are 'persons' or individuals to 
whom we can engage in face-to-face commitments (Sztompka, 1999:40; Warren, 1999:348). 
The argument, however, arises regarding the possibility of trust in other social entities such as 
institutions or organizations. Can we trust an institution? On the one hand, Hardin (1999:38) 
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argues that trust requires sufficient knowledge of the other person's interest and motivation, 
and hence trusting an organization cannot be justified by claims of analogy of individuals 
constituting those organizations. His argument is that modern institutions are complex and 
thus, an individual cannot possess sufficient knowledge of the big number of office holders 
within these institutions. Thus, he claims that trust in institutions such as the government can 
at best be described as "a relationship of inductive expectation" rather than "relationship of 
trust or distrust" (Hardin, 1999:39).  
 
On the other hand, Sztompka (1999:41) strongly suggest that trust in institutions is possible 
and maintains that "behind all other social objects, however complex, there also stand people, 
and it is the people whom we ultimately endow with trust". He cites an example of an 
individual who trusts a flight company and decides to fly with them for instance, the 
individual trusts "their pilots, the cabin crew, the ground personnel, technicians, controllers, 
supervisors, and so forth" without necessarily knowing them in person (Sztompka, 1999:41). 
Similarly, Warren (1999:349) holds that it make sense to trust an institution, because even 
with large scale institutions 'their functions are specified by law' that creates incentive 
structures guiding officials "to act in accordance with the shared expectations of law, thus 
reducing the risks of trust". Additionally, Levi (1998:80) analytically distinguishes the 
concept of trust and trustworthiness arguing that "only persons can trust or be trusting, but 
trustworthiness can attach to either individuals or institutions". This study adopts this later 
conception and treats institutional trust as an extension of interpersonal generalized trust. 
 
Reflecting on the above debate, one may note that the concept of 'trust' has puzzled 
researchers a great deal and efforts to define and clarify the concept has only successfully 
revealed it as complex, multifaceted, ambiguous and contested (Christensen and Lægreid, 
2005:487-488). There is neither a single definition of trust, nor a dominant theory of 
explaining it. In most cases, researchers give it an operational definition relevant to the focus 
of a study. This study is not an exception; it primarily focuses on two forms of interpersonal 
trust, namely; 'generalized' and 'particularized' trust. Uslaner (2000, cited in Gleave et al., 
2010:211) defines generalized trust as "the belief that most people can be trusted", and 
particularized trust as "faith only in your own kind". In this sense, when you trust an 
individual you know on the basis of familiarity or because of similarities in certain group 
characteristics, then trust is particularized to that specific individual, whereas when you trust 
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someone not because of similarity in group characteristics or when you trust a stranger you 
know nothing about, trust becomes generalized to a larger society.  
 
Institutional trust or sometimes referred to as 'political trust', on the one hand, is regarded as a 
form of generalized trust because, generally, an individual cannot be said to be familiar with, 
a big number of individuals who constitute the public offices. Therefore, when one evaluates 
the government on the basis of its functional expectations, the form of trust is generalized 
across those individuals with diverse background characteristics who occupy the government 
institutions. On the other hand, a person's judgment may be influenced by what the 
institutions and office bearers represent in terms of one's own background and similarities in 
group characteristics. Therefore, it has been argued that both generalized and particularized 
forms of trust may co-exist when examining institutional trust (Bahry, et al., 2005, cited in 
Zerfu, et al., 2008). This implies that the presence of diverse identities in a society is not a 
problem as both forms of trust can be infused into the overall trust in a society, but what 
rather problematic is the existence of tensioned relationships on the basis of identity which 
discourage generalized in favour of particularized trust. On this note, Zerfu, et al., (2008:155) 
argue that tensioned relationships "may create an environment marred by suspicion among 
individuals, which in turn may reduce generalized trust levels. 
 
Finally this study engages another important facet of the trust debate about the paradoxical 
relationship between trust and democratic governance. It is argued that trust is very important 
for institutional legitimacy, and at the same time, a 'healthy distrust' is desirable for 
democracy, without even knowing the extent of scepticism needed (Christensen and Lægreid, 
2005:504; 2003:7). This implies that both trust and distrust play crucial roles for the effective 
functioning of a democracy. Does the absence of trust imply distrust? In clarifying these 
concepts, Van de Walle and Six (2013) hold that trust and distrust are two distinct concepts 
and should not be treated as "polar opposite of a continuum". In their critique of prevalent 
research studies which see trust as positive and desired, and distrust as negative and 
destructive, and that distrust is the absence of trust, they correctly argue that both trust and 
distrust may be present at the same time in a society. They contend that while trust refers to 
"confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct", distrust entails "confident 
negative expectations regarding another's conduct", and thus distrust is "an attitude in itself" 
and not a mere absence of trust (Van de Walle and Six, 2013). This study reflects on this 
understanding in examining trust in public institutions in Zanzibar.  
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2.2 Significance of Trust 
Trust, it is argued, is a key element for the smooth and effective functioning of the state. It is 
said to enhance regime's legitimacy and popular acceptance of its policies (Jamil and Askvik, 
2013:153). Legitimacy is defined as "the belief that the institutions, especially the 
enforcement institutions, of the state are appropriate and that their decisions ought to be 
obeyed regardless of whether one agrees with those decisions” (Mattes, and Richmond, 
2015:19). In this sense, when citizens support the government they become willing to abide 
to and support regime’s policies and decisions such as tax payment and obedience of the law 
without coercion. Similarly, trust reduces the possibility of conflicts and friction by 
encouraging smooth and harmonious relationship with the government and within the society 
at large (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002).  
 
Economically, trust acts as a catalyst for country's economic development by promoting 
investment efficiency (Knack and Keefer, 1997 cited in Zerfu, et al., 2008). When 
confrontation is reduced and government enjoys large support, peace prevails and provides a 
ground for economic stability. It facilitates smooth and less costly transaction by reducing the 
suspiciousness and the need for 'strict means of enforcement' (Zak and Knack, 2001, cited in 
Zerfu, et al., 2008:153). 
 
Finally, trust is claimed to be an important ingredient for the flourishing of modern 
democratic governance, economy, social and political development, and stability. Putnam 
(1993:167) considers 'interpersonal trust' as essential element of what he referred to as 'social 
capital', which he defines as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions". 
Hence trust strengthen the social fabric of a society by improving cooperation among citizens 
and promote participation in community affairs. Similarly, Van de Walle and Six (2013, cited 
in Askvik & Jamil, 2013:460), asserts that "high levels of public trust are regarded as 
evidence that the government performs effectively, efficiently and democratically", and low 
levels of trust signifying the contrary.  
2.3 Social Capital and Institutional Performance in African Context: A Critique 
The sociological trust theory developed by Putnam in his breakthrough work 'Making 
Democracy Work' (1993) expounded the concept of social capital to refer to trust at societal 
level. Putnam aimed to explain 'why do some democratic governments succeed and others 
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fail', and his examination of regional government reforms in Italy revealed that in some 
regions, where trust relations were deeply rooted at societal level, the regional government 
reforms were successful, whereas in some regions the governments were less effective 
because those societies were characterized by a culture of distrust as public life was 
organized hierarchically, corruption was widespread, disobedience of laws was common, 
political participation was determined by private greed, and the common citizens disengaged 
in public affairs (Putnam, 1993:115). 
 
The social capital theory has been heavily challenged since then by number of scholars. 
According to Rothstein (2004:2-6), the theory suffers conceptual and empirical critiques. On 
the conceptual level, it fails to clarify the distinction between "organizations that produce 
social trust and those that produce the opposite". He further argues that "many voluntary 
organizations and networks are actually built to instil mistrust of other people in general, and 
of members of other organizations in particular". One may think of criminal organizations 
and gangs, which instil fear and suspicion among people as what Levi (1996, cited in 
Rothstein, 2004:3) termed "antisocial capital". The empirical critique holds that "it has not 
been possible to prove any correlation on the individual level between involvement in 
voluntary associations and high social trust". Similarly, Tarrow (1996:395-396) questioned 
whether "the causal link between the political culture of association and the practice of 
democracy” really a straightforward one. He then claims that policy performance may be 
positive even in non-democratic states, something that contradicts the assumptions of social 
capital theory. 
 
In as much as the social capital theory has its own strengths, it does not board well with 
realities of the third world countries. In most developing countries the civic and associational 
life is not well developed, and yet levels of institutional trust has been reported to be variably 
high and these countries are characterized by a problematic state, the economy of affection, 
the ethnic factor, and big man rule (see, Hyden, 2013; Young, 2012). According to Hyden 
(2001:161) the conception of the 'social capital' in Africa as formed by social networks of 
trust, voluntary organization, and collective actions of a civic nature is both biased and 
misleading. He argues that social trust is not absent in Africa, but is formed based on reasons 
of 'class solidarity', common values and communal ties. In his analysis of social capital 
among rural and urban farmers, entrepreneurs, and women groups in Tanzania, Hyden 
(2001:162) observed a loss of confidence to engage in collective actions in solving common 
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public problems such as health, education and infrastructure, which require political strategy 
and mobilization. This is because people were suspicious towards government the due to the 
inherited political legacy of colonial period and highly centralized post-independence rule.  
2.4 Theoretical framework: Identity and Performance Approaches 
Scholars researching on trust in Africa have insisted taking into consideration the fact that the 
African context offers a differentiated social reality from that of the Western countries. In 
comparative analysis, Zanzibar shares features that resemble contemporary and historical 
political development as that of most African states (see, Hyden, 2103; Young, 2012). 
However, the nature of interplay of politics and racial identities in Zanzibar makes it 
characteristically different from some African states. In Zanzibar, it is race in particular-
defined in terms of differences in colour- rather than ethnicity, which is more inclusive of 
other attributes like religion, culture, and language. In this case, therefore, identity and 
performance theories are very much applicable in understanding popular trust in the 
government. These two major theoretical perspectives identified for this study focus on 
explaining the sources of institutional trust also referred to as political trust. That is, they 
attempt to answer the question how trust in public and political institutions is created and 
maintained.  
 
On the one hand, the identity based perspective views trust in institutions as a product of 
'common group identity'. Identity may be defined as "any social category in which an 
individual is eligible to be a member" (Chandra, 2006:400). This perspective assumes, 
according to Askvik (2008:519-520) that "one tends to trust members of one's own group and 
distrust members of other groups". Askvik (2008:521) holds that in this approach "trust in 
public institutions and the government appears as an extension of trust in representatives of 
one's own particular identity group, be this a political party, a religious movement, or people 
of similar cultural or ethnic background". For instance, supporters of the opposition political 
party may tend to express low trust in the government as they see it reflecting the ruling 
party's identity. In this sense, trust based on identity reflects particularized trust and as the 
strength of identity support increases, the level of generalized trust decreases. Hyden 
(2013:187) maintains that Africans, like anyone else, "have multiple identities and how they 
see themselves depends on whom they address". This pragmatic identities is what Bratton, et. 
al., (2005) categorized as self-ascribed identities, which include race, partisanship, regional, 
and national identification, among others. Given the poor performing economies in Africa, 
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and yet incumbent governments are re-elected and public opinion surveys consistently report 
relatively high level of institutional trust, the identity approach claims to offer a better 
explanation of the scenario. 
 
On the other hand, as much as identity is key in explaining trust in emerging democracies, the 
capacity of political institutions to deliver on both economic and political fronts is equally 
significant (Chikwanha, 2005:214). This approach holds that people judge their governments 
based on perception of pragmatic improvement in their socio-economic welfare. Therefore, in 
this approach political trust is defined as "an individuals' confidence in government 
institutions based on their perceptions of their performance" (Hutchison and Johnson, 
2011:738). The institutional performance approach emphasizes the role of citizens' evaluation 
of output of public and political institutions as a source of political trust. It assumes that 
citizens will trust public institutions "insofar as they are satisfied with public policies and 
services" (Askvik, 2008:522). This is basically an institutional theory which assumes that 
institutions do matter. It is a political science based approach to the study of trust which 
basically argue that the "social capital does not exist independently of politics or government 
in the realm of civil society. Instead, government policies and political institutions create, 
channel and influence the amount and type of social capital" (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002:7). 
Accordingly, "the capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties and establish social trust is 
in this account heavily influenced by (the effects of) government institutions and policies" 
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2002:7). Disqualifying ideological and identity consideration, Mishler 
and Rose (1997:420) maintain that "in the short term, popular trust in government may be 
inherited.., in the longer term, however, trust must be earned; it must be performance based". 
Similarly, Rose and Mishler (2010:24) assert that "trust or distrust in political institutions is 
primarily determined by the political and economic performance of new democracies". On 
similar note, Hutchison and Johnson (2001:738) argue that "African political attitudes are 
primarily influenced by observations of government performance rather than commitment to 
abstract ideals".  
 
The relevance and explanatory strengths of the two theories is supported in various trust 
studies conducted in Africa. For instance, in summarizing the research findings on voting 
behaviour from a number of African countries, Bratton (2013) concluded that African voters 
are motivated by social identity, but they also consider partisan loyalty and especially 
economic performance." Similarly, Askvik (2008; 2010) found both identity and performance 
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having influence on citizens' trust in South Africa, and suggested that the respective theories 
should be seen as complementing each other. This study is moulded on similar theoretical 
lines in the context of Zanzibar. However, methodologically, this study differs from that of 
Askvik, which was primarily quantitative, in that it employs a mixed method approach  by 
adding qualitative data from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to the empirical 
survey data from Afrobarometer round 6 in Tanzania. Next, I delineate and discuss the 
'identity' and 'performance' variables from the proposed theories in connection to the 
dependent variable-institutional trust'. 
 
2.5 Variables of the Study 
A variable is "an empirical property that can take on two or more values" (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:55). Since social science deals with human behavior, it is 
better to define a variable as "a characteristic or attribute of an individual or an organization 
that can be measured or observed and that varies among the people or organization being 
studied" (Creswell, 2009:49-50). Hence, variable can be concepts such as 'race', which can be 
attributed to two or more values, say African and Arab, or can be abstract concepts such as 
'trust' seen as low, high, moderate and so forth. In scientific research, variables are derived 
from a theoretical or conceptual framework and can be formulated as hypotheses to provide 
tentative answer to the research question posed (Creswell, 2009:51). There are various types 
of variables, however, in this study two types are most important namely, dependent and 
independent variables. Independent variables are those that are assumed to cause or influence 
outcomes, while dependent variables are the outcomes or results themselves of the 
independent variable (Creswell, 2009:50). Simply put, independent variable is the 'assumed 
cause' and dependent variable is its 'assumed effect'.  
 
2.5.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is institutional trust, also referred to as political trust or 
trust in government. Institutions could be defined as "mechanisms or structures designed to 
govern the behaviour of individuals" (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011:739). This also includes 
the individuals and leaders who occupy the structures. Trust in institutions refers to a person's 
positive beliefs and expectations that the institutions and "its members in general will act in a 
competent and reliable way in order to fulfil its objectives and obligations" (Askvik, 
2010:26). In this study this variable was measured based on individual's overall ranking of 
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the government institutions and leaders.  Respondents were presented with a list of 
institutions and leaders and asked  to express the degree to which they trust the selected 
institutions and leaders with a more general question "how much do you trust each of the 
following". Respondents were asked to chose from a Likert scale responses to determine their 
level of trust.  
 
2.5.2 Independent Variables 
The Study employs two main independent variables: identity and performance. According to 
Creswell (2009:105), a researcher may relate one or more independent variables to a 
dependent variable in order to measure which among contending explanatory factors best 
explains the dependent variable. The two independent variables are further defined and 
operationalized below. 
 
2.5.2.1 Identity Variables 
The study employed three categories of identities: the first is the individual's demographic 
attributes, which include age, sex, and education. The second category encompasses self-
ascribed social group identities namely; ethnicity/race, rural-urban location, region, and 
occupation. The third category involves common political identities in terms of party 
affiliation, historical legacy, and national identity. Other identities such as language and 
religion were not included in this study since Zanzibaris are homogeneously Swahili 
speakers, and about 96 percent are Muslims predominantly of Sunni denomination (Bakari, 
2011). 
 
2.5.2.1.1 Individual's Demographic Attributes 
The first group of identity variables are the individual's demographic characteristics, 
specifically age, sex and education. Several empirical studies have focused on understanding 
how these demographic identities shape individuals' economic, social and political attitudes 
such as perception of democracy, likelihood of voting, party affiliation, political 
participation, evaluation of the economy, and policy preferences. To begin with, age has been 
analyzed as constituting different 'generational identities' in terms of youth and non-youth age 
group. The definition of youth is very much contested and has been defined for various 
purposes. In this study 'youth' included people aged 18 to 39 years, while non youth are those 
aged 40 years or above. The minimum age limit for this study was the legal voting age of 18 
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years like other researches on political attitudes. It is argued that although the African context 
is characterized by different socioeconomic and political conditions such as high rate of 
unemployment, poor service delivery, fragile electoral process, and weak party competition, 
youth political attitudes are not different from other parts of the world (Resnick and Casale, 
2014; 2011). In their study of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries, Resnick and Casale (2014; 
2011) repeatedly observed that youth, being the most affected age group with unemployment 
and poverty, are more likely to express pessimistic attitudes and less confidence in the 
democratic process compared to old people. On the other hand, Mattes and Richmond (2015) 
found no difference between youth and old people in South Africa on a range of political 
attitudes. This study posed a rather positive hypothesis considering age as influential on trust, 
where young people would be less likely to express trust in the government than older ones.  
 
Another demographic identity that influences individual's political attitude is gender. The 
social roles and socio-economic conditions that a particular gender group faces are said to 
influence differences in attitudes and preferences. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, 
Gottlieb et al., (2015) observed that in context where women are socially and economically 
vulnerable and dependent, they express different policy preferences such as priority for 
improved access of clean water and their political participation and representation becomes 
more limited compared to men. Moreover, public opinion survey findings from Uganda in 
2005 revealed gender differences in several political attitudes, where men were more likely 
than women to prefer democracy, to support multiparty, to reject single party system, to be 
affiliated to a political party, and to oppose the removal of a presidential term limits 
(Afrobarometer, 2005). Thus, this study hypothesized that men are much likely to be critical 
of the government and thus less likely to express trust compared to women, as men have more 
access to information, and participate more in political process.  
 
Finally, there are varied findings on the relationship between education and institutional 
trust. In most industrial countries education has been found to increase political participation 
and hence one's political trust, while the relationship is negative in most of African countries 
where in most cases an increase in education has been found to decrease one's likelihood of 
trusting the government (Croke et al., 2015:15). Educated individual possess greater 
knowledge about the functioning of the government and have more access to information and 
thus more likely to be troubled by poor performance characterizing most developing 
democracies in terms of poor economy, prevalence of poverty and corruption, electoral 
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mismanagement, and other forms of authoritarian practices. Croke et al., (2015:3) suggest 
that regime type is more important in explaining the effect of education on individual 
political attitudes, where they found in Zimbabwe that educated people deliberately chose to 
disengage  from the political sphere as they become pessimistic of meaningful contestation in 
the electoral authoritarian regime. Interestingly, they found that education increases support 
for democracy and support for opposition party, while decreases support for incumbent and 
reduces perception of government performance. The study also hypothesis that the highly 
educated individuals are more likely to be  critical of the government and likely to express 
low trust than the less educated ones. 
 
Overall, the individual demographic attributes of age, sex, and education have the most 
interactive effect between each other and with several other factors in shaping trust attitudes. 
For instance, Resnick and Casale (2014; 2011) observed that government economic 
performance and political affiliation are key influences alongside individual's age group, 
where youth are less enticed to vote and participate in politics compared to older ones. In 
Uganda, the Afrobarometer surveys (2005) reported that gender and education are equally 
significant in explaining Ugandans political views, where girls were lagging behind boys in 
terms of access to education. Furthermore, Gottlieb et al., (2015) found that the 
socioeconomic conditions affecting particular gender group marked out meaningful 
differences among men and women in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study therefore, the 
individual demographic identities are considered to have influence on individual's inclination 
to a specific trust attitude together with other factors, but not as direct causes.  
2.5.2.1.2 Social Group Identities 
In this second category of identity constructs, four group variables were examined namely; 
ethnicity/race, rural-urban location, region, and occupation. The concept ethnicity is the 
most inclusive of social identities and has traditionally been defined to embrace groups 
unified by commonness of colour, language, culture, history, territory, and religion, whereas 
the concept of 'race' is a subset of ethnicity and it refers to identification based on individual's 
skin colour (the two concepts are used interchangeably in this study). However, there is no 
consensus on the defining attributes of ethnicity, while some treat it as a fixed cultural 
property that defines an individual; others consider it as an outcome of social relations 
(Hyden, 2013:207). However, it is widely accepted that ethnicity is a reality in Africa, and 
that ethnic divisions is a challenge to projects of national integration throughout the region. 
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Another disagreement in scholarly literature concerns the use of ethnicity as a causal factor to 
explain an outcome such as voting behaviour, political conflicts, and trust in government. 
Chandra (2006) suggest that in explaining an outcome one should relate it to a particular 
subset of ethnic identity rather than ethnicity in general, or rather use ethnicity in conjunction 
with other factors. In this sense, Chandra argues that "either ethnicity does not matter or has 
not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked" 
such as violence and patronage. In a study of ethnic conflict for example, Ellingsen 
(2000:234-235) observed the effect of other variable in explaining the influence of ethnicity 
such as when political and economic allocation of resources becomes highly divisive and 
discriminative on ethnic lines, then ethnic identity becomes hostile and the only organizing 
force, except when national identity prevails. Others strongly suggest a need to go beyond 
ethnicity in explaining political and economic outcomes. For instance, in examining conflicts 
in Africa, Hyden (2013) holds that ethnic cleavages are losing their explanatory significance 
in the changing context of African countries. Similarly, Zerfu (2008) argues that ethnicity in 
itself may not significantly affect trust, but rather the interaction between ethnicity and ethnic 
nepotism can. Also, Keefer (2010:9) argue that ethnic clustering of political support should 
not be directly interpreted as collective action of co-ethnics, instead, it "is likely to be a 
byproduct of other features of the political environment", such as absence of information, 
instilled fear, or coercion.  
 
On the other hand, there are considerable empirical literature which claims strong influence 
of ethnicity on individual political attitudes and behaviour. For instance, Norris and Mattes 
(2003:2) observed from a study of 12 sub-Saharan countries that ethnicity based on race and 
language was the strong predictor of party support mostly in countries where a society is 
divided by many languages such as Nigeria, South Africa and Namibia, while playing less 
significant role in linguistically unified societies such as Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania. 
Moreover, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) found that although most Kenyans preferred to define 
themselves with national rather than ethnic terms, their actions reflected ethnic lines in 
electoral choices and mistrust among ethnic groups. Likewise, Bratton et al., (2011) observed 
that ethnicity could explain why incumbents are re-elected despite poor performance of 
African economies, though they caution against single factor explanation as they also found 
economic considerations uppermost important. This study therefore, does not dismiss the 
possibility of influence based on race or ethnicity; instead it assumes positive relationship in 
order to examine its explanatory significance.  
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Other social categories such as rural-urban location and region have been recognized as 
influential in explaining patterns of popular attitudes towards the government. The large gap 
of access to information, economic conditions, and difference in social service delivery are 
factors cited to influence an opinion gap between rural and urban inhabitants. There is a 
mixture of findings regarding opinion differences of rural and urban residents depending on 
a context. Bleck and Michelitch (2015) found in Mali that rural residents were less enticed to 
identify themselves with the state compared to urbanites due to unmet needs for public 
services and infrastructure, basic needs insecurity, and physical insecurity. On the contrary, 
Harding (2010) argues that most governments in Africa pursue policies that benefit rural 
majority as electoral incentives due to large rural population and hence leaving urban 
residents dissatisfied. Others suggest that rural areas remain critically poor and less 
developed in terms of social services, yet rural dwellers are more likely to support incumbent 
government due to information gap (Young, 2009). Interestingly, the rural-urban opinion 
differences are much connected to performance indicators, although it is treated as identity 
category. In this study, therefore, it is expected that rural-urban differences amount to 
variation on individual's trust attitudes in government institutions. In particular, I expected 
rural dwellers to be more likely to show higher trust in government than their urban 
counterparts due to glaring disparity in access to information. 
 
The regional aspect of identity is both linked to ethnic geography and performance criteria, 
both of which are commonly associated with variations in political attitudes (Harding, 2010). 
Bakari (2011) found that in Zanzibar recruitment into public sector was discriminative on the 
basis of region, and political party support, where by regional origin and support for 
opposition could be a factor for non-recruitment or dismissal from job. However, this 
variable has not been widely employed in empirical research on trust across Africa, and 
hence this study will make a valuable contribution in this regard. The study thus assumes that 
regional identity may have significant influence on individual's trust level.  
 
Finally, individual's occupation, in terms of whether working in government, private, or self-
employed, or unemployed, has a positive effect on trust level. Given the restricted freedom of 
expression in most developing countries, it is likely that those employed in public sector or in 
formal organizations have more positive evaluation of the government compared to those in 
informal occupations and private sectors. This could be partly linked to what Bayart 
(2009:188) referred to as 'the politics of the belly' implied in his quote of a  Cameroonian 
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saying "the mouth which eats does not speak", which reflects the compromise made by the 
employed educated elites and those working in the formal organizations of the state. It also 
reflects the legacy of single party authoritarianism profound in most African countries. As 
observed above by Bakari (2011), recruitment into the public sector in Zanzibar was 
discriminatory based on political party support and regional origin, thus the study 
hypothesized that those working in the government sector and formal organizations of the 
state are more likely to express higher trust level compared to those working in the private 
sector, NGOs, and self-employed. 
2.5.2.1.3 Common Political Identities 
The third category of identity encompasses three variables, namely; party affiliation, 
historical legacy, and national identity. Party affiliation refers to the extent to which 
individuals identify themselves with a particular party. According to Young (2009), party 
preferences in Africa supersedes consideration of individual's credentials, where if a party is 
a contender then anyone running on the party label have a chance of winning. In his study of 
determinants of support for president in sub-Saharan Africa, Young (2009:14) examined 
ethnicity and partisanship influence and concluded that it was party attachments rather than 
ethnicity that assured African presidents most reliable support base. I therefore assume that 
party association has significant influence on individual's trust in government, where by 
supporters of ruling party are more likely to express higher trust while expecting lower trust 
among opposition supporters. 
 
The second political identity is historical legacy, also sometimes referred to as ideological 
identity. I use the term historical legacy simply to denote the socio-political history handed 
down from one generation to another. These are beliefs, practices, events of influence, and 
ideologies of a particular time in history that reemerge and endure or used to shape the 
present. Essentially, historical legacy can have both positive or negative effect to the current 
generation depending on the type of history and the belief of a community. Most African 
countries have had a dark past political history under colonialism which ended in some areas 
by major events in history including resistance, military coups, revolutions, and regime 
changes towards independence. The post independence era also brought in its own history 
under the project of 'national building' which in most cases resulted to various forms of 
authoritarian regimes and practices that lasted for several decades before the transition to 
democracy towards the end of twentieth century. Zanzibar has gone through similar history 
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with its own distinct experiences. In particular, its political history of the Arab colonial rule, 
the struggles for independence, the independence regime of 1963, the revolution in 1964, and 
the post revolutionary one-party-state that lasted for three decades until the introduction of 
multiparty democracy in 1992.  
 
Several studies have considered the influences of the past legacies in shaping present citizens' 
trust attitudes in public institutions. Mbatudde (2013) in her examination of institutional trust 
in Uganda found events such as the 'movement system' and the turbulent history of war left 
an enduring legacy to affect political trust attitudes of many Ugandans in various ways. 
Chikwanha (2005:214) examined two types of influences from the historical legacies, 
namely; the 'ideological trust' which he defines as trust originating "in the promises made by 
the liberating regimes"; and  'experiential trust' as "a reflection of the governance the citizens 
have actually experienced under these regimes and their successors". Chikwanha's (2005) 
reflected on the failure of the new political leadership to deliver on both economic and 
political fronts and the extent of citizens support to these regimes. In this study, the 
ideological and experiential trust are merged together in what I called historical legacies. In a 
similar model, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ
3
) has survived since the 
1964 Zanzibar revolution initially under Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and later its successor 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi
4
 (CCM). Both the ruling party and the government not only 
maintained the historical identity, but have used past historical influences to mobilize 
political support of its citizens. The question is, to what extent the government and leaders 
identity, and historical trajectories experienced by people have influenced trust in governing 
institutions in Zanzibar. In other words, do people of Zanzibar identify themselves with 
particular historical perspective and align their support to that effect. The study assumes that 
historical legacy is strongly linked to citizens trust attitudes in Zanzibar. In particular, the 
study hypothesize that attachment to historical legacies of pre-independence incline an 
individual to trust the government more, while identification with post revolutionary legacies 
erodes institutional trust. 
 
                                                 
3
 The current government of Zanzibar even under the structure of Government of National Unity still maintains 
itsidentity as a liberating regime. Its Official tittle in swahili , Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar, translated as 
the revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is derived from the history of the Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 
1964. 
4
 The official swahili tittle Chama Cha Mapinduzi can be translated as 'the Revolutionary party'. 
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The third political identity is attachments to one's national identity also referred to as 
geographical nationalism, which is identification based on country's territorial boundaries. 
This is the most inclusive political identity at a country level by which people of one country 
are unified with a vision of national interest, rather than appealing for within country 
divisions, and by which a territorial community regards themselves in relation to others. 
Several factors are said to influence a sense of national identification including linguistic 
homogeneity and absence of dominant ethnic group. In a study that covered 16 sub-Sahara 
African countries, Robinson (2009) found Tanzania to be a singled out example with highest 
level of national identification due to reasons such as the widespread use of Kiswahili as a 
second language and in schools, equitable regional distribution of national resources in early 
post-independence period, and due to the political leadership role of first president, Julius 
Nyerere. The study also found that ethnicity was positively related to national identification 
in ethnically heterogeneous societies compared to societies with dominant ethnic group, 
while finding no relationship between performance indicators such as improvement in 
provision of social service with national identification (Robinson, 2009:24). This study 
therefore, expected that national identification would co-exist with other group identities, and 
that individuals who identify themselves based on national identity would prioritize 
performance criteria rather than their ethnic and political identities in their expression of 
trust. 
2.5.2.2 Institutional Performance 
Institutional performance is the study's second major independent variable beside identity. 
Performance refers to achievements of the state institutions in areas related the economy, 
politics, and social service delivery. As noted above, in this study I examined performance 
based on citizens perceptions of how well or bad the government has done in key functional 
areas. In relation to economic achievements the study examined individuals' satisfaction with 
the economic conditions both at individual and country levels, which include perception of 
employment conditions, poverty, tax payment, price control, and the distribution of national 
resources. Moreover, assessment of political performance focused on satisfaction with 
democracy and elections, perception of corruption, and perception of political stability. 
Further, in analyzing satisfaction with social service delivery, citizens' perceptions in five 
key services were examined, namely, education, healthcare, road (infrastructure), access to 
water, and electricity. Finally, assessment of specific public institutions, such as such as the 
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office of the president, the police, tax department, corruption bureau, and local government, 
and their overall job performance on specific functional aspects were examined. 
 
There is a considerable empirical literature examining government performance evaluations 
across Africa, but space does not permit to comprehensively discuss supportive evidences for 
each aspect. This study will highlight main arguments and empirical country examples to 
examine its influence on trust in public institutions. In the framework of this study, 
examination of interactive effects of variables is key in understanding the influence of 
various factors on citizens' trust attitudes. Several studies have reported that judgments of 
government performance co-exist with identity attachments in an individual's decision to trust 
although with primacy of one over the other factor. Bratton and Kimenyi found (2008) found 
ethnicity and performance evaluation as determinants of voting behaviour among Kenyans, 
while Young's (2009) examination of seven other sub-Saharan countries dismisses ethnicity 
and instead found party affiliation and approval of job performance as predictors of support 
for presidents. On the other hand, there is considerable literature suggesting the primacy of 
performance evaluation over all other criteria. Logan (2008) for instance, examined trust gap 
between incumbent and opposition parties in 18 sub-Saharan countries using both structural 
country level and individual level factors and found performance evaluation having the 
greater explanatory power in explaining trust gap on party support. Specifically, Logan noted 
that strong performance in managing the economy, and provision of social services amount to 
increase in trust to both ruling and opposition parties, while negative perceptions of 
corruption affect more the incumbent party.  
 
Moreover, a mixture of findings on the effect of various performance indicators has been 
reported in several contexts. Economic problems were ranked highest of all priorities in 2013 
from 34 African countries, with unemployment topping the list (38%), followed by poverty 
(23%), and management of the economy (13%), among others (Dome, 2015). Young (2009) 
found modest evidence of considerations of individual's economic wellbeing, strong evidence 
for job approval, while no evidence for perception of national economy. This suggests that in 
economic terms individuals judge performance of the government and its institutions on the 
basis of improvement in their own life rather than the growth in national economy, of which 
they normally lack cognitive capacity to detect. In 2013 public opinion survey findings from 
34 African countries revealed an overall widespread discontent with economic conditions, 
based on measures such as performance in job creation, narrowing the gap between rich and 
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poor, and improving the living standards, despite growth in national economy (Hofmeyr, 
2013). The study therefore hypothesized that the more positively citizens evaluate 
government economic performance, especially in sectors related to individual wellbeing, the 
more highly they will express trust in the government.  
 
Furthermore, government's political performance in terms of improvement in democracy is 
closely evaluated by citizens in forming their political trust attitudes. Africa has had a recent 
past of various forms of authoritarianism including single party rule, military regime, and 
presidential dictatorship, and in some contexts these features are either present or its legacies 
instills fear in citizens political choices and behaviour. It is argued that against this 
background that the opening up of political space in Africa makes citizens crave for greater 
political freedom, civil rights, and competition, and thus granting overwhelming support for 
democracy and rejection of all forms of autocratic rule (Armah-Attoh, et al., 2007; Logan, 
2008:20-21). I therefore expected that improvement in ensuring free and fair political game 
will positively impact on trust level, while poor democratic performance such as unfair 
electoral process will hamper trust negatively. 
 
Likewise, citizens’ perception and experiences of corruption as they keep track of the 
functioning of the government and institutions has huge influence on trust attitudes. 
Transparency International (2017) defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain," and classifies it into petty, grand, and political corruption. I employ these three 
categories as defined by the Transparency International (2017), where grand corruption 
"cossists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central 
functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good"; 
whereas, petty corruption "refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low-and mid-level 
public officials in their interactions with the ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access 
basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments, and other 
agencie"; and political corruption as "a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of 
procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who 
abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth." They also noted that corruption 
is distructive to social, political, and economic progresses and has corrive effect on citizens' 
trust and legitimacy of the governing institutions.  
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Perception of corruption has been found to have strong influence on citizens trust attitudes in 
various studies. Armah-Attoh, et al., (2007:20) conducted a comprehensive examination of 
the effect of perception of corruption on institutional trust covering three rounds of public 
opinion surveys from 1999 to 2005 in up to 18 countries, and the study revealed that 
corruption is the strongest factor with negative influence on institutional trust and confidence 
in electoral process. They also argue that people perceive all forms of corruption as wrong 
and it affect citizens as they form disillusioned attitudes with democracy and tax payment. 
Contrary to the assumption of theoretical literature, which suggests strong influence of 
corruption on tax payment in a sense that widespread perception of corruption creates 
disobedience in tax payment, D'Arcy (2011:18) observed that in Africa corruption among tax 
officials did not affect willingness to pay tax, and thus although it erodes regime's legitimacy, 
it may not affect specific institution. In as much as the relationship between corruption and 
tax payment or democracy is important in understanding reciprocal effect of performance and 
institutional trust, this study does not examine corruption in relation to tax payment, instead it 
specifically focuses on trust in government as its dependent variable. In this direction, Cho 
and Kirwin (2007) found that corruption produce mistrust in a 'vicious circle' of relationship, 
where people who lack confidence in corrupt institution try to get service by offering bribe, 
hence resulting in circular corruption-mistrust relationship. Therefore, I expect an increase in 
experience and perception of corruption to influence trust negatively. 
 
In addition, the level of citizens' satisfaction with social service delivery has a significant 
impact on their overall trust level. Africa is less developed in terms of social service 
infrastructure and citizens' demand in this sector constitute a major priority on government 
policy priorities in areas of health, education, roads, and home-based services like water and 
electricity. There are of course country differences in terms of which social service is 
prioritized among these, but the difference is not significant (Dome, 2015:8). A recent 
Afrobarometer public opinion used categories of 'public services' which constitutes water 
supply, infrastructure (roads), and electricity; and 'social service', to include health, 
education, and housing (see, Dome, 2015). The findings revealed that health service is a top 
priority (23%), followed by water supply (21%), infrastructure and education (both at 19%), 
and electricity (13%). Although satisfaction with service varies from one service to another 
and within-country contexts with a mixture of positive and negative evaluations, it is widely 
accepted that negative evaluation of government's service delivery erodes institutional trust. 
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This study therefore hypothesize that the more positively the citizens evaluate social service 
delivery the more positively they will express trust in government. 
2.6 Description of the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework employed in this study depicts a multiple interaction effect 
between the two independent variables (identity and performance), and their relationship with 
the dependent variable (institutional trust) as depicted in figure 1 below. First, the causal 
direction of identity variables are in twofold, (a): identity as a direct cause of institutional 
trust, a case may be where regardless of manifest performance indicators respondents persist 
on their way of expressing trust citing identity as a main factor, and (b): identity as 
influencing the way one evaluates the government performance, and hence his/her overall 
trust level. The former scenario describes a blind confidence or complete mistrust based on 
identity considerations, while the later depicts an adjusted positive relationship of one's 
identity, in line with the expected evaluation based on one's identity, and hence the expected 
level of trust coincides with individual’s identity on various considerations. Specific identities 
that are powerful and likely to skew an individual's perception of government performance 
regardless of the tangible achievements on the ground include ethnicity and party affiliation. 
 
Second, the causal direction of institutional performance is as well two-folded. First, 
institutional performance as primarily a direct cause of trust. In this sense, institutional 
performance becomes a pragmatic criterion alone of judging the government; and second, 
institutional performance as a factor for identity formation and consequently the expression 
of negative or positive trust. That is, the functioning of the government in terms of 
implementation of policy programs may be a factor reinforcing formation of identities. For 
instance, as noted above, government performance may influence differences in attitudes 
based on gender, age group, education, region, ethnic group and so forth. That influence of 
policy performance on identity could, on the one hand, favourably create a large stock of 
trust in two scenarios, first: by means of negative policies such as discriminative policies 
designed and implemented in favour of a dominant ethnic group or region so that the 
government may enjoy block legitimacy based on such identity, which is a worst-case 
scenario. Second, identities may favourably express confidence in government influenced by 
positive policies promoting welfare of a particular group such as policies addressing women 
marginalization and improving their political participation. On the other hand, such influence 
may be negative, where poor performance of the government across several public policies 
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aggravates marginalization of group identities, and consequently causing low trust. The 
rationale of performance's influence on identity and hence trust is that the primary cause is 
attributed to public policy performance rather than identity attachments. 
 
Finally, the dependent variable, institutional trust, has a reciprocal effect with performance 
variables. This idea is informed by the significance of trust in public institutions as noted 
above, where institutional performance is seen to affect trust level, and as a result, 
respective trust level creates either favourable or unfavourable conditions for the effective 
functioning of institutions relative to legitimacy base it has been able to create. A good 
example here would be the performance of tax collection institutions, where its effective 
functioning in terms of not being linked to corruption, mismanagement, and the government 
capacity to allocate tax revenues back to social services becomes a critical factor for building 
tax payers' trust base, and ultimately creating a smooth tax collection exercise next time 
around due to the legitimacy it enjoys. 
 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Framework of the Study 






















Source: Author's synthesis of reviewed literature 
 
Variable 1: Identity 
 Demographic attributes  (age, gender, & education) 
 Social identities (ethnicity, rural-urban location, 
region, & occupation) 
 Common political identities (party association, 








Variable 2: Institutional performance 
 Satisfaction with the economy (perception of 
national economy, perception of individual's 
economic conditions) 
 Satisfaction with democracy and elections 
 Perceptions of corruption 
 Perceptions of political stability 
 Satisfaction with social service delivery (health, 
education, road, water, electricity) 
 Local government performance 
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2.7 Summary of Major Hypotheses 
The study poses three major hypotheses in relation to the theory and research questions as 
follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: Age, sex, and education influence how an individual is inclined to 
assess government performance and consequently his/her overall political trust, but 
are not direct causes of trust in themselves. 
 Hypothesis 2: Social and political identities may strongly influence one's political 
trust, or influence significantly one's judgment of government performance, and 
his/her overall political trust. 
 Hypothesis 3: The more positively the citizens assess the performance of government 
institutions and leaders the more highly they will express political trust. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter surveyed various understanding of the concept of trust from theoretical and 
empirical literature. The study focused on generalized as well as particularized forms of trust, 
and as noted above, the two forms co-exist. If trust is based on identity, particularized trust 
would be higher, whereas if performance evaluation was more powerful, generalized trust 
would be stronger. The chapter strongly argued that social capital theory fails to explain the 
African trust hurdle because the norms and networks of civic engagement are poorly 
developed in African context. On the contrary, identity and institutional performance theories 
informed the analysis of the study. The identity and institutional performance theories largely 
reinforce each others as depicted in the study's conceptual framework, where it was noted that 
causal relationship could be direct or indirect with multiple interaction effect among 
variables. This review limited itself on a comparative analysis of trust findings in African 
settings similar to that of Zanzibar. Therefore, the study makes significant contribution by 
adding new insights on the significance of identity and institutional performance theories of 












The focus of the present chapter is to describe the study's methodology. It begins by 
describing the research design and specific research strategies adopted for the study. It also 
clarifies the analytical focus of the study by pointing out the unit of analysis. Then, the 
research methods employed for data collection are explained in detail as well as showing how 
sampling was done and the sample size. Moreover, the chapter depicts how data analysis and 
interpretation of findings was carried out as well as explaining how the study observed 
considerations for validity, reliability, and research ethics. Finally, the conclusion sums up 
the main points defining the research methodology of the study. 
3.1 Research Design  
Research design are “plans and the procedures for research that span the decisions from broad 
assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis" (Creswell, 2009:3). A good 
research design should allow flexibility, revision, and adaptability at various stages of the 
research process given that consistency and scientific procedures are maintained (see, Layder, 
1998; King, et al., 1994:12). The researcher is the architect of the study and his/her world 
view, preferences, and experiences, together with the nature of the problem, influence the 
choice of research strategy (Creswell, 2009: 3-20).  
 
In this study I used a mixed methods design to examine the significance of identity and 
perceptions of performance in explaining political trust in Zanzibar. More specifically, the 
study employed a 'concurrent triangulation design' (see, Figure 2). In this approach the 
researcher "collects quantitative and qualitative data concurrently and then compares the two 
databases to determine if there is convergence, differences, or some combination" (Creswell, 
2009:213). The mixing usually occurs during the analysis and discussion of findings as it 
enables researcher to compare 'side-by-side' by bringing "quantitative statistical results 
followed by qualitative quotes that support or disconfirm the quantitative results". In this 
study, the available quantitative data from Afrobarometer, was supplemented by focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews, documentary review, and direct observation method. The 
analysis was done and findings compared and presented concurrently to cross validate results, 
confirm or disconfirm findings, or to corroborate conclusions with more evidences. 
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A mixed methods strategy was preferred because it gives the researcher an advantage to 
triangulate qualitative and quantitative data sources, to utilize the advantages of their rich 
methods, and minimize limitations of each. The quantitative approach is more widely used in 
trust studies because it is more rigorous and can process a bulky amount of data and easily 
establish causality and generalizability. The approach also strengthens the claim for 
objectivity as evidences are gathered from a large sample with standard questions. For 
example, one may examine party affiliation documented by respondents in relation to their 
expression of trust to see whether party identification influences trust patterns. The 
quantitative approach though is limited as it does not give in-depth account and clarifications 
of answers from respondents.  
 
The qualitative approach, on the other hand, facilitates in-depth investigation of cases and 
contexts and enables the collection of insights, interpretation, and clarification of information 
from the respondents themselves. It is also a flexible approach that allows follow up 
questions and enables a researcher to obtain detailed and nuanced description of 
phenomenon, experiences, and information required. Using the same example supplied 
above, the qualitative approach allows the researcher to get the respondents voices, insights, 
and possible reasoning regarding the meaning of party labels and its influence on trust level. 
Thus the researcher is able to crosscheck whether other factors have more influence from 
respondents' perspectives. The qualitative approach is commonly criticized for involving 
greater researcher's subjectivity with potential researcher's bias, and for lacking criteria of 
generalizability of its findings to other cases.  
 
In the context of Zanzibar's multi-ethnic society and given the contested interpretations of its 
identity politics, a single approach would have offered a misguiding picture, and thus, 
engaging both approaches has supplemented each other's weaknesses. More specifically, the 
study was designed for a single case of Zanzibar. The justification of using a single case is 
that Zanzibar can be considered as either a critical case or an extreme/unique case (see, Yin, 
2009:47). It is critical case because, as noted earlier, Zanzibar is a multi-ethnic society, a 
perfect case to test an identity theory of trust. It is also an extreme, because it differs in many 
respects from Tanzania Mainland and all East African countries due to the history of 
politicization of identity, divisive politics, and persistent political conflicts (Bakari, 2011). In 
this sense, documenting and analyzing this case has been a valuable contribution to trust 
studies to further test the relevance of identity and performance theories. 
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Figure 2: Concurrent Triangulation Design 
 
 
QUAN               QUAL 
Data Collection         Data Collection 
 
QUAN               QUAL 
Data Analysis        Data Results Compared        Data Analysis 
Source: Creswell, (2009). 
 
3.2 Unit of Analysis 
Unit of analysis is "the most elementary part of the phenomenon to be studied" (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:53). This study focuses on an individual as the main unit of 
analysis. This is because the individual is the basic element from which data is gathered; and 
individual’s perceptions and social attributes become the measure of political trust. Several 
studies have used individuals’ perceptions and their social attributes in measuring political 
trust (see, Christensen and Lægreid, 2003; Mbatudde, 2013). However, aside from an 
individual, one can also use other constructs such as rural-urban location, region, or identity 
constructs as units of analysis to which findings are generalized. Thus, potentially the study 
may be regarded as a "single case (embedded) design" (see Yin, 2009:46). This means that 
the study focuses on a single case, but with multiple units of analysis as findings are also 
generalized to group of people with similar identity. 
 
3.3 Methods of Data Collection, Sampling and Sample Size 
In a mixed method research design, the researcher chooses various methods and tools of data 
collection from both qualitative and quantitative approach. These include among others, 
surveys, questionnaires, observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and 
documentary analysis (see Creswell, 2009). The selection of any of these tools must be 
appropriate for a particular type of data source. For example, secondary data can be collected 
using documentary review, whereas survey is useful for primary data. This study makes use 
of multiple methods of data gathering to improve the richness of information and the validity 
of findings. Yin (2009:114-124) holds that although collecting evidence from multiple 
sources is expensive compared to single sources, it strongly allows for the triangulation of 
   QUAN QUAL 
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data sources as well as methodological triangulation by developing 'converging lines of 
inquiry' and enhancing research validity. The following methods have been employed in 
collecting data from primary and secondary data sources, namely; survey (Afrobarometer 
survey round 6 in Tanzania), in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, documentary 
review, and observation. Next, I elaborate sampling methods, procedures, and sample size for 
the survey, focus group and in-depth interview. Sampling refers to the techniques and 
procedures used in obtaining units of the study, while sample size is the number of elements 
or units selected from the population for the study. 
 
3.3.1 Afrobarometer Survey, Round 6, Tanzania 
Afrobarometer is a non-partisan African-based research network that conducts public opinion 
surveys on trust, governance, democracy, economic conditions, and related topics across 
more than 30 countries in Africa through face-to-face interviews in local languages. In 
Tanzania the latest data available was from the 6th round conducted between 26th August 
and 19th October, 2014. The country's sample was based on the 2012 National Population 
and Housing Census, where a sample size of 2,386 adults of 18 years or older was drawn for 
the whole of Tanzania, with a margin of error of +/-2 at a 95% confidence level. The survey 
used a nationally representative, random, clustered, stratified, multistage area probability 
sampling design. Since this study focus on Zanzibar in particular, I took the data for the five 
(5) regions of Zanzibar from the main dataset. The sample size for Zanzibar was 240. The 
sample characteristics from the survey fulfilled the criteria for this study. 
 
3.3.2 In-depth Interviews 
According to Yin (2009:106), "interviews are one of the most important sources of case study 
information". In the form of 'guided conversation' interview allows fluidity of inquiry. The 
'key informants' may provide critical opinions and insights that may guide the researcher to 
access "corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence" for further inquiry (Yin 2009:107). 
One of the limitations of this method is that it requires a lengthy period of time with the 
possibility of an  interview to be conducted in more than one sitting. Key informants for this 
study involved academicians, civil society activists, and journalists, who have extensive 
knowledge and experience with Zanzibar society and politics. The interview method was 
used to obtain expert opinion, which was useful in clarifying, explaining, and interpreting 
Zanzibaris' political attitudes and patterns of institutional trust. In-depth interview was 
administered to a total of 10 key informants, namely; 6 prominent academicians, 2 veteran 
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journalists, and 2 civil society activists (see Table 2). The researcher used a snowball 
sampling technique in selecting the sample units by starting with his own contacts from 
University of Dar es Salaam, and then got the rest of key informants by asking them to 
recommend other targets. The interview was administered using a prepared interview guide 
to guide the conversation (see Appendix 1), but also the researcher as able to ask follow-up 
question when necessary. 
 









-Professor of political science, University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) 
-Lecturer of Political science and Public Administration, (UDSM) 
1 Female Professor of political science, Mkwawa University College of Education 
1 Male Emeritus history Professor (i.e. retired)  
1 Male Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy, Open University of Tanzania 
1 Male Lecturer in Development Studies, State University of Zanzibar (SUZA) 
1 Male Independent veteran journalist, and media Consultant 
1 Male Former Managing Editor of Zanzibar's 'Cooperation of Government Newspapers' 
1 Male Civil society activist from Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF) 
1 Male Civil society activist, Zanzibar NGO Cluster (ZANGOC), an umbrella organization 
Total = 10  
 
Source: Field work July - Sept 2015 
 
3.3.3 Focus Group Discussion 
Focus group discussion is a form of interview and a method of primary data collection 
involving a group of six to ten participants led by a group moderator (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009:150). According to Bloor, et al., (2001:19-21) in composing a focus group the 
researcher should consider participants' characteristics relevant to the topic to accommodate 
sufficient diversity of opinion for a meaningful discussion. Sample should carefully be 
selected so that the group composition may not inhibit fruitful discussion. Therefore, a certain 
possible level of group homogeneity must be maintained and yet ensure diversity and 
productive discussion. Since this study involved several cross-cutting measurements of 
identity variables such as age, sex, education, race, and political affiliation, it is therefore 
unrealistic to conduct a completely homogeneous group discussion for each identity aspect. 
For example, one and the same person can be categorized as male, youth, Arab, educated, and 
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opposition supporter. It is also an impossible task and unrealistic to conduct so many focus 
group discussion due to time and resource constraints. 
 
The study used stratified purposive sampling to prioritize some cross-cutting considerations 
to ensure diversity of opinion, adhere to possible homogeneity and encourage free expression 
of opinion. One limitation that was imposed by the responsible authority issuing  the research 
permit in Zanzibar was that the study should not use 'special groups' based on specific party 
support. Thus, the researcher was required to select participants with varied party support into 
each group although initially the study intended to have separate discussion with different 
party supporters to avoid conflictual views. Thus the researcher flexibly used the following 
criteria for sampling. The first criterion was developed to capture the geographical 
representation of the two regions
5
 of Unguja and Pemba, where four (4) focus groups were 
conducted in each region. The second is the rural-urban representation due to the glaring 
differences in development between these locations, that is, for each region two groups were 
conducted in urban and two in rural area. The third factor was gender whereby in each sub-
location (rural-urban), female participants formed separate group from male participants. The 
rest two criteria were used to select participants into the groups, where the fourth criterion 
was age. In each group half of respondents were between 18 to 39 years and the other half 
aged 40 years or above. The firth and last criterion was party affiliation, among the four 
youth participants two were opposition affiliated and two were affiliated to the ruling party, 
and the same for old participants. Those individuals' not affiliated to any political party, were 
added to each group when available, but without exceeding 10 participants per group. The 
study conducted a total of 8 focus groups involving 71 participants (see Table 3). Initial 
recruitment of focus group participants were done through a short screening form to 
determine eligibility criteria as for sampling as outlined above. Selected participants were 
then informed about their inclusion in the groups, the venue and time.  
 
In this study, focus group interview was designed to solicit opinions directly from ordinary 
citizens about the topic. Data from this qualitative method provided useful information on 
how people feel about various issues posed through topics for discussion that allowed free 
expression of variety of viewpoints. The researcher acted as a moderator of the discussion, 
and 2 qualified research assistant with Advanced school education were recruited and trained 
                                                 
5
 Here region refers to the two main islands, not the government administrative structure 
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to act as assistant moderators, one in Pemba and another in Unguja. Focus group discussion 
was organized in two stages, first, before the start of each focus group participants were 
asked to fill in a short 'pre-group questionnaire' designed to record participants' demographic 
data, and self-ascribed identity, and assigned identification number, which were useful in the 
analysis of data. Each participant mentioned the assigned identification number before 
contributing to the discussion. Then, the second phase involved guided deliberations on 
topics put forward to them by a moderator (see, topic guide fo focus groups, Appendix 2). 
The discussions were audio-recorded for transcription purpose after consent was sought from 
discussant prior the discussion. 
 
Table 3: Profiles of Focus Groups 
















CHOKOCHO Rural  9 Males 6 - (youth) 
3  - (old) 
3 - CCM 
3 - CUF 
3 - Not affiliated 
KANGAGANI 
 
Rural 9 Females 
 
4 - (youth) 
5 -(old) 
5 - CCM 
4 - CUF 
UTAANI 
 
Urban 8 Males 
 




4 - CCM 
2 - CUF 
1 - CHADEMA 
1 - ACT WAZALENDO 
UWELENI Urban 9 Females 5 - (youth) 
4 -(old) 
3 - CCM 
4 - CUF 









Rural 9 Females 6 - (youth) 
3 -(old) 
4 - CCM 
5 - CUF 
POTOA Rural 8 Males 3 - (youth) 
5 -(old) 
4 - CCM 
4 - CUF 
JANG'OMBE 
 
Urban 10 Females 7 - (youth) 
3 -(old) 
3 - CCM 
3 - CUF 




Urban 9 Males 4 - (youth) 
5 -(old) 
4 - CCM 
4 - CUF 
1 - CHADEMA 
Total 8 Groups  Total= 71   
 
Source: Field data July-September 2015 
 
3.3.4 Direct Observation 
In a case study design that focuses on current issues, the researcher's role in making 
observations of the proceedings around the study setting is very significant. Direct 
observation method is a source of primary data that allows the researcher to observe the 
context, behaviours, conditions, and events relevant to the study. It provides additional 
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information about case characteristics of the topic under study that could otherwise not be 
obtained away from the natural setting (Bloor, et al., 2001:110). This method offers the 
opportunity for researchers to obtain information direct from the case and its surroundings. 
This method was used throughout the field work to seek more information about the study 
context. Also, the method was useful in observing the economic, political and security 
conditions, the actual services and infrastructures during the field work. The research 
observed some of the proposed ways of increasing the reliability of this method such as the 
use of photographic evidences of some physical observable phenomena of interest after 
seeking prior consent in certain situations (Bloor et al., 2001:110-111). 
 
3.3.5 Documentary Review 
Documentary information was another important source of secondary data that was widely 
accessed during the field work. This study sought information from formal studies available 
on the internet, and library. Also, official reports such as national demographic and household 
surveys, and key information from useful websites were consulted. The researcher is aware 
that these sources may report information potentially biased from the authors' viewpoints or 
the intended audiences, and hence information was cross-checked with other sources of 
information for verification.  
 
3.4 Data Analysis  
Data analysis involves "preparing the data for analysis, conducting different analyses..., 
representing the data, and making an interpretation of larger meaning of the data" (Creswell, 
2009:183). Data analysis relates both to the procedures chosen and the theoretical view of the 
research and hence is connected to various stages of the research process to ensure validity 
and reliability of the conclusion (Creswell 2009:218-219). In this research both quantitative 
and qualitative techniques of data analysis were employed. Data from Afrobarometer surveys 
are already processed into an SPSS file; hence statistical measures of Chi-square and 
correlations were utilized to determine relationship between variables and to test the 
significance of variation. Also, data from interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, 
translated, and grouped into thematic categories to simplify the use of content analysis 
technique. Similar procedures were utilized in the analysis of focus group discussions. Data 
were manually allocated with index codes (labels) and placed into thematic categories 
relevant to analytical themes to make them easily manageable for interpretation. Data 
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interpretation was done by examining each hypothesis in relation to thematic categories to 
see whether the responses confirm or refute it. Speech statement from participants were 
quoted and supplied as evidence in support of propositions. 
 
3.5 Validity and Reliability of the Study 
Validity and reliability relate to the overall quality of the study. According to Yin (2009:40), 
four criteria can be used to measure the quality of the study in social science inquiries. These 
are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. These are very 
important considerations especially for a case study design in order to enhance its overall 
credibility. 
 
3.5.1 Validity of the Study 
Validity criteria aim to ensure that the methods, and procedures used validly and accurately 
measured or investigated the topic. Discussed below are three validity measures 
recommended for a research study to take into consideration to enhance its overall 
acceptability. 
3.5.1.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is about developing sufficient operational measures in terms of clarity of 
concepts and objective judgment criteria in making sense out of data (Creswell, 2009:41). 
This serves to reduce researcher's bias although subjective judgment cannot be completely 
overruled in qualitative research. This study has clarified concepts used and cited a number of 
scholars that have applied similar concepts in their studies. Multiple sources of evidence 
outlined above  constitute another strategy that have been used to enhance construct validity 
of the study. The researcher established a chain of evidence linking various aspects of the 
research by following the stipulated procedures of the study. 
3.5.1.2 Internal Validity 
Yin (2009:42-43) argues that internal validity "is mainly a concern for explanatory case 
studies, when an investigator is trying to explain how and why event x led to event y". This 
also relates to a problem of making inferences. Yin further argues that in order to ensure a 
'causal relationship' between independent and dependent variables, a researcher needs to 
consider alternative rival explanations so that the 'third factor' effect does not render the 
claimed relationship spurious. This study adheres to these recommendations by examining 
  38 
 
both identity and institutional performance factors in explaining political trust. The researcher 
also looked for possible explanatory frameworks such as the 'social capital' theory, but could 
not fit in the context. The qualitative approach was thus used to provoke opinions from key 
informants regarding other possible causal factors of institutional trust. 
3.5.1.3 External Validity 
External validity concerns the possibility of generalizing the findings "beyond the immediate 
case study" (Yin, 2009:43). Concerns of generalizability are often raised to criticize 
qualitative case study design, particularly 'a single case'. This study enjoys both the formal 
generalization advantage derived from quantitative approach and the 'analytical 
generalization' of qualitative methods because it used mixed method approach. According to 
Yin (2009:43), formal generalization "relies on statistical generalization" where "a sample is 
intended to generalize to a larger universe", whereas case studies offer 'analytical 
generalization' whereby "an investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to 
some broader theory" not on other cases.  
 
3.5.2 Reliability of the Study 
Reliability is about consistency and repeatability of the research process, that is, if the same 
tests, procedures, and conditions are repeatedly applied by other researchers, the similar 
findings will be derived. Yin (2009: 45) argues that "the goal of reliability is to minimize 
errors and biases in a study" by documenting clearly all the methods and procedures used 
from the initial research process to its conclusion. In this study the author kept records in a 
well organized manner including researchers notes from interviews, observation, and 
documentary analysis and other forms of proof collected from the field to increase reliability. 
Also, the researcher has ensured that proper citation of actual sources consulted are supplied. 
The limitation of these strategies is that the information at the disposal of the researcher may 
not be kept long after the completion of the research project, except few crucial attachments. 
In this final report I have supplied some important attachments including tools of data 
collections, and research clearance letter. 
3.6 Ethical Consideration 
Ethical issues are important consideration for the credibility of the research study in various 
stages. In studies involving human participants, a researcher is supposed to protect and 
"develop trust with them; promote the integrity of the research; guard against misconduct and 
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impropriety that might reflect on their organizations or institutions" (Creswell, 2009:87). This 
research adhered to ethical considerations from the initial intentions of the research, data 
collection, data analysis and interpretation, and finally the same was ensured during writing 
and submission.  
 
The study taken into consideration the initial ethical issues related to the formulation of the 
research problem and its purpose, which is clearly identified in this paper. The study secured 
the legal research clearance for data collection from relevant authority (see Appendix 3). The 
researcher asked for an informed consent from respondents, introduced himself and his 
assistants and the aim of the research properly, and avoided influencing respondents' opinion. 
Also, considerations on data analysis such as following the professional and scientific 
procedures of research analysis and interpretation, as well as issue of concern for scientific 
writing of the final report will be taken into account. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has put forward the methodological procedures of doing research on political 
trust. It used a mixed method approach and in particular a case study design. Data were 
collected using five main tools from both secondary and primary data sources, namely, 
quantitative survey, in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, direct observations and 
documentary analysis. Data analysis plans were proposed and criteria of quality of the study 
were described in line with research ethics. The study has largely tried to supplement the 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses findings on the dependent variable of the study. The main 
objective of this chapter is to examine the status of citizens trust in public institutions. This 
provides a springboard to explore the roles of identity and institutional performance as the 
two major independent variables of the study in the following two chapters. The findings and 
discussions presented here and in the subsequent sections are derived from various sources of 
data and the researcher's personal reflections on the findings. The quantitative data are 
derived from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 in Tanzania, which are then triangulated 
with qualitative evidences in discussing the topics so as to clarify, confirm, disconfirm, or 
corroborate the findings of the survey by providing further evidences. The qualitative data 
include primary data from 8 focus group discussions conducted between July and September 
2015. Also, the analysis is enriched further with findings from ten in-depth interviews 
conducted in the same period, and direct field-observation, as well as documentary review. 
4.1 The State of Institutional Trust in Zanzibar 
As explained in previous chapters, in this study trust was measured in terms of people's 
expressions of confidence levels and feelings of satisfaction with public institutions. These 
perceptions are judgments of how well public institutions met its functional obligations 
towards its citizens and the relationship people have towards them. Higher trust level is 
regarded as a political capital for the smooth functioning of the state institutions, whereas 
lower levels of trust inhibit institutional performance as institutions lack support base for its 
policies and decisions (Jamil and Askvik, 2013:153). The study assumed similar analytical 
framework on the impact of trust and institutional performance. Below I present and discuss 
findings that give an overview of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. 
 
4.1.1 Citizens Confidence in Various Public Institutions 
It is argued that trust is not constant throughout a number of public institutions, and therefore, 
although one can speak of trust in government or public institutions in a general sense, it is 
also important to understand how people judge specific institutions, such as the police, the 
courts of law, and the parliament. In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were presented 
with a list of public institutions and were asked to indicate their trust levels for each. The 
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response categories included 'Not at all', 'Just a little', 'Somewhat', and 'A lot'. For purposes of 
simplification of analysis throughout the study, I grouped the first two responses- 'not at all' 
and 'Just little'- as 'low trust', and the remaining two responses, that is, 'somewhat' and 'a lot', 
as high trust. The results of their ranking is depicted in below. 
 
Figure 3: Trust in Various Public Institutions in Zanzibar 
 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
 
At this level, it suffices to make some general observations of ranking for each institution and 
the trust level it is attributed to before explaining the causes of that score in the subsequent 
sections. Figure 3 above shows that amongst the surveyed institutions relevant to this study, 
trust was highest in the president (67%), followed by the army (58%). The disapproval score 
of trust as 'just a little' or 'not at all' was highest in the opposition political parties (59%) 
followed by the tax department (57%), the National Eelectoral Commision (NEC) and the 
police both at 55 percent, the courts of law (54%), and the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau - PCCB (53%). Data also reveals that some institutions received moderate 
trust scores such as the parliament (50%), the ruling party and local government both at 52 
percent trust level against 48 percent of disapproval score.  
 
4.1.2 Overall Citizens Trust in Public Institutions in Zanzibar 
Having observed trust score in specific institutions, it is imperative to derive an overall 
picture of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. In the Afrobarometer survey round 6 there 
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was no general question included asking people of their overall trust ranking. What I present 
here is a calculated cumulative score of trust across the surveyed institutions presented above. 
This cumulative trust scores offer an overall picture of trust levels and could help explain the 
amount of legitimacy the government or public institutions collectively enjoy from its 
citizens. Table 4 below shows the overall trust level scores for public institutions in Zanzibar. 
 
Table 4: Overall Trust in Public Institutions in Zanzibar 
Response Number of responses % of Responses 
Not at all 50 21 
Just little 72 30 
somewhat 61 25 
A lot 57 24 
N=240 240 100% 
 
If we take the data (Table 4) and apply the 'hight trust vs low trust' cotegorization proposed 
above for easy interpretation of the findings, then the data can be interpreted to indicate that 
51 percent of respondents had low trust compared to 49 percent who showed high. This 
implies that the government and public institutions in general command a relatively moderate 
trust from its citizen. This trust results should merit a concern from the government and 
public institutions in general because it means public institutions and its policies lack support 
from half of the population. 
 
The study investigated further the trust levels depicted above by analysing respondents' 
opinions about the country's direction. In the survey, participants were asked of their opinion 
whether they thought the country was going in a right or wrong direction. Their responses 
were cross-tabulated with the overall institutional trust variable. As shown in Table 5 below, 
the findings revealed that an overwhelming majority (78%) were of the opinion that the 
country was going in a wrong direction. Nevertheless, desite having evaluated the direction 
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Table 5: Relationship Between trust and Perceptions of the Country Direction 
 Going the Right direct Going the wrong direction 
High trust% 73 43 
Low trust% 27 57 
Total% 100 100 
N=239 n=52 n=187 
Question: Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is 
going in the right direction. So let me ask YOU about the overall direction of the country: Would you 
say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction? 
 
The observed difference is statistically significant and visibly shows the need to further 
scrutinize the findings on trust scores to determine the factors that affect citizens' trust in 
Zanzibar.  This is because, the fact that trust in government and public institutions in general 
is half divided as noted above does not concur with the fact that 78 percent of the same 
respondents (187 out of 240) felt the country was going in the wrong direction. One would 
have expected that perceptions of country's direction would relatively correspond to the 
assessment of trust in government. That is, given the overwhelming negative feeling of the 
country direction, one would expect to observe a higher disapproval level. Since that was not 
the case in the findings presented, it implies that the understanding of trust attitudes in 
Zanzibar is a complex phenomenon, there is a need to examine multiple possible factors 
responsible in explaining the observed trust levels, as this study assumed. 
 
Opinions from the well-informed key informants obtained through in-depth interviews also 
reiterate this puzzle. A political scientist from the University of Dar es Salaam claimed that 
'Zanzibar's citizens trust towards their government is dwindling'. Similar conclusions were 
reached by all key informants of in-depth interviews based on their analysis of Zanzibar's 
socio-economic and political context. Their impression, however, does not match with the 
trust perceptions expressed by citizens' themselves in the Afrobarometer survey. Indeed, 
citizens opinions from focus group discussions collected by the researcher roughly confirm 
the Afrobarometer survey findings that trust was relatively moderate among participants, 
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4.2 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I examined the state of trust in public institutions in Zanzibar. Trust levels 
were measured separately for each institution to determine the highest and lowest ranking 
among the listed public institutions. The findings show that trust varied throughout specific 
public institutions, implying that trust in each institution is affected by specific factors 
perceived by individuals. It was important to note such observed differences of trust scores in 
specific institutions so as to explore and link factors affecting such attributed score in the 
subsequent sections. Moreover, the results show that the overall trust level depicts that 
citizens' disapproval and approval perceptions were of relatively equal measure. This signify 
the need to be concerned for public institutions because such is not a healthy state of trust in 
public institutions as it could have an impact on the amount of legitimacy the government is 
afforded in executing is duties. Finally, findings on perceptions of the country's direction 
presented a perplexing results that show the need for further examination of factors affecting 




















  45 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DOES IDENTITIES MATTER FOR POLITICALL TRUST? 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses findings on the influence of identity (one of the two 
major independent variables) on citizens' trust. Having examined the status of institutional 
trust in Zanzibar, I now present and discuss findings on identity variables in an attempt to 
explain the observed patterns of trust in Zanzibar. Again this chapter make use of both 
quantitative data from Afrobarometer Survey, and qualitative data from focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews, field observation, and documentary review. 
5.1 The Place of Identity in Trust Attitudes Among Zanzibaris 
In this study, identity is one set of independent variables, which is further divided into 
demographic attributes (age, sex, education), social identities (location, occupation, ethnicity, 
and region), and common political identities (party association, national identity, and 
historical legacy). In the following sections I examine each of these variables in the light of 
findings from both quantitative and qualitative data sources to determine their effect on 
citizens' political trust. 
 
5.1.1 Demographic Identities 
5.1.1.1 Age 
As shown above, age was categorized into two major groups: the youth which included 
respondents aged 18 to 39 years, and the elderly which comprised participants aged 40 years 
or above. Age was not the main criteria of sample selection in the Afrobarometer Survey 
Round 6, but it appeared that these age groups were relatively well represented in the data. 
The findings in Table 6 below reveal that Trust was moderate at an average of 50 percent 
throughout youth and older population. The observed difference was not statistically 
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Table 6: Relationship Between age and Institutional Trust 
 Age between 18 - 39 years Age 40 years or above 
High trust% 49 50 
Low trust% 51 50 
Total % 100 100 
N=240 n=130 n=110 
 
Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interview disconfirm the above 
findings. In the focus discussions, there were strong opinions among the youth group that the 
youth are less trusting compared to their older counterparts because they are less tied to the 
history and politics of the past. They are also less likely to have strong connections to 
political parties, becuase the majority of them have little interest in politics as their main 
concern is lack of employment and economic progress. The youth are economically 
disadvantaged compared to their old counterparts. On the contrary, the old generation in the 
group were not entirely trustful, but showed hire propensity to be entangled in the past 
memories which influence their trust attitudes. In the groups it was observed that while most 
of youth dettached themselves from identity based descriptions, as will be seen in the next 
sections, they prioritized performance considerations in fordging their trust attitudes. As 
discussant from Kidongo Chekundu makes his point clear about the influence of age on trust, 
he hoeld that "most of us from young ages and some people up to fifty years, we didn't witness 
the revolution or the colonial rule. For most of us we care about a responsible government, 
not our political ideologies". 
 
From the analysis of those very familiar with Zanzibar's politics among scholars, and those 
who work closely with the society in Zanzibar including prominent journalists and civil 
society activists, who were key informants in my in-depth interview, it is clearly that age is 
an influential factor in trust attitudes among Zanzibaris. All of the 10 key informants agreed 
that youth are increasingly becoming dettached from the politics of the past, while the old 
generation are prone to be influenced to the politics of race, and party attachments. A key 
informant, a prominent history scholar, noted this in his discussion, he observed, "it seems the 
young people are coming out now and say they are tired of the history, tired of this politics 
and they are beginning now to behave differently. The old generation is much more inclined 
to identity and history attitudes. The old generation, people of more than 50 years, and even 
among the politicians, they are very worried. And many of the youth don’t go to political 
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party meetings." Another key informant suggested that senior citizens and those who directly 
benefit from the government even among the youth are more likely to express higher  trust. 
 
It suffice to conclude therefore that age has influence on trust attitudes among Zanzibaris 
despite the observed statistical findings presented above. Thus the study hypothesis that 
youth are more likely to express less trust than the older popupation is affirmed. As I move 
on to examine other variables in subsequest sections such as ethnicity, historical legacy, and 
party affiliation, the influence of age would be more clarified by words from participants own 
words as young people vehemently reject association to identity while some section of the old 
population would identify themselves with it, hence affecting the trust attitudes differently. 
 
5.1.1.2 Gender 
Men and women are said to hold different trust attitudes towards public institutions. This 
study also hypothezed that gender identity shapes individual's trust preceptions. The survey 
used gender as one of its sampling criteria, hence male and female respondents were equally 
represented (120 each). The findings shown in Figure 4 below alsoFigure 4: Relationship 
Between Gender and Institutional Trust comfirm that gender was positively related to 
individual's trust level and the observed difference was statistically significant. It was found 
that women showed more trust (57%) compared to men (43%). 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship Between Gender and Institutional Trust 
 
Findings from focus group discussions support the above findings. However, women raised 
some dissenting issues of gender concerns in relation to government performances in areas of 
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security and employment, though for some, their political judgments remained indeferent. 
Some of the issues affecting women that were widely discussed in focus groups included 
sexual bribery in employment sectors, sexual abuse in the community such as rape where 
those who commit crimes go unpunished, poverty and low income especially for widows, and 
poor social services such as shortage of clean water. Nertheless, some women still were not 
influenced by their evaluation. A female discussant from Kibeni was clearly very disturbed 
by the rampant corruption in the country, but when asked who is responsible for it, she 
replied, "no one! It just destroys us completely. Who should we blame? We don't know who 
can fight it. All we need is to thank God! That's it". It can be argued as observed in the 
literatre review that women's limited political participation, and due to their gender roles in 
Zanzibar society, means that they likely to have limited political knowledge and limited 
access to political information. Thus, they are less likely to be influenced by their 
disatisfactions of policy issues, and some may fail to link their sufferings with issues of 
governance and administration. In contrast, their male counterpart are more exposed to 
political processess as this could highly increase their access to political information. Men are 
also bread winners for their families, hence the as they face extreme economic hardships they 
become likely to be disatisfied with the government. 
 
5.1.1.3 Education 
Contrary to the hypothesis of the study, the findings show that education has no relationship 
to individual's trust in public institutions as shown in Table 7 below. The 'less educated' 
category consisted of those with informal education and all levels of formal education below 
secondary school (including those who did not complete secondary school), while the 'highly 
educated' category comprised those who completed secondary school, post secondary school, 
and higher levels of education. The findings show that although there is a bit of variations in 
terms of expression of trust between the less educated and highly educated people, where by 
the less educated expressed a little higher trust (51%) compared to trust level among highly 
educated group (45%). The difference is however statistically not significant. This could 
probably be attributed to the nature of the sample, high literacy rate in Zanzibar, and high 
political awareness of citizens stimulated by the small size nature of the polity and its 
political culture, as explained below. 
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Table 7: Relationship Between Education and Institutional Trust 
 Highly educated Less educated 
High trust% 45 51 
Low trust% 55 49 
Total % 100 100 
N=240 n=69 n=171 
 
To start with, education was not a crucial sample criteria for the Afrobarometer survey and 
this could have influenced the results, where the variable was not meaningfully represented. 
Coincidentally, the 'less educated group appeared to be overrepresented, where among the 
240 respondents interviewed, 171 (71%) could be categorised as 'less educated' based on the 
study's categorization, whereas only 69 (29%) were highly educated.  
 
Another explanation could be that the impact of individuals' education level in understanding 
common political issues is less influential due to the high literacy rate in Zanzibar society. 
According Zanzibar Household Budget Survey report 2014/15, among adult population in 
Zanzibar (15 years and above), literacy rate was 84 percent (where by rural area is 76 and 
urban 92), while percentage of adults with no education was 16, majority of whom (23%) 
were in rural locations compared to (8%) urban areas (URT, 2016a). The literacy
6
 rate in 
Zanzibar is considerably high compared to Mainland Tanzania. Therefore, high literacy rate 
in Zanzibar could be an important factor in explaining why level of education was not 
observed to have a significant impact on trust attitudes, because large percent of the 
population have the basic literacy skills required to access political information. 
 
Moreover, field data from qualitative focus group discussion do not differ much from the 
findings presented above, although opinions from indepth interviews seem to suggest 
education as an important factor in Zanzibaris' trust attitudes. In the focus group discussions 
participants of different education levels showed high awareness in their assessment of 
several issues at an indivudual level and the country at large. Non of the discussants 
considered level of education as necessary in relation to trust attitudes. In their opinions, 
every citizen of Zanzibar was very much aware of the politics and the differences in 
                                                 
6
 Note: Zanzibar Household Budget Survey 2014/15 used a new test of asking individuals to read from a card as 
a literacy test.  
  50 
 
expression of trust could be attributed to other factors of identity and performance rather than 
education.  
Furthermore, almost all key informants observed that Zanzibar being a small polity with a 
small population size, communication of political information spread quickly and reached 
almost every corner in a short period of time. A key informant from University of Dar es 
Salaam observed that Zanzibar's small size and intensity of political competition were two 
key factors for high political awareness, he noted, "since the early days of what we call "the 
era of politics” that refers to the period during the struggle for independence. Given its small 
size, it was very easy to disseminate information. So even during the early days of the 
struggle for independence the level of political awareness in Zanzibar was very high. 
Whether you live in urban or rural areas you could be easily reached by those who were 
propagating politics those days. And the intensity of competition then, it was a deeply 
divided society in terms of politics, it has continued to be divided so politically to date, not 
socially.  
 
In addition to that, another key informant, a prominent journalist, noted that political activism 
was at the peak in Zanzibar society because of strong feelings of Zanzibari nationalism that 
propelled high level of political participation, and in particular the 'viabaraza' tradition has 
become a source of political awareness for a wider population. He noted, "in Zanzibar's 
culture there's something we call 'gossip centers', or vibaraza
7
 or vijiwe. Actually these are 
like learning centers where people would have coffee and visheti and dates, but at the same 
time they talk of issues such as Afghanistan, issues of Asia, African continent, and football. 
So through these conversations people learn a lot, and therefore, their political awareness  
becomes very high through these vibaraza.".  
 
Finally, the issue of political competition was widely elaborated by key informants. They 
argued that high political awareness was influenced by issues such as the suppression of 
political space and negative impacts of post revolutionary policies and practices and during 
one party rule. These, together with the 'Union question' make Zanzibaris politically active in 
terms of complaints, defending their identity, and  a sense of the need for change of political 
                                                 
7
 Vibaraza or vijiwe is a swahili slang meaning meating places for informal/casual talks. The topics in those 
gatherings could be about society, politics, or sports, and involve different age groups. Vibaraza are very 
common in Zanzibar organized especially during evenings. 
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system. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the impact of individual's level of education 
on their trust attitudes is not so much pronounced.  
 
5.1.2 Social Group Identinties 
5.1.2.1 Ethnicity and Race 
Zanzibar is a heterogeneous racial community representing varieties of ethnic groups from 
Mainland Tanzania and some peculiar local ethnic categories. As mentioned earlier, the study 
regrouped the ethnic categories into three politically significant ethnic groups namely, the 
Africans, the Shirazis, and the Arabs. It is important to note that in the Afrobarometer survey, 
ethnic identity was not a criteria in sample selection. However, placed into the above-
mentioned categories the sample from the survey depicted meaningful representation of 
ethnic identity, where among 240 respondents, 40 identified themselves as Africans, 89 were 
Shirazis, 10 were Arabs, 2 from other ethinic groups, and 99 described themselves by 
national identity rather than their ethnic attachments. 
 
Table 8: Relationship Between Ethnicity and Institutional Trust 
 Africans Shirazi Arabs Others National Identity 
High trust% 60 50 36 100 45 
Low trust% 40 50 64 .0 5 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 
N=240 n=40 n=89 n=10 n=2 n=99 
 
The findings above (Table 8) reveal that 60 percent of the Africans showed high trust, 
whereas Shirazis depicted moderate trust (50%), while Arabs had the lowest trust level 
(36%). It is interesting to note that about 41 percent (99) of respondents perefere national 
identification than their ethnici attachments. However, overall, the observed difference is 
statistically not significant, and thus there is no relationship between ethnicity of respondents 
and their trust level. 
 
The above findings are confirmed by qualitative evidences from focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews. There was a vehement rejection of ethnicity as a factor for explaining 
trust in government. This doesn't mean that ethnic or racial identity was absent, but rather it 
was not considered a significant factor in explaining citizens' political attitudes. That was the 
dominant view from focus groups regardless of participants' age group, gender, or party 
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affiliation, while few (less than five percent) still thought ethnicity was influential. The first 
thing, discussants took time to clarify was that despite the political propagation about racial 
conflict in Zanzibar, the social realities is one of harmonious cooperation, understanding and 
peaceful co-existence among various ethnic or racial categories. One discussant from Utaani 
stressed on the role of islamic religion in ensuring that recognition of identities served 
identification purpose only, he stated, "we know each other by tribes, ethnic groups, or origin 
for purpose of identification only. We have buried all those ethnic hatred in the distant past. 
You don't hesitate to mention your tribe, but only for purpose of knowing each other and our 
historical roots. These are the teachings of our religion and we live by them." Another 
participant from Chokocho explained the misconception others have about Zanzibar society 
being ethnically conflictual, he critically observed... 
"you may hear a lot of people say nonsense about Zanzibaris being ethnically or regionally hostile and 
divided. Socially there is no such a thing, we are very united and we live in peace and cooperation. Our 
marriages have crossed the ethnic borders, a Pemban married to a Tanganyikan, a Makunduchi in marriage 
with a Pemban. Myself, a Pemban, I got my daughter married to a Makunduchi and some people say we are 
hostile. No! we don't have segregation of humans against other humans based on our social differences". 
 
Another disussant in the same group was in agreement, 
"I agree, we have all sorts of ethnic people in our areas. We have Makonde, Haya, Nyakyusa, and Yao from 
Mainland. We also have Indians, Arabs, Shirazis and Hadimu. Intermarriage have immersed our 
differences. Unguja and Pemba does not symbolise human differences and we are not hostile for this. We are 
all Zanzibaris regardless".  
 
Asked of their opinion whether peoples' identification with ethnicity or race is influencing 
their trust perceptions of the government, large majority of discussants disqualified ethnicity 
in their political attitudes. A discussant from Utaani clarified what he thought was important 
consideration in relation to trust in government, he explained, "in forming my opinion on trust 
I look at performance of the government. Even if my party takes over the government, I will 
judge it based on performance. Ethnicity has no place in this for us as well". Another one 
added, "I agree, even if we are governed by a foreign white man, an Arab, or a Makonde, 
what matters is performance". 
 
Moreover, through direct observation method I found that Zanzibaris were not sensitive with 
their ethnic attachments. In most cases when local Zanzibaris were asked for purposes of 
inclusion in the focus group discussion, most respondents were not able to figure out which 
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ethnic group they belong from many tittles they hear about their own descriptions. Most of 
them ended describing themselves with national identity as Zanzibaris. There were even 
those who mentioned religion as their ethnic description because they did not understand the 
meaning of such discriptions of their identity. And for those who able to mention a specific 
ethnic group, they wondered about two or more options they could use describe themelves, 
for example, people of Pemba had to choose between Shirazi, Hadimu, or Swahili. The 
question on ethnicity made most people laugh before they attemp to describe themselves, and 
even ask the interviewer which one was suitable from many tittles they hear are talked about. 
However, the Arabs and the Africans (Mainland origin) were likely to express their ethnic 
description easily. 
 
Furthermore, 9 out of 10 key informants essentially echoed the view that the ethnic relations 
in Zanzibar are harmoneous, except when politics are injected into it. I wanted to know their 
opinions whether they see racial relations in Zanzibar as harmoneous, suspicious, or 
conflictual. Five of the key informants described the racial relations as harmoneous, four 
others thought they were suspicious, and only one informant considered them as conflictual. 
Nervertheless, those who considered racial relations as suspicious, reasoned that they do so 
when politics comes into play. The respondent who considered social relations as conflictual 
cited after election stalemate in Zanzibar as an evidence, she argued, "I think it is still 
conflictual. The ongoing stalemate regarding the refuted 2015 elections is one indicator of 
the conflictual relations that exist. I think this is a reflection of deep-underlying sentiments 
based on racial and ethnic relations in Zanzibar society"
8
.   
 
However, there is no valid evidence to support the argument that racial relations in Zanzibar 
are conflictual, because in every sense the political stand-off in Zanzibar after elections can 
not be summed up as racial or ethnic clashes. Instead, it can be granted that racial relations 
are harmoneous at societal level, but due to history the racial sentiments 'are used 
deliberately when they suit politics of the day to drum political support' and thus become 
suspicious, as one informant from University of Dar es Salaam observed. Another key 
informant, a veteran journalist, put it this way, "if you leave aside politics, social relations of 
people of Zanzibar have been extremely good. But politics especially this multiparty politics 
is affecting it. They are made to look suspicious. Now politicians bring in ethnicity, religion, 
                                                 
8
 This interview was conducted later (after the October 2015 election) to supplement the study, while most 
others were done between July and September, 2015. 
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race and considerations of peoples' origins. But Zanibar is cosmopolitan, it used to be 
referred as 'the land of religious tolerance'." One of the prevailing feelings of suspicion 
among ethnic groups particularly those of Tanzania Mainland origin versus the the native 
Shirazi, is "the question of who is more Zanzibari than the other", noted a key informant from 
the State University of Zanzibar. In Zanzibar, the racial politics is propagated in broad day 
light by the ruling party and the government in power (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Racial Poster Displayed by Ruling-party-supporters at the National 
Revolutionary Day Celebrations, January 12, 2016 
 
Source: Zanzibar Yetu (2016) 
Note: Captioned subject in swahili "Machotara HIZBU Zanibar ni nchi ya Waafrika", can be traslated  as       
          "Mixed race HIZBU
9
 Zanzibar is a country of blacks (Africans)" 
 
The question for further analysis is, has politicization of race in Zanzibar been able to 
antagonize people on ethnic lines and influence their political support to that effect? To 
examine this, I refer to opinions from a key informant from University of Dar es Salaam who 
                                                 
9
 HIZBU is a name of the party during pre-revolution politics, an Arabic word by origin which means 'party' . 
The full name of the party was 'HIZBU ALWATANI which meant 'the nationalist party'. It is hereby used to 
describe Arab attachments claimed to be dominating the support of the HIZBU party. The message is thus 
intended to those mixed race people of Arab origin in Zanzibar. 
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makes this claim about politicization of race in Zanzibar, he holds, "those are more or less 
like stereotypes, ... and otherwise it's like self-deception that these people are bad, but the 
way you relate to them it doesn't depict that these people are bad. ...[only] when it comes to 
public employment, or giving some rights to people, then there is some kind of 
discrimination. This implies that the politicization of race did not attain the intended effect. 
Another key informant explained that such strategies are not as effective anymore, he noted, 
"more recently because of the deteriorated economic conditions 50 years after the revolution, 
some of the younger people of all races begin to realize that the problem is not the race, the 
problem is the government and the economy, and therefore there has been a lot of coming 
together of people on common interest… But you will find that even now the political and 
racial arguments are constantly used, not always to the same effect as it would have had 50 
years ago." 
 
Therefore, from the above findings it is clear that citizens perceptions of trust is not strongly 
influenced by their ethnic attachments. Both, the survey findings and qualitative data from 
focus groups and in-depth interviews have confirmed this. Hence, the study did not find any 
strong evidence to show that ethnicity matters for trust, hence the hypothesis of the study is 
rejected.  
5.1.2.2 Rural-Urban Location 
The findings reveal a positive relationship between respondent’s location and trust level, 
where trust was lower among urban residents (42%) compared to their rural counterparts 
(57%), as seen in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Relationship Between Rural-Urban Location and Citizens' Trust Attitudes 
 
Exposure to news media was found to be closely affecting the rural-urban gap. When 
respondents were asked how often they get news from the following sources, the findings 
revealed that radio was the most accessible media both in rural and urban settings, whereby 
about 82% had access to radio everyday, few times a week, or a few times a month in rural 
areas, while the percentage was slightly higher in urban areas (87%). Television was the 
second most accessible source of news, but the findings show a significant discripancy of 
access, where in rural areas only 49% had access compared to 81% among urban population. 
It should be noted that in Zanzibar the only television channel is government owned because 
of a limited media freedom, while private radio stations have started to broadcast albeit with 
severe government interference. Further, the findings reveal a big gap of access to 
information through other media, where by majority in rural settings (68%) never had access 
to newspapers or accessed it less than once a month, in contrast to urban respondents (45%). 
Indeed, access to internet is much limited in both locations, but much more in rural areas 
(94%) than in urban settings (79%), while about 98% of the rural population did not have 
access to social media, compared to 80% who did not have access to social media among 
urban residents. In brief the findings shows the rural dwellers are more constricted in the 
access to news throughout all sources of media though in some others both areas have 
extremely limited access, while urban residence are the more exposed to information. 
 
Indeed, other factors such as big gap in terms of income poverty contribute to their incapacity 
to purchase or access media sources, which seem to be laxurious needs for their livelihood, 
while high illeteracy rate in rural areas also hinder their access to information. Income 
poverty and illeteracy rate are reported to be higher and worse in rural areas compared to 
urban areas as shown in the Zanzibar Household Budget Survey 2014/15 (URT, 2016a). 
Among the 30.4% of Zanzibar population who can not afford their basic needs, majority are 
from rural areas (40.2%) compared to urban settings (17.9%), while extreme poverty defined 
as inability to meet daily needs for food, the most affected area is rural (15.7%) in contrast to 
urban areas (4.5%). This means the large rural population are unable to be informed through 
media sources. Meanwhile, the difference in illiteracy is higher in rural (23.9) compared to 
urban areas (7.7%) from a total population of 16.3% illeterate people who could not even 
read. The two factors, namely, extreme poverty and high illeteracy rate exacerbate the 
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information gap which was found to be the key factor in rural urban diiferences in trust 
attitudes.  
 
In summary, on this aspect, there was no qualitative data to supplement the analysis, and thus 
I rely on the above findings to make the conclusion. As shown above, the findings support the 
sutdy's hypothesis that rural-urban-location is positively associated with differences in trust 
attitudes. The findings reveal that rural citizens are more likely to express higher trust in 
public institutions compared to their urban counterparts. Indeed, information gap in terms of 
access to news media between rural and urban location was found to be the key factor for the 
observed trust attitudes despite rural areas having lowest progress in various sectors. Further, 
high percentage of income powerty and high illiteracy rate handicaped rural dwellers 
critically in the access to information. 
 
5.1.2.3 Region 
The literature revealed that in Zanzibar, regions are very much said to form part of people's 
identity. This study also assumed a positive relationship between regional identity and trust 
attitudes based on general assumption that people from Pemba, where the opposition party 
has an overwhelming support, would likely express lower trust levels compared to those from 
Unguja, where the rulling party draws its major support. Other factors considered as 
influencing the scenario is the apparent differences in social and economic development 
between the two islands where Pemba is by far disadvantaged compared to Unguja. However, 
the survey findings reveal an opposite direction of trust attitudes against the assumptions of 
this study. The findings show no relationship between regional identity and institutional trust 
levels. Nevertheless, though statistically not significant, the findings possed a puzzling 
scenario in this case, whereby Pembans showed much support of the government (53%) 
compared to Ungujans (48%) as seen in Figure 7 below. This is in every sense contrary to the 
exitsitng socio-economic and political realities between the two regions.  
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Figure 7: Relationship Between Region and Institutional Trust 
A deeper analysis from qualitative data sources disconfirm the survey findings and suggest 
that regional identity has significant influence in Zanzibaris political attitudes. Before I 
present the qualitative evidences, first I examine some intricate aspects of the statistical data 
from the Afrobarometer survey presented above and from secondary sources. To start with, 
this puzzle could be explained by the nature of the sample having interactive effect with 
another variable, namely; the (rural-urbal) location of respondents. As shown in previous 
findings, rural-urban location of respondent has positive effect on trust attitudes, where rural 
dwellers have shown higher trust levels compared to urban residents. This attribute is likely 
to have influenced the twist of results contrary to the hypothesis of this study. Admittedly, 
rural and urban locations were equally represented in the sample, by drawing 120 respondents 
from each locations. However, Pemba being categorized as predominantly rural, and about 75 
percent of Pemba's respondents were drawn from rural settings. This is in sharp contrast with 
Unguja whereby about 59 percent of respondents were drawn from urban areas. As seen in 
Table 9 below among 120 urban respondents 87% were from Unguja and only 13% were 
from Pemba. Granted that this might reflect the countours of the sample population in terms 
of sample selection considerations, I however think that in this case it has also significantly 
affected and skewed the findings. 
 
Table 9: Distribution of Respondents between Regions and Rural-Urban locations 
 Urban Rural 
Unguja% 87 60 
Pemba% 13 40 
Toal% 100 100 
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N=240 n=176 n=64 
Source: Derived from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 6 Tanzania dataset (Zanzibar regions) 
 
Furthermore, an importnant clarification needs to be made regarding the influence of regional 
identity to trust attitudes. That is, the regional identity was observed to have strong 
interractive effect with performance considerations, hence supporting the conceptual 
framework used for analysis in this study. By that I mean that participants from focus groups 
discussions and in-depth interviews vehemently rejected regionalism as a 'stand alone' 
identity of respective people. Instead, their opinions suggest that regional identity, which is so 
pronounced in Zanzibar, was created, shaped, perpetuated, and reinforced by institutional 
performance factors. This argument could be supported by glaring differences of economic 
conditions, and political representations in the country's governance between the people of 
the two main regions. For instance, if official statistics is worth to go by, the Zanzibar 
Household Budget Survey 2014/15 report a striking disparity of economic conditions 
between the two regions, cut in half. Consider for example, the two crucial measures of 
income poverty, that is, the basic needs poverty and the food poverty
10
. Among the two 
regions, Pemba is the most affected economically and by far, where the percentages of basic 
needs poverty ranges from 47.7% to 69.0% compared to Unguja's 14.6% to 26.3% (Figure 8). 
This means using a basic needs poverty line scale, Pemba is poorer by 21.4% to 42.7% 
compared to Unguja. Indeed, by percentages of food poverty, also referred to as extreme 
poverty, a large population of Pemba (15.7% to 32.6%) languishes into extreme povery in 
comparison to Unguja (3.5% to 7.2%). This means Pembans are extremely poorer by 8.5% to 
24.5% (Figure 9). It is worth presenting the figures in pictorial format below. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of Basic Needs Poor Population by Dstrict, HBS, 2014/15 
                                                 
10
 The Zanzibar HBS 2014/15 report describe basic needs poverty (also referred to as poverty) as the absolute 
minimum resources (amount of income) required to satisfy needs interms of consumption of goods. The food 
poverty (referred to as extreme poverty) is defined as where the household total spending on all items is less 
than they need to spend to meet their needs for food (see URT, 2016b).  
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Source: URT, (2016b) 
 
In the focus group discussion it was widely observed that there were major concerns of 
economic conditions and the feeling the the government discriminated Pemba in its economic 
policies and political governance. For example, a discussant from Utaani noted, "economic 
conditions are bad for everyone, but most specifically in Pemba. Our government does not 
encourage industrial and company investment in Pemba. These things need water supply, 
electricity, roads, and manpower, and we have all that, but all investments are made in 
Unguja, why aren't they considering us?" 
 
Figure 9: Percentage of Food (extreme) Poor Population by District, HBS, 2014/15 
 
Source: URT, (2016b) 
 
Thus, regionalism is an indisputable fact in Zanzibar's politics, but it is not based on feelings 
of social divisions and conflicts, rather it is a sort of identity formed out of common 
  61 
 
experiences and a sense of discrimination. A key informant, a prominent political scientist 
from University of Dar es Salaam, offers some clarification on this, he argued, 
For the regional divide of course there are historical factors and economic factors, and above all the most 
important are political factors. For the historical factors, is that even during the colonial time there was a 
difference, Pemba for example was treated like purely a rural area for production of cloves while Unguja 
was the center of government and colonial administration. So, most important services were available in 
Unguja, not even throughout Zanzibar, but just  Zanzibar town. The other areas in Zanzibar, the north and 
south, were as poor as those in Pemba or may be even some areas in Pemba were better off than some of the 
areas in Unguja. At that time over 70% of the national wealth was being produced in Pemba, but those who 
benefited from it were based Unguja. That has continued even after independence, Unguja has been the 
center of everything and Pemba has been a periphery. So, that in itself created a sense of marginalization. 
Moreover, if you look at the composition of the government of 1963 it was at least reflecting the fair 
regional representation, but the post-revolutionary government has always displayed that marginalization of 
Pemba.  
He continued; 
"But it's not a matter of identity [per se], it's just a matter of mobilization and political experience. It doesn't 
suggest any identity that  I am supporting this party because I am from Pemba, it's not a question of identity 
per se. That's why if you analyze the current political trend there is also a very strong support for the 
opposition particularly if you are talking of let's say Urban West region and Northern region [in Unguja], 
the support for the opposition has grown very strong. For example, people of North Zanzibar have been for 
a long time very strong supporters of the opposition not because of identity [by and of itself], but it's because 
of political experience, the kind of persecution they have undergone, and the kind of socialization of course. 
When you experience a particular event or phenomenon over a period of time it create a sort of identity. It 
may not be a strong identity, but for example, the way people from Pemba were persecuted after the 
revolution, that in a way created a sort of identity among people in Pemba based on a sense of 
discrimination. Thus, a sense of discrimination creates a sense of identity, it may not be strong as it is 
depicted, but we cannot ignore completely."  
 
The point was more elaborated by participants in focus group discussions, accepting the 
feeling of regional identity and its influence, but giving performance reasons for its existence. 
For example, a discussant from Potoa clarified that the regional identity is not really a social 
division that affect social cooperation, but rather a politicized phenomenon used by 
politicians for their own interests, he holds, "I think this regionalism is exaggerated. 
Politicians try to antagonize people for their own political interests. Political posters are 
being displayed and hatred speeches are preached to make people believe that it's real. But, 
it has no place in our society and no one truly feels that way about a Pemban or an Unguja 
fellow citizen". Another discussant from Kangagani admitted regional identity is real, but 
explained the reason behind it from her own personal experience as a teacher, she observed 
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critically, "let's speak the truth! The real reason for regional divide (Pemban and Ungujan 
identity) is discrimination by the government. We in Pemba are left behind in everything. We 
are told because we did not participate in the revolution. I will give you an example, for us 
teachers in Zanzibar we have BAMIZA (Baraza la Mitihani Zanzibar
11
). Look at its 
composition, all sixteen or eighteen members are from Unguja. Another thing, when there is 
selection for teachers to go for marking national exams almost all of them come from 
Unguja. They makes us feel miserable and discriminated against. Hence, the Pemban 
identity becomes stronger among ourselves". 
 
Indeed, some arguments may sound rediculous, but it might be useful present the so as to 
clarify that the regional identity in Zanzibar is real and its people are identified using all sorts 
of common aspects of identity including linguistics idiosyncrasies, as this discussant from 
Jang'ombe potrays it when talking about descrimination in employment, she observed, "in 
employment when they want to know whether you are from Pemba, they test your 
pronounciation with a word 'Mkate' [bread], if you pronounce it 'Nkate' then they know you 
are from Pemba. You wont get that post". 
 
Therefore, from the above analysis, I submit that regional identity influences trust attitudes in 
Zanzibar, whereby among the two main regions (islands) of Zanzibar, people from Pemba are 





The data reveals out of 220 respondents who had some form of employment, majority (167) 
were self-employed, followed by government sector employee (34), private sector (14),  and 
NGOs (5). When occupation was cross-tabulated with trust level, the findings revealed a 
positive relationship as seen in Figure 10 below. Trust was highest among those employed by 
the government (74%), and among those unemployed which are herein marked as not 
applicatble (60%), while disapproval score was highest among those working in NGO's 
(80%), followed by those employed in private sectors (57%), and self employed (55%). The 
observed difference was statistically significant, and hence, supporting the study's hypothesis 
that in Zanzibar, people employed in government institutions are more likely to show high 
                                                 
11
 Zanzibar Examination Council 
12
 Note: Unguja island is sometimes referred to as 'Zanzibar' in some official circles, but legally Zanzibar refers 
to both Unguja and Pemba and the surrounding archipelago under its jurisdiction.  
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trust in the government compared to those working in non-governmental organizations, 
pivate sector, and those that are self-employed. 
 
 
Figure 10: Relationship between Occupation and Institutional trust 
Opinions from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interviews corroborate the 
above quantitative findings. Employment in government sectors was widely percieved to be 
descriminatory based on party affiliation and regionalism, where opposition supporters and 
people from Pemba claimed to be left out. That means high percent of those working in the 
government are sympathetic with the government and likely to evaluate the government 
positively and to trust it. A discussant from Utaani lamented about recruitment practices 
based on partylines, he noted, "to tell you the truth, this government employs by looking at 
your political affiliation even for these important posts of medical doctors, someone has to be 
a staunch supporter of the ruling party. Even if you are less educated you will be employed as 
a doctor! They sacked so many competent doctors for political reasons and we all know 
that."  
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by participants mentioning the feeling that certain sections of 
the society benefit more by filling most of government employment posts, hence they are the 
loyal source of government support. A discussant from Chokocho observed,  "certain 
sections of this society enjoy more benefits from the government not because of their 
ethnicity, but for political reasons. For example, people from Makunduchi fill most of 
employment posts from the government. Other sections are discriminated against also 
because of political reasons." (quoted in full elsewhere in this study). Indeed, several key 
informants from in-depth interviews concurred that politicization of public service and state 
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apparatuses in terms on party lines is very high in Zanzibar. Assessing the GNU in particular, 
a key repondent from University of Dar es Salaam noted, "the government has been exclusive 
in favour of CCM supporters and Unguja at the expense of CUF supporters and Pemba. 
GNU is inclusive at the top (political leaders), but remains exclusive at the middle and 
bottom ranks of governance structure." Others who are employed, but not supporters of the 
ruling party have to 'keep their mouth shut' and express sympathy to the government for their 
own survival. 
 
5.1.3 Common Political Identities 
5.1.3.1 Political Party Affiliation 
Party rivavlries is is very much said to be at the heart of Zanzibar politics. The main 
assumption of the study was that party association positively affects institutional trust, and 
that supporters of opposition parties would likely express less trust to the government unlike 
those who are affiliated with the rulling party. The data shows that 113 respondents described 
themselves as feeling close to the rulling party (CCM), 81 close to the main opposition party 
(CUF), and 6 close to other opposition parties, while 40 respondents did not feel close to any 
political party. When their descriptions of party association was correlated to their 
institutional trust, the findings as seen Table 10 below shows a positive relationship and 
hence affirms the hypothesis of the study. On the one hand, trust was observed to be higher 
among rulling party supporters (65%), compared to those who felt close to opposition 
political parties (33%). Interestingly, those not affiliated to any political party (referred to as 
'not applicable') showed higher disapproval level (60%). 
 
Table 10: Relationship Between Party Affiliation and Institutional Trust 
 Ruling party Opposition parties Not applicable 
High trust% 65 33 40 
Low trust% 36 67 60 
Total % 100 100 100 
N=240 n=113 n=87 n=40 
Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that? 
 
When interrogated further about if presidential elections would have been held the next day 
which party’s candidate would they vote for, respondents remained loyal to their parties' 
allegiance. About 109 out of 113 CCM affilated respondents continued their faith in their 
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party, only 3 of them suggested they would vote for opposition parties, and 1 would not vote. 
Also, among  87 of those feeling close to opposition parties, only 2 said they would vote for 
CCM, while 85 of them maintained their loyalty to the opposition parties. This is an 
interesting observation regarding the strength of party support, which confirms further the 
above findings by displaying continued faith in their respective parties regardless of other 
other factors. 
 
Findings from qualitative data sources such as focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews were extensively elaborate on this topic, and strongly supported the quantitative 
findings presented above. In the focus group discussions I wanted to know participants view 
of their perceptions about several issues connected to party support, such as the strength of 
political party support in Zanzibar, relationship between race and party attachments, 
relationship between party followers, and the influence of partisanship on citizens' trust 
attitudes in government institutions. There was high awareness among participants that party 
attachments were very strong than all types of identity. This was made clear by a respondent 
from Utaani group who started refuting the role of ethnicity in trust attitudes among people in 
Zanzibar, he ended his clarification on this note, "but, as for party affiliations that is a 
serious business in our communities. An opposition supporter will not change even if 
employed by the government. 'a co-wife is never happy about sharing a husband". Generally, 
expression of strong party connection was made openly among supporters of the ruling party, 
while discussants affiliated with opposition parties claimed to be driven more by performance 
considerations, though also acknowledging that strong party attachments exist. An old 
discussant affiliated with the rulling party from Kidongo Chekundu said he has no shame to 
his party's support, he claimed, "to this political support I always say, 'whatever the heart 
cherish is its medicine'. Whatever you do to an individual he will not change. I, Kijogoo, love 
CCM, whatever you do to me I won't change, even if you kill me. I will love CCM until death 
do us apart". 
 
About their perceptions of political parties and relationships between its followers, 
discussants potrayed that party rivalries was at a conflictual stage where descrimination, 
social exclusion, violence, and even death have been the consequences in some cases. On the 
one hand, supporters and sympathizers of the opposition parties claimed that opposition 
parties were established for good democratic intentions to widen citizens' choice, but there 
were misconceptions about their roles. They argued that the opposition supporters are 
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segregated and descriminated against most because the ruling party construe them as trouble 
makers, which they say, is not true. On the other hand, some of the rulling party's supporters 
held negative opinions about the opposition parties. This was demonstrated by an old CCM 
affiliated discussant from Kidongo Chekundu who was explaining to the group his opinions 
of the origin of opposition parties, he claimed, "one has to understand these opposition 
parties. They were not established for purpose of democracy. Each of these opposition 
parties has a history. Their origin is hatred. They were not formed especially to offer genuine 
democratic challenges and to stimulate development. No! Their founders have their past 
history either from party rivalries before the Zanzibar revolution, or they were in the 
government and they had misunderstanding and decided to form their own parties for 
vengeance. They emerged from hostilities". Others added, 
"in this country, if the offender is in ruling party and the victim is in oppositions parties, the case will neither 
be heard nor processed. There is stigma" [Adiscussant from Kangagani) 
"Even in our society when your neighbour knows you are from this or that party they will segregate you, 
especially when election politics draws closer. Even those with authorities in our streets, like our street 
representatives escapes certain houses just because they support opposition, particularly when there is 
something beneficial. It's hatred all over". [kidongo chekundu] 
 
However, participants insisted that ethnicity does not influence party support. One discussant 
observed critically, "it is also not true that political support is related to one's ethnic group 
influenced by history. There are Arabs who are even closely related by family ties to the 
former Arab colonial family, but today they are leaders of the ruling part. ethnicity is 
crosscutting in political support not confined in particular party". Also in this regard, mjority 
of key informants from in-depth interviews concurred that ethnicity or race have extremely 
weak relationship to party affiliation.  
 
In summary, patry attachments are extremely pronounced in Zanzibar's politics; you either 
belong to this or that political party, non-partisanship is simply hypocricy; that is a 
prevailing feelings among Zanzibaris. I noted this from since the first day of administering 
pre-group questionnaires for selection of participants in focus group discussions. It should 
indeed be noted that everything circles in to the two dominant political parties, namely, CCM 
and CUF, and those who claim affiliation to other political parties are simply 'beating around 
the bush' or branded as 'selfish money mongers'. The expression from this key informant 
from University of Dar es Salaam is not very far from the truth, though a little strong a 
statement, he stated, "I can say that the level of political maturity and participation is very 
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high in Zanzibar. The level of political party support is unprecedented and sometimes 
infectious. While people can be followers of political parties, in Zanzibar the attachement to 
a political party is very strong. However, this partisanship seems to have waned a bit after 
witnessing some bigwigs crossing over to the adversary party." Other key informants echoed 
similar opinions and observed that party affiliation sometimes are stronger than Zanzibar 
national identity or even stronger than religious influences, as one key informant from 
University of Dar es Salaam put it, 
"Yes it is extremely strong. Those who are in power in Zanzibar, their main preoccupation is solidarity 
within group (internal solidarity). So whatever it takes so as to hold the group together they will do it. You 
can say that political affiliation is so strong to the extent that even religion or religious beliefs are 
undermined. The 2001 killings of demonstrators is a testimony of the strength of political affiliation, people 
are ready to kill people belonging to the same religion because of political reasons. It is also stronger than 
the national identity of Zanzibar. There was an attempt for example to bridge the gap in favor of promoting 
Zanzibar's national identity as was evidenced by the 10th Constitutional amendment in 2010, then you could 
see how they behaved in the constitutional assembly. Zanzibar members were split or divided across the 
middle, it's not that those who opposed the Warioba draft were opposed to greater autonomy for Zanzibar, 
not at all. All Zanzibaris, regardless of their political affiliation would actually like greater Zanzibar 
autonomy, but political survival is also very important. That's why because of political survival of a 
particular faction then when it comes to those things that would have an impact for the political survival as 
a group, as a special group, a privileged group in Zanzibar's politics, then all other things can fall apart." 
 
The only matter that needs further clarification are the factors influencing party support itself, 
that is, should it be considered a 'stand alone' identity, or an identity shaped by other factors? 
The observed dynamic pattern of political support in Zanzibar community as argued above 
suggests that party affiliation is interractive with other variables as depicted in the theoretical 
framework of the study. Majority of key informants held that the claims of ethnic or racial 
influence on party support are utterly unfounded. They nevertheless granted that policy 
performance and history, especially post-revolutionary history, has strongly shaped political 
party support. A key informant from University of Dar es Salaam argues that for historical 
reasons in terms of political experiences "the kind of persecution they have undergone,.... 
When you experience a particular event or phenomenon over a period of time it create a sort 
of identity". A veteran journalist described in details such experiences in history including 
gross violations of human rights describing in full details and names a long list people who 
went missing and their graves nowhere to be found. He insisted that this pushes people to 
"want change either for the better or for the worse". He also noted that even when changes 
start to appear, there emerge some political leaders who he described them as being 
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"controlled by the legacy of the past", who bring the history into political agenda of the day. 
Another key informant, a retired academician, considered the changes of political party 
support map from before independence, and post revolutionary policies, and the current 
patterns of party support, he concluded that performance criteria were the reason behind. For 
example, he argued that the Afro-Shirazi (ASP) party, which later merged with Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) from Tanganyika to form CCM, earned about 42% of the 
votes from Pemba during elections before independence, but that support has diminished to 
15% and is declining due to citizens' disatisfactions with the performance of the revolutionary 
government. 
5.1.3.2 Historical legacy 
The prominent role of history in the politics of Zanzibar is one aspect that is peculiar in 
contrast to Tanzania Mainland and some other East African countries. In this sense, it is 
understandable that the standardized questionnaire used in the Afrobarometer survey 
throughout Tanzania did not capture this delicate issue. Therefore, I rely on data from 
qualitative sources to examine the influence of historical legacy on trust attitudes in Zanzibar. 
Findings from focus group discussions reveal that historical legacy is imprinted in most 
people's political attitudes even if they do not openly admit. Youth and opposition supporters 
seemed to play down the influence of history on their attitudes and passionately proposed the 
consideration of performance indicators, although acknowledging that histrory is still being 
propagated in political platforms. A young discussant from Utaani echoed this view, he 
noted, "the historical legacy of the government no longer influences the present. It is true 
there were those who were sympathetic with the overthrown government by the revolution, 
but time has passed enough and now government performance is the uppermost criteria of 
judgment". Also, others in the same group refuted the argument about the influence of the 
racial history, which is connected to the pre-independence history, arguing that race is not an 
important factor for political support.  
 
However, there was some recognition of the influence of a distant historical legacy among 
older generation and ruling party suppoters, and some proudly described themselves with it. 
A participant from Kidongo Chekundu argued this way, "you cannot disregard history. 
History is everything of who we are. History is transfered from one generation to another. 
There are few who no longer care or don't bother about history, but most of us are shaped by 
it. We get stories from our parents and grandparents, and they influence our attitudes". 
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Another old discussant from the same group made clear that history was the reason for his 
continued support in the ruling party, he said, "listen to me youngman! I am a revolutionist. I 
don't hide this fact and God knows this truth inside me, and I won't change. President 
Karume warned us there will come the so called educated people who will bring misery and 
suffering to us and they won't care about our history. That's why I tell you, I am CCM to 
death". Similarly, a young woman discussant and rulling party supporter from Uweleni 
argued that she is proud of the government and revolution for they symbolise liberation, she 
stated, "we hear that our parents were tortured, chained, and humiliated by Arab 
colonialists. If an Arab ruler wants to see how a person dies, one would be ordered to climb 
a coconut tree and shot down to death. If her majesty wanted to see how a women deliver a 
child, then a local pregnant woman would be brought and brutally operated on her stomach 
to remove a child and lead to the death of the mother. The revolution came to remove these 
inhuman treatments". 
 
Having provided some initial reactions of discussants, I noted that historical legacies were 
shaping people's trust attitudes in multiple ways, as much as there were disagreement about 
validity of various history accounts. The question was then, which history? One type of 
history, in favour of and propagated by the government and the ruling party, was the 
historical legacy of colonialism, pre-independence racial politics, and the revolution itself 
(see Figure 11 below). As noted in the literature review, trust based on this type of history is 
called ideological trust', in which the government leaders and institutions are potrayed as 
lebarators or freedom fighters and the hopes they represent. However, this version was highly 
contested among discussants in the focus group discussions. On the one hand, some 
discussant particularly the youth and those associated with the opposition parties argued that 
it was a fubricated history used by the ruling party to intimidate and antoginize people on 
racial lines to win political support. On the other hand, a small margin of participants 
especially those affiliated with the ruling party thought it was real and something they care 
about (see quotes above). Arguably, this history still influences some sections of Zanzibar 
society although is increasingly losing ground. When this historical legacy is positively 
recieved by citizens, it reinforces trust to the government institutions as the custodian of the 
revolution. 
 
The second version was the history of the post revolutionary government and during one 
party rule, which essentially works against the government in power. Several issues were 
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referred to including the history of the unconlsulted Union with Tanganyika in 1964, and in 
particular the political persecution that people undergone under post revolutionary regime for 
political reasons, as one participant explained, "as for me, I have never heard of what the 
other lady has said about torture during colonialism, but I remember when the independence 
government was overthrown, I was still in standard two, I realized of the revolution when my 
father was taken away from home. I was terrified." In most cases old people affiliated to the 
opposition held this view, and few young generation referred to it. The third version, which is 
a predominant concern among youth and mixed other discussants, was the recent history 
during the twenty five years of multiparty elections that included issues of gross human rights 
violations, political persecution, economic stagnation, regional descrimination, and in 
particular, the 2001 killings of demonstrators. Both the second and the third versions of 
historical legacies could be described as experiential trust, which in this case have had 
negative impact on citizens' trust in public institutions and hence enhanced disapproval level. 
 
Opinions from indepth interviews made some clarification about the strength of influence of 
the above mentioned historical legacies in citizens trust attitudes in Zanzibar. First, there was 
wide recognition that historical legacy was an important factor in Zanzibar politics, although 
majority of key respondents were of the opinion that the prominence of historical legacies of 
distant past, that is, colonialism, pre-independence, and revolutions was increasingly 
diminishing. Asked specifically about their opinion whether the government's and ruling 
party's attachment to the history of revolution, as liberators, was still lingering on people's 
minds, they were in agreement, but majority thought the feeling is dying out. Below are the 
views of two key respondents, both of them prominent academicians, they observed, 
"That kind of idea seems to be still there particularly among the old people, those who would identify 
themselves with the system. There are people who still believe that these are the liberators and they are the 
ones who are deserving to be in power. That is why you have those kind of statements like "we cannot 
surrender power simply through a ballot paper", meaning that Zanzibar's independence was achieved 
through revolution, therefore it has to be safeguarded by whatever means including using coercion to 
safeguard the so called "holy revolution". But also may be even among the young people, some of them 
through socialization might also buy that idea. But increasingly that idea is dying out as an outcome of 
education. So the more people are becoming educated they distance themselves from that legacy. They 
realize that this is the party that brought independence, but that doesn't mean that it should continue to rule 
forever. (Key respondent from University of Dar es Salaam) 
 
"Well, I think that is the ideology of the ruling party, ruling elite. That is what they use and it does have an 
effect among some sections of the population. They are easily persuaded that if this government falls the 
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Arabs will come back, the Sultan will come back, and the situation will get worse. But it is difficult to argue 
that the situation before the revolution was worse as it is now in many parts. In Zanzibar that ideology is 
used by the ruling elite to remain in power. But the support is shrinking particularly because of the 
younger people born after the revolution, who feel that that politics now is gone, it’s no longer. There has 
been a considerable amount of shift. So that ideology, like in the rest of Africa, people say yes you performed 
your role to bring independence, but you have to deliver the fruits." 
 
Asked if the ideology is no longer appealing how could the ruling party cling to power for 
such a long time even after four periods of multiparty elections against the background of 
poor socio-economic development, six out of ten key respondents thought the ruling party 
held on to power through undemocratic means and election fraud, one of them put it like this, 
"if it was because of that ideology that it came in power, they would not have needed to steal 
in every election, and that is admitted now even by those members of that party who have 
now crossed-over and are now saying that they were stealing." In this case, the influence of 
ideological based trust is becoming increasingly weak. 
 
Figure 11: Ideological Poster Displayed by Ruling-party-supporters at the National 
Revolutionary Day Celebrations, January 12, 2016 
 
Source: Zanzibar Daima (2016)  
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Note: Captioned subject in swahili "Machotara Vibaraka wa Usultani Watupishe na Mapinduzi Yetu", 
can be traslated as "Mixed race Puppets of the Sultanate should leave us with our Revolotion" 
 
Regarding the historical legacies of intermediate and recent history which is the basis for 
experiential trust, most key informants suggested that it has been gaining wider support. 
There were some detailed discription of post revolutionary policies and undemocratic 
practices, both from intermediate past and recent events, that have impacted negatively the 
image of the government institutions. A key repondent, a prominent journalist, after a length 
explanation of events and comparative history, he had this to say when asked of the influence 
of the historical legacy, 
"I do agree about history, and this history is the history of human rights violations. I wish there would 
be a rule of law, and then reconciliation of those people, for instance, those whose 
families went missing, or people whose properties had been confiscated, they would be 
given at least compensation, or create truth commission like in South Africa. Then the 
situation would have been good. 
He continued; 
"Leaders who came to power after the revolution instead of leading they bacame rulers. That's why you find 
in Kenya KANU only remains the tittle, Obote's UPC party has gone, Nkrumah's party has disappeared, 
UNIP of Zambia was finished, Banda's party is getting only 10.5 to 11 percents of the seats, and there is 
even a big crack in the African National Congress of South Africa. Now that is because people have been 
dissappointed by leaders who fought for independence. For example Robert Mugabe fought for freedom 
from colonialism, but now he has become an emperor, his wife has powers like a Queen. And you see what 
happens in Zimbabwe, those in power wants to hold on." 
 
Another key informant from the State Univeruty of Zanzibar echoed similar view, he noted, 
"liberation parties have failed to deliver. That's why when multiparty politics was reintroduced most of them 
lost power, but it's because they have nothing new. If they say conditions are better, people are not blind, 
they know that in some sectors the situation is worse than even before independence. They have failed 
because of their history of corruption, misuse of power, poor management of the economy, and so forth." 
 
To conclude, historical legacy has been found to be in use both as a base for ideological trust 
and is also a source of experiential trust. Thus, the hypothesis of the study is strongly 
supported by the evidences supplied. The study found out that historical legacy as a source of 
ideological trust is only influential in some limited sections of the society, and is increasingly 
becoming less compelling among large majority of the population especially the young 
generation. Instead, the post-revolutionary historical legacy based on experiential trust has 
the uppermost trust eroding influence on trust attitudes. 
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5.1.3.3 National Identity 
Identification with the nationa identity in Zanzibar has two expressions; the first one which is 
more strong is identification as Zanzibaris because Zanzibar has an autonomous government 
which runs its own non-union matters. But Zanzibaris also have another national identity, 
being part of the United Republic of Tanzania, they are Tanzanians as well. Both, 
identification with Tanzanian and Zanzibaris National identity co-exis, as described by a 
discussant in the focus group from Chokocho when he noted,  
"I want to be identified as a Zanzibari, but this is not possible without being a Tanzanian. So inside our 
country I am a Zanzibari, but outside our country we are all Tanzanians. To me non-national identification 
are not important".  
 
Another discussant from Utaani preferred Zanzibari national identity over a Tanzanian one, 
he opined,  
"For me the Zanzibar national identity is so important. I don't think it's right to call someone a Tanzanian, 
because Tanzania is a Union of two countries. There must be first a Zanzibari and a Tanganyikan, everyone 
should be known by their original nationality". 
 
Moreover, by direct observation method during the research fieldwork, in particular when 
administering pre-group questionnaires for selection of focus groups participants, I noted that 
high percentage of respondents recognized themseleves by national identity rather than their 
ethnic or racial attachments. As noted above, some mentioned religion (muslim) in reply to a 
question of ethnic affiliation. Others, were not sure of the ethnic tittles they should choose 
among many to describe themselves, for example, among the local Zanzibaris from Shehia of 
Kibeni, they would wonder between identifying themselves as Shirazi, Hadimu, Swahili, or 
Tumbatu, they were more certain when they say they were Zanzibaris.   
 
Nevertheless, in the Afrobarometer survey, the reference was more of Tanzanian national 
identity rather than the Zanzibari national identity. So, I generally examined their description 
with national identity regardless of which particular reference was made. The study assumed 
that, given the cosmopolitan nature of Zanzibar society, national identity would co-exist with 
individuals identification with other social group identities such as ethinity. I also expected 
that those who identified themselves with national identity were likely to express less trust in 
public institutions and would prefer more performance evaluation than their attachments to 
group identities.  
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The findings on the variable of national identity was briefly presented above when discussing 
ethnicty. It was shown that about 99 respondents described themseleves with national identity 
rather than their ethnic attachments. Also the findings showed that out of 99 respondents who 
decribed themselves on national identity, 54 (55%) indicated high disapproval of public 
institutions. The survey investigated the national identity further against ethnicity by posing a 
question to participants about whether they felt closer to either their ethnic or national 
identities. This question was important to ensure that participants are presented with a choice 
of preference between the two identities and measure their description against their repective 
trust levels. Suprisingly, the identification with only national identity increased from 99 
respondents to 104 out of 240, and 18 others said they feel equally national and their ethnic 
affiliation. This means that at times citizens would mention their ethnic identity, but given 
more choice, they would change their identity or attribute to both set of identities.  
However, among 104 respondents who said they feel only national identity, 61 (59%) showed 
high trust. Together, with those who feel equally national and ethnic identity (122 
respondents in total), 67 of them (55%) expressed higher trust. When I cross-examined the 
findings of those who described themseleves with national identity (99 respondents) with 
those who felt much more closer to national identity rather than ethnic attachments (122 
respondents), there was a puzzling scenario. As shown above, the former expressed higher 
disapproval level while the later expressed higher trust level. 
 
Futhermore, the findings showed there was no relationship between identification with 
national identity and individual's trust. Data from qualitative findings were also not enough to 
make a significant analysis of the effect of national identity on trust. There was wide 
recognition among focus group discussants and key informants from in-depth interviews 
about the prominence of national identity in Zanzibar, especially the Zanzibari nationalism. 
Yet, no much discussion was made about the direction of its influence on institutional trust. 
In most cases, participants would refer to it being so strong, but also in some cases they 
offered examples where national identity was undermined by party preferences, through 
discussions on its effect on trust level was not very clear. From the above observation, I 
conclude that I was not able to significantly test the influence of national identity, and in 
particular, the direction of influence on trust attitudes. That is, I could not determine whether 
identification with national identity would incline individuals' to more or less political trust. 
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5.2 Discussion 
In this chapter I examined the significance of identity variables on citizens' trust in public 
institutions. The findings revealed that among the identity variables examined in this chapter, 
political identities in terms of partisanship and historical legacies had the strongest effect on 
citizens' political trust in Zanzibar. Other variables which were positively associated with 
institutional trust include age and gender, location, region, and occupation. However, the 
study found no evidence on the influence of education, ethnicity, and national identity on 
trust attitudes. I discuss these findings below more elaborately. 
 
In relation to the influence of partisanship on citizen's trust attitudes in Zanzibar, the study's 
hypothesis was strongly confirmed by both quantitative and qualitative sources of data. As 
shown in Table 10, the findings show that support for opposition parties decrease trust in the 
government while affiliation to the ruling party boost support. It was observed that in 
Zanzibar partisan attachments is extremely pronounced, unprecedented and sometimes 
conflictual leading to discrimination based on party lines, social exclusion, violence and even 
death. It is known for example that in Pemba after the 2001 killings of opposition 
demonstrators, social exclusion was practiced widely among supporters of two main political 
parties,  whereby CUF supporters boycotted attending social events of the ruling party 
followers such as funeral, or wedding, or even buying commodities from such people. It was 
noted that partisanship was so strong that in some occasions it undermined national identity 
or even religion. Partisanship was found to have the most interactive effect with other factors 
such as government performance and history, which is consistent with the theoretical 
framework of the study about the interactive nature of identity and performance variable. 
However, there no evidence was found to relate party attachments to ethnicity. 
 
The above findings are consistent with several studies that have examined party affiliation to 
trust attitudes. For example, in a study of voting behavior in Africa, Young (2009) found that 
that party labels supersedes other considerations in determining voting behavior, it is what 
gives presidents their most strongest support base.. 
 
On the effect of historical legacies on trust attitudes, both historical legacies based on 
ideology and experiential historical legacies were observed. However, the findings show that 
the ideological historical legacy in terms of the government and leaders' identity as liberators 
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and freedom fighters is increasingly losing its appeal, although it is still being used. It was 
widely perceived that the Revolutionary government is haunted by peoples' political 
experiences of the past under the regime that has been under the same party and maintained 
the same identity since the revolution of 1964. The government was both associated with a 
history of negative practices such as violation of human rights and championing 
discrimination, and policy failures in terms of economic stagnation and prevalence of 
corruption.  
 
The above findings are consistent with the proposition of identity theory and are strongly 
supported by empirical evidences from similar context. For instance, Chikwanha (2005:214) 
argued that in African context ideological identity is linked to the support most African 
governments receive as icons of liberation struggles, especially where ruling parties have 
been in power since independence like in Tanzania, thus the legitimacy of incumbents partly 
hang on this ideological trust basis. He argues that "without this mechanism, the institutional 
decay in most Africa's countries implies that the governments would have degenerated into 
the worst-case scenarios, like Somalia, and to an extent, Zimbabwe" (Chikwanha, 2005:226). 
Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that the ideological influence of historical legacies in 
support of the ruling regime is declining. For example Mishler and Rose (1997:420) found in 
their studies of post-communist regimes that inherited trust may be appealing for a short time, 
but in a longer periods governments must deliver to satisfy its citizens. Similarly, Jeffrey and 
Lewis (2011) observed the decreasing impact of ideological identity in current politics in 
African context, they however observed that parties still make appeals of their respective 
ideological heritages, citing Ghana's NDC and NPP as an example (see Chikwanha, 2005). 
More importantly, Dimitrova-Grajzl (2010) in a study of the impact of historical legacy of the 
post-socialist countries found that the socialist legacy was significant in explaining trust 
among youth, and specifically found to affect trust negatively. 
 
Regarding the demographic attributes, the results reveal that age and gender were 
significant in explaining citizens trust attitudes. The quantitative findings (Table 6) revealed 
that age was not related to trust, but findings from qualitative sources disconfirmed the 
results and suggested that generational identities were important in explaining institutional 
trust in Zanzibar, whereby youth were the more likely to express less trust compared to their 
old counterparts. It was also found that youth were the least likely to be attached to history 
and identity politics of the past, instead they preferred pragmatic judgment of the government 
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based on performance criteria as they were the most disadvantaged group. Their main 
concern was improvement in economic conditions such as getting employment and 
increasing their income. In Zanzibar, similar findings were reported by Galteland (2010) who 
found that, given the prevalence of poverty and low level of development, the youth were 
mostly dissatisfied and politically disengaged as they reject to be identified with past 
divisions of identity politics compared to the old people who were more allegiant to the 
historical polarization. Mbatudde (2013) also found in Uganda that old people showed more 
trust to the government due to their experience with past wars and insecurity, and their 
perception that the about the role of the new government in stabilizing the country. 
 
Also, evidences show that gender was influential in shaping individuals inclination to 
specific trust attitudes (Figure 4), whereby women were more likely to express much trust 
compared to men, hence supporting the hypothesis of the study. Through focus groups it was 
learned that though  women were more economically disadvantaged and evidence revealed 
that they are faced with multiple challenges such as poor home based social services, their 
trust level were still high compared to women. The study found that women's limited access 
to political information due to their gender roles was the key explaining factor for their trust 
attitudes. Whereas men were more exposed to political information such as through what a 
key informant called 'gossip centers', of which women cannot attend. Men are also more 
inclined to have less trust because they are the bread-winners for their families and hence are 
facing the economic hardships on daily basis. 
 
Indeed, among the social group-identities examined in this study, location, region, and 
occupation revealed positive influence on individual's trust attitudes. To begin with, location 
of respondent in terms of being resident of rural or urban locations was found to important 
factor in trust expressions, whereby rural residents were more trusting than their urban 
counterparts (Figure 6). The findings show that a glaring gap in access to information through 
news media sources was the key factor in explaining the rural-urban divergence of trust 
attitudes, while huge disparity in economic conditions and illiteracy rate further handicapped 
rural residents' capacity to access information through news media. In particular, it was noted 
that media freedom is highly limited in Zanzibar compared to Mainland Tanzania. On a 
similar note, Makulilo (2015), observed that media situation in Zanzibar is worse, whereby 
the only available local television (TVZ) is government owned, as well as the main radio 
station and newspapers, while the small private radio stations that exist are under the 
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influence of ruling party politicians. In this scenario, the influence of such traditional media is 
limited, while the social media that offers an alternative platform for urban dwellers, is 
almost nonexistent in rural settings. The findings are line with the observation made by 
O'Gorman (2012) that despite the rural neglect the ruling party loyalty among rural 
population in Tanzania is unchallenged, "their support is based on ideological factors - an 
inherent loyalty or nostalgia for a party that helped to bring independence to the country, 
which has maintained peace, and which historically supported farmers". Also, Harding 
(2010) found higher support of the incumbent government among that rural residents in Sub-
Saharan Africa, though different from this study, he found pro-rural policies to be the 
explaining factor. 
 
Regarding regional identity, the findings from the quantitative survey revealed no 
relationship between region and institutional trust (Figure 7). However, it was noted that the 
survey sample could have skewed the results due to the influence of rural urban factor as 
respondents from Pemba were dominantly from rural areas (Table 9). Indeed, strong 
evidences from documentary review, direct citizens' opinions from focus groups, and in-
depth interviews disconfirmed the survey findings. Instead, regional identity was found to be 
significant in explaining citizens trust in line with the hypothesis of the study, whereby 
people from Pemba were less likely to express support in government institutions compared 
to their Unguja counterparts. Moreover, the results suggested that regional identity had strong 
interactive effect with historical legacies and performance variables where by solidarity based 
on regionalism was exacerbated by feeling of economic discrimination, lack of regional 
representation in the country's governance, and common political experiences of 
marginalization particularly at the expense of Pemba (see also, Matheson, 2012; Bakari, 
2001; 2011). 
 
Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative data revealed that occupation in terms of being 
employed by government or working in the private sectors, was related to trust, where by 
those employed by the government were expressed higher trust compared to those working in 
private sectors, NGOs, and self-employed (Figure 10). Qualitative sources revealed that 
employment in government was discriminative based on party lines and regions as 
politicization of public service was very high, hence suggesting the likelihood that those 
employed in government to be sympathetic and trusting servants. The findings are supported 
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by Robinson (2009) who also found in 16 African countries that formally employed 
individuals are more likely to identify with the state.  
 
Finally, the study did not find evidence in support of the influence of education, ethnicity, 
and national identity variable in explaining political trust in Zanzibar. For education, it was 
noted that the sample did not represent the education variable enough to draw meaningful 
conclusions. Also, another factor suggested to have undermined the noticeable influence of 
education was the high literacy rate in Zanzibar where large percent of citizens have the basic 
skills required to access political information, and indeed the 'gossip centers' culture of 
Zanzibar contributed to high level of political awareness. Moreover, there was no enough 
qualitative to supplement survey data. This could probably be something surprising, but 
Mbatudde (2013) also did not find differences based on education in the evaluation of 
government performance and trust.  
 
Regarding ethnicity, the existence of heterogeneous ethnic/racial group backs up the findings 
of this study which showed that ethnicity was not related to trust (Table 8). Also, it was found 
that socially there was no dominant ethnic group, and political support, for instance, crosscut 
ethnic boundaries. Similarly, Moss & Tronvoll (2015) argue that Zanzibar residents have 
strongly been identifying themselves with their national identity as Zanzibaris rather than on 
ethnic lines. This was noted clearly in the survey findings whereby when respondents were 
asked about their ethnic affiliation, they preferred identification with national identity. The 
argument of ethnic diversity is also consistent with observation made by Letki (2008) in a 
study of English neighbourhood that diverse ethnicity have no effect on trust, while dominant 
ethnic group has. Robisnon (2009) observed similar effect of ethnic diversity in 16 African 
countries, whereby ethnic diversity was positively related to identification with national 
identity. Several other studies in Africa have also found that ethnic cleavages are losing their 
explanatory significance (see Hyden, 2013; Keefer, 2010). 
 
Also, the study was not able to examine national identity thoroughly as the survey findings 
provided some confusing results, and qualitative data were lacking on this aspect. However, 
some scholars such as Moss and Tronvoll (2015), and Jjuuko and Muriuki (2010), observed 
that identification with national identity was so strong in Zanzibar, as also confirmed with 
results from the Afrobarometer survey. Others suggested that Uamsho group claims had the 
potential of obtaining unprecedented influence in Zanzibar politics due to its economic 
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nationalist claims (Nassor & Jose, 2014:263). It is important that future research should 
examine this important aspect, because other studies elsewhere have found identity based on 
nationalism significant in explaining trust (see Askvik, 2008; Godefroidt, et. al., 2015). Also, 
Robinson (2009) found that national identity was vital for democracy. 
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
In the light of findings and discussion in this chapter, it can be concluded that identity matters 
for political trust. The mapping of identity variables revealed various levels of strength of 
influence and interactions of identity variables to trust attitudes and performance 
considerations. The findings depicted political identities such as party affinities and history as 
the most significant variable in explaining political trust, while a number of other identity 
variables such as age, gender, region, location, and occupation were also positively 
correlated to trust. A more interesting finding of the chapter was the strong interactive 
influence of performance factors in explaining identity and hence political trust. Indeed, this 
key finding is consistent with the theoretical framework of the study, and this is why in the 































THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE ON POLITICAL TRUST:  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
6 Introduction 
In this chapter I analyze the impact of perceptions of institutional performance on trust 
attitudes among Zanzibaris. The chapter presents findings and analysis from quantitative and 
qualitative data sources of the study followed by discussion of findings at the end. Again the 
quantitative data presented in this chapter are from the Afrobarometer survey round 6 
Tanzania data-set, and in particular for the five regions in Zanzibar. The qualitative evidences 
were collected during fieldwork from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, direct 
field observation, and documentary analysis. Data from the above mentioned sources are 
triangulated to ensure meaningful analysis. 
6.1 Perceptions of Institutional Performance 
As explained earlier in the study, perceptions of institutional performance is inclusive of 
evaluation of office holders, institutions, and the impact executed public policies and 
programs. As a second major variable of the study, institutional performance is examined in 
terms of citizens perceptions of output of public policies in areas of economic and political 
achievements, as well as social services delivery. In the following sections each key area is 
elaborated further and examined in the light of the findings. 
 
6.1.1 Satisfaction with Economic Performance 
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I examined two general aspects in relation to satisfaction with the economy namely; 
perceptions of national economy and perceptions of individual's living conditions. The study 
hypothesized that the more positively citizens evaluate government economic performance, 
especially in sectors related to individual economic wellbeing, the more positively they would 
express trust in the government.  
 
I relation to satisfaction with national economy, participants were generally asked to describe 
the country's present economic condition. As shown in Table 11 below, a total of 186 
respondents (78%) said the country's economy was very/fairly bad, while 32 (13%) said it 
was neither good nor bad, and only 22 (9%) thought the economy was fairly good. When 
perceptions of satisfaction with national economy was compared with trust attitudes, the 
findings show no significant relationship between them. It can be observed that even among 
those who said the country's economy was very/fairly bad, their trust perception were very 
much divided. 
 
Table 11: Relationship Between Perceptions of Country's Economic Condition and 
Trust Attitudes 
 Very/Fairly bad Neither good nor bad Very/Fairly good 
High trust% 47 53 64 
Low trust% 53 47 36 
Total % 100 100 100 
N=240 n=186 n=32 n=22 
Question: In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of this country? 
 
Similarly, percentions of individual's economic wellbeing were negatively inclined, whereby 
123 respondents (51%) were of the opinion that their living conditions were very/fairly bad, 
while 54 (23%) thought it was neither good nor bad, and 63 (26%) said it was fairly/very 
good. Again, as shown in Table 12 below, the study did not find evidence of relationship 
between perceptions of satisfaction with individua'sl living condition and institutional trust.    
 
Table 12: Relationship Between Perception of Individual's Living Condition and Trust 
 Very/Fairly bad Neither good nor bad Very/Fairly good 
High trust% 48 57 46 
Low trust% 52 43 54 
Total % 100 100 100 
N=240 n=123 n=54 n=63 
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Question: In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? 
 
Further questions were posed to check participants perceptions in evaluating their economic 
conditions. When respondents were asked about how they assessed their living conditions 
compared to other Tanzanians, about 50 percent said it was worse or much worse, 37 percent 
said it was the same, and only 13 percent said it was better. Similar findings surfaced when 
asked of their opinions regarding the country's economic condition compared to twelve 
months ago, where 52 percent said it was worse or much worse, where as 41 percent said it 
was the same, and only 6 percent felt it was better. Again, respondents held a despair opinion 
when asked about their perceptions of the prospects of the country's economy in the next 
twelve months, whereby 35 percent said it would be worse or much worse, and 56 percent did 
not envisage any change. All these findings reiterate the fact that participants evaluated the 
economy, both at national level and individual level with discontentment. Nonetheless, their 
trust attitudes were not very much influenced by their economic evaluations. 
Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interviews shed light on the above 
findings and help to explain the observed relationships. In the focus groups discussions, 
participants considered both the national economy as well as individual's economic 
conditions, but were very much focused in assessing the later rather than the former because 
they were critical of the national economy as they see little improvement in their own lives. 
 
"We are told that our national economy is growing, but our own conditions are worsening. If the economy is 
growing how do we know? If we are not benefitting from the growth, we pay for everything from education 
to health care". [A discussant from Kangagani] 
 
"Our economic conditions  especially at individual level is tight. The prices for goods and services are so 
high. What our government does is to increase salaries for those working in public sector. How can an 
ordinary citizens who is unemployed afford his life?" [A discussant from Potoa] 
 
But, even those employed by the government at lower levels had the same opinion, as 
expressed by a discussant from Utaani: 
"Personally, I am a government employee - a teacher. I am a bachelor degree holder. My monthly income 
[salary] is three hundred and fifty thousand shillings. This income hardly is enough for a week or so, only for 
basic needs such as food and medical treatment. I exclude other important things like clothing because we, 
poor people, buy clothes only once a year. Our economy is in a mess and inflation is killing us".-Utaani 
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Age, gender and political affiliation was not observed to be significant in terms of 
participants' opinions in assessing the economy. However, some old people mostly affiliated 
with the ruling party made reference to a distant past when the country's economy was in 
deep crisis to argue that the national economy had changed for the better, but some admitted 
that their individual economic conditions have little improvement. 
"Looking back where we came from I think we are now better off. Our conditions were so bad, back then we 
could not afford to buy building materials, roads were not passable, there was no electricity, and no water 
supply. Anyone of my age [57 years] can see the changes, people now are getting education and they make 
progress. However, I agree that we still face high rate of unemployment, but this is a problem all over the 
world." [An elderly male discussant from Chokocho] 
 
 
A contrary view of the comparison of the past and present was repeatedly raised in two other 
group discussions: 
"The past is gone, our economic conditions were not so bad. In the past you go to a local forest and you get 
ripe bananas, mangoes, pineapples, and plenty of forest fruits to eat. Our children went to school free, we 
didn't buy books, chalks, uniforms, these were all provided for free, and they were even given porridge and 
bread for breakfast. But today, you need to buy all these for your small kid, and pay more money as if you 
are preparing wedding gifts for a bride" [A discussant from Utaani, and similar view was expressed in 
Kangagani] 
 
A large majority of opinions from focus group discussions evaluated the government 
negatively in the management of economy and were in despair about the future prospects 
under the same regime. Some of the issues raised included poor circulation of money, low 
income, high rate of unemployment, closure of industries, foreign citizens occupying local 
jobs, inflation, double taxation, unaffordable payments in social services, unexplored national 
resources for the advantage of Zanzibar people, Zanzibar's inability to access foreign aid and 
loans due to the Union, economic classes, and the general poverty level. 
"We work tirelessly even when we are sick, but we do not get any tangible income except huge accumulation 
of debts. We do not get anything. When we sleep we ask God to keep us alive so that we can pay back the 
debts. For a small business for example, you pay taxes to ZRB [Zanzibar Revenue Board], you also pay to 
TRA [Tanzania Revenue Authority], and you pay taxes to the Local Municipal. How can you prosper?" 
[lamented a female participant from uweleni] 
 
"Zanzibar in the past, we had small scale industries which provided employment to many people. We had 
copra processing industry, shoe-making industries, Soda industry, cigarette manufacturing, and oil 
manufacturing industries. They are no more, they have been either privatized and not producing anymore or 
closed down." [A discussant from Utaani] 
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"Our economic conditions are extremely poor and prospect for change can come only if there will be a 
change of government. But if this same government continues, there will be no changes and the economy will 
fall down even more".  [A discussant from Uweleni] 
 
"Our economy will not change for the better until Zanzibar becomes a sovereign state. Currently we can not 
ask for foreign aid and loans, until the Union government do so and we do not get our share. Our country is 
so small, a little amount of foreign aid and loans will suffice to fight poverty and unemployment." [A 
discussant from Chokocho] 
 
A key informant, an academician from the University of Dar es Salaam, puts the issue of the 
nature of the political system and Zanzibar's autonomy in relation to the Union at the core for 
the prospect of Zanzibar's economy: 
"Actually in my view Zanzibar economy has been deteriorating, and if you look at the GDP and per capital 
income of Mainland and that of Zanzibar, the Mainland is higher than that of Zanzibar. That was different, 
in the past Zanzibar used to have a higher per capital income because of its small population up to 1980s or 
may be early 1990s. The prospects for improving living standards are brighter in Mainland compared to 
Zanzibar. And I don't see the possibility of Zanzibar improving its economic wellbeing unless there is a 
major sort of restructuring of the Zanzibar's political system including of course streamlining the issue of 
Zanzibar's autonomy to manage its own economy. Because in so many respects the Zanzibar's economy is so 
different from that of Mainland. Economy is not essentially a Union matter but the way it is managed in 
practice it's like a union matter in terms of policies." 
 
Others suggested that the government's handling of the economy has created classes and 
reflects discriminatory policies based on regions: 
"There are things inside the government and outside it. Those who work within the government benefit from 
it such as by receiving salaries and health insurance. Such people will tell you the prospect of the country is 
good. But, about 99 percent of us, the ordinary citizens, we are hurting so much. We live like devils, our life 
is so hard." [A discussant from Chokocho] 
 
"Economic conditions are bad for everyone, but most specifically in Pemba. Our government does not 
encourage industrial and company investment in Pemba. These things need water supply, electricity, roads, 
and manpower, and we have all that. But all investments are made in Unguja, why aren't they considering 
us?" [A discussant from Utaani] 
 
But why do citizens of Zanzibar assess the economy negatively by an overwhelming 
majority, nevertheless their trust attitudes are equally divided as was observed in the survey 
findings and during focus group discussions. There are possibly multiple interaction effects 
of variables that will be further explored, but some key informant tried to explain this 
perplexed perceptions on two grounds; first, these people are driven by faith in God as the 
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Granter of their economic needs, and second, because most Zanzibari families supplement 
their economic needs from remittances they receive from their family members abroad,  
"So they feel that their poverty is part of their fate and God's providence on them. And the Sheikhs
13
 do not 
help us on this. In the mosques they talk about rich only, and that if you were 'made to be' poor then God 
loves you, or is a test from God. In the end of their speeches they ask for offerings and donations for the 
poor. They don't talk about poverty as something politically catalysed or connected to leadership and 
governance."  [An activist from civil society organizations] 
 
"In our country, Zanzibar,what is helping the situation not to get worse is that its people have embraced 
religious faith. But another crucial reason is you fellow Zanzibaris, our relatives, in foreign countries. 
Zanzibar diaspora are all over the world, and are supporting their families, relatives and friends back home 
economically. [Another activist from civil society organizations] 
 
This was noted in the group discussions as many participants attributed thanks to God for 
their conditions regardless, while fiercely offering negative evaluation of the government's 
management of the economy. Others, failed to link economic problems such as 
unemployment with the issue of governance, as one discussant who offered critical comments 
about employment situation in the country, but when quizzed on how that affected her trust in 
the government, she said, "I trust the government very much, because it can not solve all of 
our problems. We have to employ ourselves. The one to be blamed are the citizens themselves 
not the government". [A discussant from Kibeni] 
 
6.1.2 Political Performance 
In this section, I examine three aspects in relation to political performance namely; 
satisfaction with democracy and elections, perception of corruption, and perception of 
political stability. 
6.1.2.1 Satisfaction with Democracy and elections 
This variable was examined in two separate concepts namely, democracy and elections, the 
former is inclusive of the letter, but for a common understanding of ordinary citizens the later 
is a clear manifestation and a true test of the former. Hence it was important to examine both 
separately, but they are treated as one variable in this study.  
 
In relation to satisfaction with democracy, the study hypothesized that improvement in 
democracy impacts positively on citizens' trust level, while poor democratic performance 
                                                 
13
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influence trust negatively. First of all, before discussing perceptions of citizens' satisfaction 
with democracy, I present some interesting preliminary information that depicts their 
awareness and judgment of democracy in the country. The findings reveal an overwhelming 
support for democratic rule whereby 85 percent said democracy was preferable, only 10 
percent preferred non-democratic government, and 4 percent said a type of government 
doesn't matter. Parallel to wide acceptance of democracy, participants vehemently rejected 
authoritarian forms of government such as one-party rule (83%), military government (96%), 
and one-man rule (95%).  
 
Moreover, given Tanzania is a multiparty democracy, participants were asked of their 
opinions about the desirability of multiple political parties to assess if they either see the 
presence of many political parties as divisive or needed to ensure voters' choice. About 68 
percent agreed with a statement that many parties are important in ensuring voters' choice, 
compared to 32 percent who said multiple political parties are divisive. Furthermore, when 
asked to assess the extent of democracy in the country, majority of respondents said Tanzania 
was a democracy with minor problems (58%), followed by those who said it was a full 
democracy (19%) or a democracy with major problems (18%), while some were of the 
opinion that it was not a democracy at all (4%). 
 
Finally, participants were asked to express their level of satisfaction with how democracy 
works in the country. Table 13 below shows relationship between satisfaction with 
democracy and trust levels. The findings show that majority of respondents, about 186 out of 
238 (78%) were very/fairly satisfied with the exercise of democracy in the country, while 52 
(22%) were not at all/not very satisfied. The observed difference is statistically significant 
and therefore there is a relationship between satisfaction of democracy and trust attitudes. 
Trust was observed to be higher among those who were fairly/very satisfied with the exercise 
of democracy (54%) compared to those who were not at all/not very satisfied (33%). 
 
Table 13: Relationship Between Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust Attitudes 
 Not at all/Not very satisfied Fairly/Very Satisfied 
High trust 33 54 
Low trust 67 46 
Total % 100 100 
N=238 n=52 n=186 
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Question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Tanzania? Are you: (i) 
Very satisfied, (ii) Fairly satisfied, (iii) Not very satisfied, (iv) Not at all satisfied, (v)Tanzania is a 
democracy [Do not read], (vii) Don't know [Do not read] 
 
With regard to citizens' perception of elections, I examined the overall satisfaction with the 
exercise of elections and electoral processes in general. In multiparty democratic system, 
elections is an important tool for regime change and holding office holders responsible to 
their voters. Hence, the electoral process must abide to the principles of freeness and fairness 
to ensure genuine party competition, informed voters choice, and finally put in place a 
popular choice of government. In this sense elections empowers citizens with a mechanism to 
hold leaders accountable. The study assumed that the more citizens are satisfied with the 
conduct of elections the more likely they would express trust in the government that came to 
power through it. When respondents were asked of their opinions regarding freeness and 
fairness of the last election (2010), their responses correlate positively with their trust 
attitudes. As seen in Table 14 below, in excess of 64 percent among those who said the 
election was not free and fair, and those who thought it was free but with minor/major 
problems showed lower trust, while trust was higher among those satisfied with election as 
completely free and fair (78%). The observed difference is statistically significant, hence 
confirming the hypothesis of the study. 
 
Table 14: Relationship Between Perceptions of Elections and Political Trust 
 Completely 
free and fair  
Free and fair, but 
with minor 
problems  
Free and fair, with 
major problems 
Not free and 
fair 
High trust% 78 35 34 36 
Low trust% 22 65 66 64 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
N=231 n=72 n=110 n=38 n=11 
Question: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, 
held in 2010. Was it: (i) Completely free and fair, (ii) Free and fair, but with minor problems, (iii) 
Free and fair, with major problems, (iv) Not free and fair, (v) Do not understand question [Do not 
read], (vi) Don’t know [Do not read]. 
 
Nevertheless, the data reveal that respondents held a dispair opinion about the role of 
elections as a tool in ensuring genuine voters' choices and for desciplining office holders. 
When asked how well do elections ensure Members of Parliament reflect the views of the 
voters, 67 percent said 'not very well', and 27 percent said 'not at all', that is, a total of 94 
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percent had negative opinion. Similarly, when asked how well do elections enable voters to 
remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want, they had similar negative 
perception (94%). 
 
Qualitative findings from focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews corroborate the 
findings presented above. As to be expected, due to its small geographical size that facilitates 
greater social cohesion, and the historical struggles for power within Zanzibar and in relation 
to the Union,  the Zanzibar community is politically very active. Focus groups were 
dominated with animated discussions of various issues related to the practice of democracy 
and elections in the country. As the groups were equally represented with participants 
affiliated to the two major political parties in Zanzibar, opinions were equally divided in 
some topics where arguments and counter arguments were presented regarding some aspects 
of democracy and elections. However, the general feeling was that democracy in Zanzibar is 
in crisis. A key informant from the State University of Zanzibar explained the crisis of 
legitimacy marring the regime in Zanzibar, he observed, 
"Democracy is not an isolated phenomenon, it's a process. Among other things, understanding how the 
government comes to power is very important in assessing the practice of democracy. Government that 
attain power through undemocratic ways do not turnout to be custodians of democracy. In Zanzibar, that is 
the situation, all multiparty elections since 1995 have installed governments which lacked legitimacy due to 
rigged elections. Such governments would create state organs, laws, and institutions that can guarantee 
their survival through similar means because they do not depend coming to power through democratic 
means. Otherwise, to consolidate democracy is to commit suicide".  
 
A comment from a discussant in Kangagani group highlighted the feeling that coming to 
power through undemocratic means dwindles citizens trust, as she explained, "you can not 
say you trust a government that come to power through illegal means by rigging election 
results and announce themselves winners while everybody knows the ruling party had lost". 
However, given the specific nature of the government in place, a Government of National 
Unity, which joined the major political parties in its top political leadership structures, 
participants expressed satisfaction with 'Muafaka' [peace accord] that put it in place although 
admitting that the future was not so bright:  
"When Muafaka came, it resolved a lot of disputes and smoothened relationships. We hope we can continue 
this way. However, we do not ask this to happen and God forbid, but with what is happening now the future 
looks obscure. Hatred politics may return after this election"  [A discussant from Uweleni] 
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Another elderly discussant affiliated to the ruling party from Chokocho group commented on 
the improvement of democracy, peace and cooperation brought by the formation of GNU 
government and he compared the situation with the past, "if you know where we come from, 
you know we are much better today. We had one party for long time, and later when 
multiparty was introduced,  people were very hostile to each other, they couldn't sit like this 
to talk to each other". 
 
Experiences of elections has been accompanied with political instability and violence in 
Zanzibar since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. Situations have been worse 
in periods towards elections, during elections, and after elections leading to killings in worst 
case, and forcing some people to flee the country. The three peace accords agreed between 
the ruling party (CCM) and the main opposition party (CUF) are evidence of divisive and 
hostile politics in the isles as aftermath of repective elections. Thus, participants were 
understandbly disturbed about the situation, hence they expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Zanzibar Election Committe (ZEC) for its role in elections fraud and were equally critical of 
the role the security organs including police and the special government forces, 
"We accept election results for the sake of peace and stability of our country, but not because the electoral 
commission conducted the election with freedom and fairness. Otherwise this country would have plunged 
into endless chaos long time ago". [A discussant from Chokocho] 
 
"During voting days we vote peacefully in most areas, but when it comes to results the powerful ruling party 
which owns military weapons always becomes the winner. I don't think there is democracy, what we have is 
humiliation, and we don't trust elections in our country". [A discussant from Kangagani] 
 
"When elections get close there is a lot of harassment done by armed forces. Particularly the opposition 
supporters are beaten awkwardly. Multiparty democracy in our country is not fully functioning and not 
satisfactory". [A discussant from Kidongo Chekundu] 
 
"the security organs and special forces in Zanzibar are used only in one period, elections period. The forces 
would be spread all over places, you will even  fail to find a place to pee" [A discussant from Potoa] 
 
In Zanzibar there is also a feeling that most of what happens are conspired between the 
government of Zanzibar and the Union government. Hence, the prospect for genuine 
democracy in Zanzibar hinges up on political development in the Mainland Tanzania, as a 
political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam noted, "the state of democracy will very 
much depend on the developments in the Mainland. If we are going to have sort of political 
change in the Mainland, then that will also contribute to change in Zanzibar. But so long as 
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CCM is so dominant then I don't expect any significant political changes in terms of political 
relations in Zanzibar."  
 
To sum up, all key informants had extremely negative evaluation of democracy and elections 
in Zanzibar. They pinpointed excessive use of force against civilians, breach of freedoms, 
unbalanced playing field where bottom-up structures from Sheha level work aganist 
opposition parties and its supportors. One key informant from civil society organizations 
branded Zanzibar's democracy as 'hypocricy' (implying politics of lies and propaganda). 
Another key informant from civil society organizations added, "we don't have democracy, we 
have domocracy" (implying a rule based on too much talking). It all became worse because 
the rulling party in Zanzibar is "a state party, that is, the party and government are 
inseparable", explained a key informant from State University of Zanzibar. All key 
informants concurred that democracy and elections have significant influence on citizens' 
trust in Zanzibar's polity. Thus, a political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam 
observed that "legitimacy of government will come about if rule of law, transparency, 
accountability, and democracy will be allowed to take roots in Zanzibar". 
6.1.2.2 Perception of corruption 
Perception of corruption was another variable examined in relation to political trust. The 
study hypothesized that citizens' perceptions of increase in corruption would influence their 
trust negatively, while positive performance in combating corruption would increase citizens' 
trust. First of all, respondents were presented with a list of specific institutions and asked 
their perception of how many people they thought were involved in corruption in those 
institutions. Indeed, the results show a relationship between assessment of corruption in 
specific institutions and trust attitudes towards each of them. On the one hand, those who said 
'none of them' and those who 'don't know' consistently expressed higher trust in those 
institutions. On the other hand, those of the opinion that 'some of them', or 'most/all of them'  
were involved in corruption showed lower trust levels.  
 
Analysing further the scale of responses, the findings reveal that perceptions of excessive 
corruption in terms of being said 'most/all' people were involved in corruption,  was highest 
in the Police (50%), followed by Judges and Magistrates (30%), and Members of Parliament 
(25%). Also, perception of corruption ranked by a response that only 'some of the officials' 
were involved in corruption was higher in tax officials (53%), followed by government 
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officials (52%), and local government councillors (52%). In contrast, the office of the 
president and officials of PCCB were found to be the least corrupt institutions. These results 
relates positively to the trust levels in specific institutions presented in chapter four. Those 
institutions perceived to have all or most or some of its officials involved in corruption were 
also shown to have been attributed higher disapproval level such as the police, the courts, and 
the tax department, while the office of the president was revealed to be the least corrupt also 
had the highest trust level. This implies that perception of of increase in corruption has 
negative effects on trust attitudes among citizens. 
 
Similarly, the findings show a statistically significant relationship between overall 
perceptions of corruption and trust when respondents were asked of their perceptions of the 
level of corruption in the country over the past year. As shown in Table 15 below, an 
astonishing majority of respondents (91%) indicated that the level of corruption had increased 
a lot/somewhat, and disapproval was higher within this group. Likewise, those who thought 
corruption had decreased or stayed the same expressed 100 percent support to the 
government. However, the margin of difference within group leaves some doubt about the 
strength of influence perception of corruption has on individual trust attitudes. As illustrated 
among those who thought corruption had increased alot/somewhat (218 out of 227), their 
negative evaluation did not strongly skew their trust levels to that extent, they remained 
relatively equally divided.  
 
Table 15: Relationship Between Perception of Corruption and Trust 
 Increased a lot  Increased 
somewhat  
Stayed the same Decreased 
somewhat 
High trust% 45 47 100 100 
Low trust% 55 53 .0 .0 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
N=227 n=154 n=64 n=3 n=6 
Question: In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, 
or stayed the same? 
 
Qualitative data from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews are in line with the 
above findings. Opinions from focus group discussions were dominated by perceptions of 
rampant corruption in Zanzibar. Participants showed a wide understanding of the meaning of 
corruption and its various types, forms and manifestations. They talked about corruption at 
higher levels of the government (grand corruption), lower levels (petty corruption) and policy 
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levels (political corruption). They also discussed corruption in monetary terms (bribery), 
fraud, misuse of office, and other forms of malpractices. Indeed, participants showed 
awareness of the negative effects of corruption in their lives. Some of these understanding 
can be appreciated from their own words presented below. It is important to note that there 
was no even a single positive evaluation of government efforts to the fight corruption, and 
opinions did not differ by participants' age, sex, education, or political affiliation. The general 
feeling was that corruption was deeply rooted in Zanzibar, as expressed by a discussant from 
Potoa: 
"In my opinion, bribery has now become legal. You don't get anything if you don't give something. Bribery is 
no longer an enemy of justice, instead it has become something that makes someone progressive, and the 
easiest ways to get your needs, rights, and justice."  
 
Another participant was similarly pessimistic about the possibility of a corruption-free 
Zanzibar, she expressed herself this way:  
"Corruption has deeper roots in our country. Even in our political parties when you want to contest for 
position you must bribe. In our country corruption is practiced top-down, and hence it will be there to stay" 
[A participant from Kibeni] 
 
Crosschecking participants opinions about their reference of open bribery incidents within 
CCM party referendum for candidacy nomination, the researcher through documentary 
review confirmed that about 20 politicians including bigwig politicians were accused by the 
Zanzibar Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority (ZAECA, 2015). 
 
Institutions that were constantly blamed for corruption included the police, the courts of laws, 
and the local councils. A discussant from Potoa group observed;  "the police is leading in 
corruption and the courts follow suit. Look at police job posts, people are buying it at around 
eight hundred thousand shillings. Consequently, when you 'purchase' it you will want to 
recoup your money through that position". Another partipant added, "in this country if you 
want employment, all your credentials are put aside. They will need to know where you come 
from, which party do you support, who do you know, and if everything ticks well they will 
want to know how much bribe you can give. The police, the courts, and the district councils 
are all in deep corruption" (from Potoa). Constant references were made about nepotism, 
sexual bribery, bribery in employment and in social services. Participants shared personal 
experiences of corruptions and some common stories of corrupt practices such as corruption 
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during elections, which the researcher confirmed to have been reported by the Zanzibar Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Authority- ZAECA (see, ZAECA 2015). 
 
Elaborating on consequences of corruption, participants argued that corruption puts the 
security of their lives at stake, makes injustices a prevailing norm, and is an obstacle to 
progress. Participants also blamed corruption practices for a flow of illegal drugs into the 
country which kill the youths, the labour force of the nation: 
"I tell you we are no longer safe. Corruption cost people their lives in hospitals. Corruption let 
crimes go unpunished and as a consequence it hunt down victims. One day, in a 'daladala' [local 
public transport] a police officer was telling people to make sure when they catch thieves they cut 
their leg heels or stab them at the back with a sharp-end weapon before they submit them to the 
police so as to make sure they are not able to stand again. Because even if you send them to the 
police they will be let free due to corruption". [A discussant from Potoa] 
 
"It hurts so much when institutions that supposed to serve justice becomes champions of 
corruption and mulpractices. Corruption in the state apparatus such as the courts, and the police, 
is more distractive than in social services". [A discussant from Utaani] 
 
"This country will not progress when leaders embezzle money for their private accumulation. Such 
amount of money could have been used to give loans to higher education students, and to improve 
agriculture and social service facilities such as in health sector." [A discussant from Uweleni] 
 
However, there was a general feeling among participants in focus groups and some key 
informants of in-depth interviews that grand corruption was not so common in Zanzibar, "I 
have not heard of any big scandals of embezzlement of public funds in Zanzibar. We hear this 
from Tanzania Mainland such as corruption scandals involving former prime minister of 
Tanzania, Hon. Edward Lowasa, and Hon. Anna Tibaijuka. That type of corruption is not 
common in Zanzibar", claimed a discussant from Chokocho. On the contrary, others argued 
that grand corruption was there and it seriously destroys the country, it is only not visible 
because of a system of 'protecting each other': 
"I know that even the highest paid individuals here in Zanzibar do not exceed four million 
Tanzanian shillings per month. How could four million translate into several houses in a short 
time, each costing over hundred millions? We know for example, the second vice president of 
Zanzibar, Hon. Seif Ali Iddi, was questioned in the House of Representative for his embezzlement 
of public funds in the purchase of government ship from Japan. Using government money he 
bought an extra ship for his own. But nothing was done, they are protecting each other". [A 
participant from Kidongo Chekundu] 
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"In the past our parents worked in civil service for their life time and managed to own a bicycle. 
But today, within one year of employment they have three houses and luxurious cars. How much is 
the salary?!". [ Questioned a discussant from Jang'ombe] 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by several key informants from civil society, and journalists 
based in Zanzibar. Their views are summed up by this veteran Journalist: 
"The state of corruption in Zanzibar is serious than how it is reported. To the extent that those who 
get into power becomes filthy rich in few days. In fact the easiest way to get rich in Zanzibar is to 
be a leader in any of government institutions. Now the people of Zanzibar are acquainted to it, and 
they feel its part of life"  
 
The above views were coroborated by majority opinions of key informants through in-depth 
interviews. All key informants concured that corruption is at the peak in Zanzibar, but is 
made less visible due to a weak accountability and governance system in Zanzibar, as one 
prominent political scientist from University of Dar es Salaam opined, "in Zanzibar the level 
of corruption is very high, and part of the reason is that leaders can do whatever they want 
because of the system of accountability. There is a tendency of protecting each other. That's 
why there are so many scandals in Zanzibar including scandals relating to poor land 
management, there is a lot of corruption. And because of partisan politics, you can hardly 
deal with these problems." Another academician from the State University of Zanzibar added, 
"because corruption is a major obstacle to democracy and the rule of law, it tend to thrive in 
a non-democratic state. Even if you are corrupt, provided that  you played your part in 
maintaining the status quo, then you will survive." And an independent veteran journalist 
claimed that the situation is worse because "apart from the apparent lack of transparency, the 
media which is supposed to be a public watchdog, has not taken the issue of corruption 
seriously in Zanzibar".  
6.1.2.3 Perception of Political Stability 
In examining perceptions of political stability, I rely on qualitative data from focus groups, 
in-depth interviews, and direct observation method. The Afrobarometer survey did not have a 
specific question asking respondents about their general perceptions of political stability, 
instead there were questions regarding experiences of crimes in the community and personal 
experiences of electoral violence. However, since the issue of Political stability is a 
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pronounced feature of Zanzibar politics, it is important to examine its influence on trust 
attitudes.  
 
Security is of utmost importance for human life; it is crucial for economic development, 
governance, and social progress. Although I examine political stability in particular, 
participants also discussed security conditions in society in general. This topic was 
introduced to investigate citizens perceptions of peace and security in Zanzibar, and in 
particular their assessment of political stability or political instability for the past five year 
under the Government of National Unity. I also wanted to know how much these perceptions 
impact on their trust in government institutions. The assumption was that if people were 
satisfied with the security situation they would trust the government more, but on the 
contrary, if a sense of insecurity prevails then they would trust the government less. 
 
Findings from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews confirms the hypothesis of the 
study. A sense of peace and security, in this case political stability, aroused a feeling of 
satisfaction and praise for the government institutions, while a sense of insecurity or political 
instability instilled fear and loss of trust. The importance of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) was mostly acknowledged  for its role in bringing peace and stability in the 
country. It had promised to bury the four decades history of political instability since the re-
introduction of multiparty democracy. A remark from a discussant from Uweleni focus group 
make this very clear, "what helped to stop the breach of peace was the establishment of this 
GNU.  For a while now, we have lived without violence, killings, and unjust acts committed 
against us. So, now when we hear that  the government wants to abolish GNU, we start to 
fear". Another discussant from Chokocho had similar opinion, he remarked, "in a 
cosmopolitan community like ours, the role of top political leaders in maintaining political 
stability and democratic practices is very crucial. They need to avoid hatred confrontations 
that will lead to clashes between party supporters. This is why we commend the Muafaka in 
the GNU. We have been living in peace and understanding in this period" 
 
The first three years under the GNU were very much commended as the most peaceful period 
since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zanzibar. A key informant from the State 
University of Zanzibar, an author who in his previous writing evaluated the GNU as a 




, now has changed his mind, "If I was writing the paper now, I would 
have different opinion. We wrote that in 2011/2012 and we looked into evidences on the 
ground, there were every indicators in support of our conclusions. But, it's now clear that 
that was just a temporary measure which we experienced after the reconciliation, 2010, 
2011, and 2012. But from then onward the situation has gone back to 'normal'- the country is 
not stable and there is no future- the trend of political confrontation, and politics of hostility 
have re-emerged". Another key informant added about the GNU, "the structure has remained 
constitutionally, which is not very stable in any case, but the spirit of GNU has dissappeared. 
And I think that is the problem when old politics comes in despite the structure that it was 
supposed to bring." 
A sense of insecurity, clear signs of violence, and political intimidation were evident towards 
the preparation for the national elections and this was observed during the research fieldwork. 
Hence discussants accused the security organs as perpetrators of violence: 
"at the community level security is not a big problem. But my worries is when there is political conflicts, the 
security apparatus does not seem to be working impartially. They are pro-ruling party and oppressing the 
opposition parties always". [A discussant from Chokocho] 
 
"Sabotage is being perpetrated during election periods. Those who are supposed to protect us [the police] 
are the ones who rob us in our homes." [A discussant from Utaani] 
 
"The army has done very well, but the police and government special forces have  abandoned their 
responsibilities to citizens and instead they are operating on partisan lines.Our country is not safe from the 
conduct of the police." [A discussant from Utaani]  
 
The politicization of security organs in Zanzibar is said to be very high and is costing the 
peace and stability in the islands. Even at societal level, discussants were mobilizing for mob 
justice as a recourse should they encounter crimes due to perceptions of corrupt and 
politicized security organs. A key informant referred to the ongoing torture and persecution 
of citivilians mostly targetted to political opposition during daytime and in public places by a 
group of masked and armed militia believed to be part of the government special forces, he 
observed, "these people who now appear as Ninjas (Janjaweed forces) who wear masks. If 
they are members of official government forces, why should they be wearing Ninja? How 
come in the past we didn’t have that? That is increasing insecurity, and I have heard people 
say ‘I don’t think I can stay here during this election’, because they are afraid of the 
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 Nassor, A. and Jose, J. (2014), 'Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic 
Consensus?', Journal of Southern African Studies, 40:2, 247-265. 
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violence. I mean, a member of the House of Representatives has been recorded [in a 
confidential meeting] telling people to 'beat up the opposition people, but not to kill them, 
otherwise beat them until they look like 'chandarua'[mosquito net]. Now, that kind of 
language." The researcher personally observed the deteriorting security situation and the 
outrageous persecution of civilians by a gang of masked militia (Figure 12), which the 
government claimed not to be aware of. Their acts were instilling fear among citizens as one 
discussant from Kibeni expressed it, "do not be suprised, even here we can suddenly be 
ambushed and attacked for nothing at all. They can catch one or two of us and beat them 
severely. No security. There are those Ninjaz and the government says it doesn't recognize 
them" [A discussant from Kibeni].  
 
 
Figure 12: Masked Armed-gang Beating Civilians in Unguja using Government 
Vehicles 
 
Source: Field Observation July-September 2015 
 
Generally, the security situation towards the October 2015 elections was volatile and unstable 
and the acts of these militia groups could have triggered outright violent conflict. A key 
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informant, a political analyst, assessed the situation, he argued "the fundamental issues have 
not been resolved, the possibility of deterioration of political relations is still there 
particularly when it comes to managing the elections. We have not experienced any peaceful 
transfer of power from one political party to another. The other thing that has not been 
resolved is the issue of the Union that also seems to be dividing the followers of the two main 
parties. So I think these two key issues are highly divisive in Zanzibar's politics and they can 
lead to violence any time. It is only that when violence erupts in Zanzibar, the likelihood is 
that it can be contained by the Union government." Such is what happened after the October 
2015 election which was a annulled by the government in power, and a re-run of election was 
conducted on March 2016 of which the main opposition party (CUF) boycotted, claiming it 
had won the october elections, and that its annullment was unconstitutional. Zanzibar was 
consequently put under a tight military control by the Union government. Since then, 
Zanzibar political situation has remained tense with frequent incidences of violence.  
 
6.1.3 Satisfaction with Social Service Delivery 
In the Afrobarometer survey, participants were asked to mention three most important 
problems facing the country that the government should address. Social services came up as 
the top three priorities; health (159), education (104), and water supply (55). Other problems 
included unemployment (46), wages, income and salaries (45), corruption (39), management 
of the economy (38), infrastructure (27), and electricity (23) among others. Likewise, when 
respondents were asked to specify priority sectors for additions investment should the 
government decide to increase its spending,  the findings show that health (198), education 
(171), and infrastructure (35) emerged as top three priorities. This shows the prominence of 
social services for citizens' day-to-day wellbeing.  
 
The study hypothesized that the more positively the citizens evaluate social service delivery 
the more they would express high level of trust in public institutions. The findings in Table 16 
below show that 183 respondents out of 231 (79%) perceived the government as doing 
very/fairly badly in addressing the problems, while 48 (21%) were of the opinion that the 
problems were addressed very/fairly well. Indeed, the result show a positive relationship 
between perception of performance in social service delivery and citizens' trust attitudes. 
Trust was lower among those who evaluated the government negatively (45%), while 
positive assessment resulted into higher trust (58%). 
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Table 16: Relationship Between Satisfaction with Social Service Provision and Trust 
 Very/Fairly badly  Very/Fairly well  
High trust% 45 58 
Low trust% 55 42 
Total % 100 100 
N=231 n=183 n=48 
Question: Thinking of the problem you mentioned first, in your opinion, how well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling this problem, or haven't you heard enough to say? 
 
Probed further about the identified problems, participants were asked whether there was any 
other political party that could do a better job in solving the problems. In this regard 
participants remained loyal to their party affiliations whereby 149 respondents said 'no', and 
81 said 'yes'. This roughly represents the political affiliation of the sample with a very slight 
variation arguably from those who earlier reported not to be affiliated with any political party 
(see part affiliation in Table 10 above). Similarly, when asked specifically which one 
between rulling and opposition political parties is most able to address improving basic health 
services, similar patterns of responses was observed. About 144 respondents still had faith in 
the rulling party, while 82 thought the opposition parties would do a better job.  
 
In addition, when asked whether they would support or oppose if the government decided to 
make people pay more taxes or user fees in order to increase spending on public health care, 
majority of repondents (58%) said they would strongly/somewhat oppose it, compared to 
those who would support the decision (40%), while few (2%) said they would neither support 
nor oppose. The within group percentages indeed show that trust was lower among those who 
were opposed to the decision, whereas support was higher among those who supported the 
decision. Again, the observed difference was statistically significant, supporting the study's 
hypothesis about the influence of performance in social services delivery on trust attitudes. 
Besides, the observed opposition against the increase of taxation can be interpreted as citizens 
resistence as they do not see how their taxes are re-invested in improving social service 
delivery. 
 
The above findings are supported by qualitative findings from focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews. There were mixed opinions among focus group participants and key 
informants with regard to satisfaction with social service delivery. However, most 
participants acknowledged that social services in terms of health care, education, clean water, 
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roads, and electricity were the most important things that matter in their lives, and thus its 
improvement would definately boost their trust to the government in power. A discussant 
from Kangagani made it clear, "when social services are good, I am happy with my life, I 
can't complain much about other things, but when they are bad, I am trusting the government 
less and less." 
 
In most cases participants offered positive views on road infrustracture improvement both in 
Unguja and Pemba. A discussant from Utaani probably made an overstatement in 
commending government efforts, he noted "regarding road infrastructure, Pemba is now like 
Europe to a large extent. All main roads have been constructed and most of them very 
recently. Even interior roads at various places are now passable". Nevertheless, there were 
still some critical comments about road qualities where participants pointed out that most of 
them were very thin and slippery, something that causes frequent road accidents. Also 
participants were able to mention some important roads near their localities which  were still 
in very bad shapes including Chambani and Chaani roads in Pemba and Unguja, respectively. 
For instance, a discussant from Kangagani commented, "others say we have good roads! 
Have you visited Chambani? a pregnant women would deliver in the car, will not reach 
hospital due to the road situation. Still we have problems. Even these new roads they are very 
thin to pass two cars and are very slippery. That's why we hear road accidents everyday". 
 
The rest of social services, such as health care, clean water, education, and electricity, despite 
some moderate positive remarks, were assessed in a highly negative tone. To begin with, 
official statistics show that 100 percent of Zanzibar households are within 5 kilometers of a 
primary health care facility (URT, 2016a). Nevertheless, participants in focus group 
discussions noted that the delivery of health care service was the worst of all services. They 
did not argue on the proximity of healthcare facilities, but rather the access and quality of the 
services was the major problems. Participants discussed about problems of poor and 
irresponsible healthcare services coupled with corruption, and unfulfilled healthcare policy 
promises such as free healthcare for pregnant women. These two comments from Utaani 
clarify the point of poor healthcare: 
"On health service in my view, we are very poor and backward. We have some few hospital buildings but the 
services are extremely poor, no doctors and no medicine. Sometimes you have only one doctor attending so 
many patients and is not available most of the time. I have witnessed a child who was sent to the hospital 
crying with lots of pain and stayed long hours until his death without being attended by a doctor". 
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Another discussant in the same group echoed similar sentiments, he noted, 
 "At our place for instance, we only have one doctor who can perform a surgery procedure, he is famously 
known by the name 'Dr. Salum operation'. If he is not around, patient will stay three months no one else 
among the available staff can perform operation. In fact, no serious medical treatment is available, how 
could we say we have medical service?"  
 
Clean water service was also discussed widely with disatisfaction. Most participants 
acknowledged the presence of some sort of improvement in water infrustracture from central 
water authority, but still in most areas clean water was not available. When a moderater asked 
discussants how many times a week they get water from government pipelines, their answers 
varied, where in some cases they said once a week, others once a month, and to the extreme 
participants from Jang'ombe replied "once a year", and another discussant added,  "I have 
never seen it recently, I even forgot if we have water pipelines in our homes. May be the rain 
water, but not water from ZAWA [Zanzibar Water Authority]", and another explained further 
"until election times, like this time since yesterday we have started getting it because election 
is nearby." Alarmingly, Jang'ombe lies at the heart of the Zanzibar city, and clearly their 
neighbours, Kidongo Chekundu, have similar problems with clean water services as one 
discussant pointed out, "we don't get water in our area until the water pipes get rusty, when 
water comes first the rusty water comes out for long. The whole week and sometimes a month 
we get it once. Always there is un-ending rationing distribution of water, and this is in town 
area. It's a shame". In the rural area it wasn't much different, as a discussant from Potoa 
observed, "it's one thing to have them present, and quite another to ensure their accessibility, 
effectiveness and sustainable use. For example, in our village we rely on a drilled well 
constructed by our MP, and thanks to him,  but our neighbouring village had a problem with 
water pipelines, it took a year or so to fix the problem. So, these are the challenges". 
 
The Zanzibar Household Survey 2014/15 report that only about 38% of the population has 
water access within home, of which rural households have less access (23.9%) compared to 
urban househols (56.5%). However, the survey shows that about 96.9% of Zanzibar 
population have access to water within 1 kilometer distance (URT, 2016a). Though these 
statistics show some relative improvement, the situation seems worse in terms of actual 
availability of clean water as questioned by discussants above. Similarly, a key informant 
from the University of Dar es Salaam observed that water services have deteriorated even in 
  103 
 
town areas, but noted some improvement in infrastructures such as roads,  he argued, 
"Zanzibar is not a big country, so I wouldn't expect people living in urban areas for example 
in Zanzibar town that they don't have access to clean water. In the past, even during colonial 
time, or even during 1980s and 1990s, there was no serious shortage of water. There is some 
improvement in areas of infrastructures such as road infrastructures where most areas can 
be easily accessed. But, generally I think the services are very poor". 
 
Other services such as education and electricity supply were associated with unaffordable 
costs for many poor people, and for education, in particular, the quality was put into critical 
scrutiny,  
"These services have been brought closer. For example the government has been able to bring the main 
electricity line close to our houses. However, most people still can't afford to pay the associated fees for the 
services. Water, electricity, health, and education, non of them is free of charge. Many people cannot afford 
their daily food, how could they afford to pay for these expenses". [A discussant from Chokocho] 
 
The supply of electricity in Zanzibar is still far from covering even half of the population. 
Only 44.2% of the households have electricity supply, and expected the rural areas is less 
connected to electricity (20.3%) than the urban households (75.5%).  The unaffordable costs 
could indeed be the reason for this situation. 
 
Many key informants were more concerned with the quality aspect of education as they 
analysed education policy and assessed the performance of primary and secondary education. 
Large numbers of pupils in a single classroom was mentioned as a sign of a rotten education 
system: 
"Today if you go to some of those primary schools it is very sad, a 100 children in one classroom, no tables, 
no desks to sit on. This is what I saw when I went for get my registration card. Children are sitting on the 
ground, and the ground was full of holes. It was not even a straight floor. But then I am told that two 
teachers in a class teaching at the same time, one stands behind there to maintain discipline." [A 'retired' 
key informant] 
 
Generally, poor social services were complained by participants of all age groups and of 
different party support. It was clear that lack of improvement in social services delivery had 
deeply negative effect of citizens trust to the government. The situation becomes worse when 
they feel that other sections of the society are getting better treatment from the government, 
as this discussant from Jang'ombe made it clear, "we urge the government to also consider us 
living in this area. We are also human beings, we are not wild animals. They shouldn't just 
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think about Mazizini and Chukwani where owners of big and luxurious cars stay. We in 
Jang'ombe are also humans". Such an emotional statement must truly have an eroding effect 
on one's trust to the government. Hence, the views presented above confirms the positive 
influence of good performance in social services delivery over citizens trust in government, 
and bad performance on the contrary dwindles trust. 
6.2 Overall Policy Performance of the Central Government 
In addition to the findings on institutional performance presented above, the Afrobarometer 
survey, also examined citizens' percentions of the performance of central government based 
on how well or badly it was handling some key functional responsibilities. These were; (a) 
Managing the economy, (b) Improving living standards of the poor, (c) Creating jobs, (d) 
Keeping prices down, (e) Narrowing income gaps, (f) Reducing crime, (g) Improving basic 
health services, (h)Addressing educational needs, (i) Providing water and sanitation services, 
(j) Ensuring everyone has enough to eat, (k) Fighting corruption, (l) Maintaining roads and 
bridges, and (m) Providing reliable electric supply. 
 
The findings show that throughout the above responsibilities, the central government was 
evaluated vehemently negative. Above 92 percent were of the opinion that the government 
did very/fairly badly in handling the following functions: narrowing income gaps, ensuring 
enough to eat, fighting corruption, managing the economy, improving living standards, 
keeping prices down, and creating jobs. Also, above 87 percent of respondents thought the 
government did very/fairly badly in handling; improving basic health services, educational 
needs, and provision of water and sanitation; while handling maintaining roads and reliable 
supply of electricity was evaluated negatively at 77 and 65 percents, respectively. However, 
some modest perceptions of positive performance was notable in the provision of reliable 
electricity (35%), followed by maintenance of road and bridges (23%), and reduction of 
crime (21%). 
 
In analysing the overall performance throughout the above-mentioned functions, the findings 
reveal a positive relationship between perception of job performance and trust attitudes. As 
shown in Table 17 below, the findings show that trust was higher (88%) among those who 
said the government did "very/fairly well", while those who said the government did 
"very/fairly badly" showed higher disapproval level (53%). The variation is statistically 
significant, though in analytical terms the limited strength of influence of institutional or 
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policy performance on trust attitudes as depicted in various findings above suggest that in 
Zanzibar institutional trust is a phenomenon of composite influence of several factors . For 
example, as shown in Table 17, below, the fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents 
(224 out of 240) thought that overall the government performed very/fairly badly in the above 
mentioned functions, nevertheless trust attitudes within the same group was almost equally 









Table 17: Relationship Between Overall Central Government Performance and Trust 
 Very/Fairly well Very/Fairly bad 
High trust% 88 47 
Low trust% 12 53 
Total % 100 100 
N=240 n=16 n=224 
Question: Now let’s speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly 
would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
 
To examine the strength of influence further, participants were asked to say if the opposition 
political parties presented a viable alternative in governing the country. There was positive 
perceptions of the opposition political parties as viable alternatives, whereby 53 percent 
agreed, and 45 percent disagreed. However, when asked specifically to say which between 
the ruling and opposition political parties would do a better job in handling fighting 
corruption, controlling prices, and creating job, their responses show a great deal of 
relationship to their party affiliation consistently throughout the three problems mentioned 
above. For instance, about 103 out of 113 CCM supporters maintained their faith in ruling 
party in handling fighting corruption despite having assessed its performance highly 
negatively on how it has handled corruption. Likewise, majority of the opposition supporters 
opted for the opposition parties as the more capable of addressing the problems, whereby for 
example, 62 of 81 CUF supporters thought the opposition could do a better job. There was a 
small variation in this regard for those who were not affiliated with any party, most of whom 
supported the ruling party (21 out of 40), and some of them (13) opted for opposition political 
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parties. The inter-party faith was very minimal, where only 4 out of 113 CCM supporters 
thought the opposition could do better, and 14 out of 81 respondents affiliated to CUF 
showed faith with the ruling party. Quite similar figures were observed when asked in 
relation to the handling of the other two functions, namely; controlling prices and creating 
jobs. 
 
Data from qualitative focus group discussions and in-depth interview support the findings 
that considerations of performance are significant in explaining trust attitudes in Zanzibar. 
Majority of discussant in focus group discussions, about 90 percent, suggested that 
performance factors were key in forging their trust attitudes, while at the same time 
vehemently rejecting the idea that identities were of major influence in Zanzibar politics. A 
respondent from Uweleni focus group, when asked to comment if party support makes 
supporters blind in judging the government, she replied, "I dont think so! If the government 
can improve people's economic conditions and control prices, we cannot lose trust. In my 
view, it's not about party support, it's about how the government treats its vitizens". Another 
discussant from Utaani put his argument this way, "trust is a pillar for peace and stability. 
It's not that in our society we don't have trust, we do. In Pemba for example you can sleep 
outside your house safely, but if you go to the Mainland Tanzania and sleep outside the house 
they will cut your legs. But, trust in government is a different thing, the government has to 
perform to fulfil people's needs and abide to the rule of law, then it will gain  their trust." 
[Emphasis is mine] 
 
There were constant mentions of performance examples which in discussants opinions were  
strongly shaping people's trust in government. One recent issue which in their opinion has 
strongly eroded trust among citizens was the handling of Uamsho
15
 leaders' case. A 
discussant from Kangagani gives this example to elaborate her argument, she opined, "for 
instance, this issue of imprisoning our sheikhs, has infuriated many, both suppoters of CCM 
and opposition. So its about how the government conducts its affairs not identity.This issue 
has even made people change their party affiliation". Also, many other discussants pointed at 
discriminatory practices and policies executed by the revolutionary government against some 
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 Uamsho (Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation) became actively engaged in politics during 
constitutional review process, mobilizing support based on Zanzibari nationalism calling for separation from the 
Union. Uamsho leaders were ultimately detained accused of terrorism charges. 
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sections of the society and in favor of others as another performance factor eroding trust. For 
instance, a discussant from Chokocho provided his personal experince to illustrate his point, 
"Certain sections of this society enjoy more benefits from the government not because of their ethnicity, but 
for political reasons. For example, people from Makunduchi fill most of employment posts from the 
government. Other sections are discriminated against again because of political reasons. Myself, I have 
been a victim. I had applied for a post to join the Police. I passed the interview and was selected to go to 
Moshi, in Tanzania Mainland for training. As we were boarding the ship to Dar es Salaam, an officer known 
as 'Franco Ali Mweupe'pointed at me and  said that I was a Pemban and that I am not fit for the position. I 
was removed immediately from the ship. That was it, just because I am from Pemba".  
 
Another discussant feels discriminatory practices responsible for the decline of trust, 
"In Zanzibar hatred is ingrained in politics. Politics of discrimination, absence of justice, and prejudice. The 
government treat its people based on where they are from, and which party they belong. Trust in government 
fades away due to this, nothing less nothing more". [A discussant from Kibeni] 
 
Other performance issues cited include a thorny agenda of Zanzibar's autonomy in the Union 
and its associated discontentments. In highlighting where the government could improve to 
bolster its citizens' trust in its institutions, discussants stressed variety of issues which showed 
that individuals' are shaped by specific preferences. Some highlighted economic issues such 
as double taxation, price control in food items, addressing employment problem, and 
narrowing income gap. Others thought political performance was more important and 
highlighted issues such as ensuring freedom of speech, political stability, championing 
Zanzibar's autonomy, fighting corruption, enhancing media freedom, transparency and 
accountability, and ensuring justice. There were indeed those who singled out provision of 
free or affordable social services as most important. 
 
It should be noted that in the framework of this study, performance considerations include 
both positive and negative performance perceptions. On the one hand, it embraces positive 
achievements, positive policies, and positive practices affecting the society which reinforce 
citizens' trust. On the other hand, it also include negative practices, ineffective delivery, and 
negative policies which are corrosive to citizens' trust attitudes. Therefore, as shown in 
various findings above, performance considerations are significant in enhancing or destroying 
citizens' trust in government institutions. 
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6.3 Overall Performance of Local Government Councils 
The study also examined citizens' perception of performance of local government in handling 
the following key responsibilities; (a) Maintaining local roads, (b) Maintaining local market 
places, (c)Making audit findings of the council known to the people, (d)Handling complaints 
about local government councilors or officials, (e) Guaranteeing that local government 
revenues are used for public services and not diverted for private gain, and (f) Managing 
conflicts over land. The findings reveal that the local councils were negatively evaluated 
throughout the six aspects mentioned above at above 82 percent in each, except in managing 
conflicts over land (73%). 
 
However, when perceptions of performance of local government was cross-tabulated with 
trust level, the findings show no relationship between the two variables. It should be noted 
that in this case, the trust score used was specifically for the local government council where 
people were asked how much do they trust their local government council as an insitution. 
Again, there were overwhelming negative evaluations of local government performance in 
executing its responsibilities, whereby 207 out of 233 respondents (89%) said it performed 
very/fairly badly. Nonetheless, as seen in Table 18 below, trust in local council was equally 
divided even among those who had evaluated it negatively, though trust was higher among 
those who said the local government did very/fairly well. This could be attributed to 
particularised trust attitudes where individuals tends to trust others who are familiar with. The 
proximity of local government and their day-to-day interractions with citizens'enhance trust 
among the population despite their poor performance. 
 
Table 18: Relationship Between Overall Local Government Performance and Trust 
 Very/Fairly well Very/Fairly bad 
High trust% 73 50 
Low trust% 27 50 
Total % 100 100 
N=233 n=26 n=207 
Question: What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I mean your municipal or 
local government council. How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
 
Findings from qualitative focus groups and in-depth interviews also show that local 
government councils were evaluated negatively. In Zanzibar, the administrative structures at 
the lower echelon have lesser autonomy from the central government (Bakari, 2011), and are 
closely interwoven in terms of implementation at local level. Participants claimed that the 
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local government councils were highly politicized, lacks transparency, unaccountable, and 
irresponsive of popular demands. A discussant from Potoa suggested that delays in solving 
problems related to social services like water are most of the times due to inefficiency of the 
local government councils, he opined, "sometimes it's the Municipal councils which are 
irresponsible. They collect revenues from citizens but they fail to address a simple problem 
for over a long period of time. The least they could do is to report it to higher authorities on 
time if they can't handle it". 
 
At the lowest level local administration in Zanzibar is exercised through the Sheha who is the 
head of Shehia administration. Shehia is equivalent to village government in the Mainland's 
local administration structure. Sheha is appointed by the Regional Commissioner in 
consultation with the District Commissioner and currently all of them are members of the 
ruling party. They are part of the local administration although officially they are part of the 
central government structure at lower level (see Table 19). Participants in focus group 
discussions were more familiar with Shehas than the district councils or town councils. Most 
of them knew very little about the local government councils proper. To them, Sheha, deputy 
sheha, and their councils were a reference points for local government councils. Generally, 
they  held negative evaluation of the roles of Shehas claiming that they operate on biased 
basis, motivated by ruling party orders, and they are obstacles to citizens access of their 
political rights and social justices. 
 
Table 19: Sub-National Administrative Structures in Zanzibar 
 Unguja Pemba Total 
Regions 3 2 5 
Districts 7 4 10 
District Councils 6 4 9 
Municipal Council 1 0 1 
Town Councils 0 3 3 
Shehia 258 131 389 
Source: Field data, July-September 2015. 
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6.4 Discussion 
Perceptions of overall central government performance was positively correlated to trust 
attitudes, whereby positive evaluation resulted into higher trust level while negative 
evaluation resulted into lower trust levels (see Table 17). Indeed, focus groups findings 
showed a mixture of considerations of the performance factors, where some participants 
prioritized economic performance, others political performance, while others thought 
performance on social service delivery was important. Overall, the findings show that 
political performance in terms of perceptions of corruption, and satisfaction with democracy 
and elections, and performance in social service delivery had somewhat the strongest impact 
on citizens trust attitudes. Another important performance area is the perceptions of political 
stability, though I could not examine this using quantitative data.  Hence, performance 
considerations were significant in explaining trust attitudes among Zanzibaris. However, the 
study did not find strong evidences to link satisfaction with the national economy and 
satisfaction with individual's economic conditions with trust level.  
 
Several studies support the performance perspective although with prominence of one factor 
over the other. Fr instance, Rose and Mishler (2010) suggested that in new democracies, trust 
or distrust in political institutions was based on political and economic performance. 
Similarly, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) also found that positive evaluation of government 
performance strongly reinforces institutional trust. Similar to this study, Mishler & Rose, 
(2001) observed that institutional performance was the key to citizens' trust in political 
institutions, and were strongly in favour of political performance in terms of fighting 
corruption and improving democracy, as well as responding to public priorities. Findings 
from Ghana also corroborate the superiority of institutional performance factors (Godefroidt, 
et. al., 2015). 
 
In relation to satisfaction with democracy and elections, findings reveled that majority of 
respondents were generally satisfied with exercise of democracy, and their trust reflected 
their satisfaction, while dissatisfaction with elections yielded lower trust among majority of 
respondents (see Table 13 and Table 14 above). Indeed, results showed despair among 
respondents (94%) on the role of elections in ensuring voters choice, disciplining office 
holders, and especially removing leader from office. Thus, the study's hypotheses both for 
democracy and elections variable were supported. Findings from qualitative data sources 
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further elaborated that coming to power through undemocratic means dwindles citizens trust. 
The findings revealed that despite the violations of democracy and unfairness of elections in 
Zanzibar, experiences of electoral violence and persistent political conflict meant that people 
accepted the outcome of elections for the sake of peace and stability, which partly explain the 
observed trust attitudes. The prominent of political factors is backed up by empirical 
research. For example, Haagensen (2016) found democracy and corruption as strongly and 
negatively affecting institutional trust in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Moreover, citizens' perceptions of corruption was positively correlated to their trust attitudes, 
hence supporting the hypothesis of the study. The findings revealed that majority of 
respondents perceived public institutions as corrupt and their institutional trust was similarly 
lower (as shown in Table 15 above). However, although citizens held high perceptions of 
increase in corruption in the country (91%), that was not equally reflected in their trust level. 
Interestingly, the findings on perceptions of corruption was found to be consistent with trust 
in specific institutions, whereby those institutions perceived to be corrupt, such as the police 
and the courts, scored the lowest, while the least corrupt institutions such as the office of the 
president was attributed higher trust. Indeed, qualitative findings from in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions corroborated the quantitative results. Corruption was perceived 
to be a threat to security and people's lives as crime went unpunished and embezzlement of 
public funds left people with poor health care. It was further noted that corruption was 
flourishing in a non-democratic environment due to weak accountability system, and more so 
because the media has not seriously exposed it. Other trust studies have revealed similar 
observation, for instance, Cho and Kirwin (2007) found that corruption was important in 
explaining trust in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereby corruption corrodes trust, and mistrust 
increase corruption, hence forming a vicious cycle (see also Haagensen, 2016). Also, Armah-
Attoh (2007) found corruption as 'the major' obstacle to popular trust in public isntitutions.  
 
The findings revealed that satisfaction with social services delivery positively correlated with 
trust, where the positive performance in social services yielded higher trust and perception of 
negative performance resulted into lower trust level (see table Table 16 above). Findings 
from focus group discussions found that, among the five examined services in this study, 
health performed the worst, followed by clean water services, education, and electricity, 
while the government was evaluated relatively positive in improving road infrastructures. In 
most cased participants were concerned about access and quality of services, rather than 
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presence of infrastructure. However, consistent with the conceptual framework of the study, 
participant's evaluation of social service delivery was found to be influenced by party 
attachments as respondents remained loyal when asked whether another political party would 
have done a better job. 
 
Further, in examining perceptions of political stability, I relied on qualitative evidences and 
the findings supported the hypothesis of the study. Although this was not statistically 
measure, citizens opinions from focus group showed high dissatisfaction with the security 
situation. They in particular attributed blame at the security organs of the state for 
perpetrating violence as they were perceived to be highly politicized. However, participants 
seemed to recognize that the role of GNU in maintaining stability compared to their past four 
decades' experiences of political conflicts.  
 
Indeed, findings on citizens' perception of the economy was not strongly related to their trust 
attitudes (see Table 11 and Table 12 above). Findings from focus group discussion revealed 
that citizens prefer to evaluate their individual's economic conditions in rather than the 
national economy, and they expressed high discontentment for not seeing improvement in 
their own lives. Among issues of concern for individual economic conditions included triple 
taxation from organs of union government, Zanzibar central government, and local 
government structures, regional economic disrimination, high unemployment, price inflation, 
low income, and general poverty situation. Nevertheless their negative evaluation did not 
affect their trust level significantly, hence the study' hypothesis was rejected. Qualitative 
evidences suggested that Zanzibaris' religious faith and majority of population's dependence 
on remittances from their Diaspora relatives were important in explaining their divided trust 
attitudes.  
 
Finally, the findings revealed that perception of performance in local government was not 
significant in explaining trust in local councils, where the trust was observed to be equally 
divided (50%) despite an overwhelming majority (89%) evaluating it negatively (see Table 
18 above).  
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
The results in this chapter showed varied citizens' attitudes relating to performance 
consideration. The findings show that political performance in terms of satisfaction with 
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democracy and elections and perceptions of corruption, as well as satisfaction with social 
service delivery,  had the strongest effect on citizens' trust attitudes. Also, perceptions of 
political stability have an impact on political trust. However, the findings revealed that 
economic considerations and evaluation of local government performance was not strongly 
related to expression of trust. Further, the findings show that performance evaluation is also 
influenced by some identity attachments such as political party affiliation. Generally, 










SUMMARY, IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
7 Introduction 
In this chapter I present a summary of the entire study on institutional trust in Zanzibar. The 
chapter begins with an overview of the study in terms of the study problem and methodology 
used. It then provides concluding analysis of the two major independent variables, having 
examined them separately in the previous two chapters. Further, a summary of key findings is 
provided and the study's theoretical framework revisited in the light of the findings. Finally, 
the chapter culminate with some remarks on the limitations of the study, its contribution to 
trust studies, and suggestion for further research. 
7.1 An Overview of the Study 
What explains political trust in Zanzibar? To be more specific, let me put it this way, how 
significant are identities and perceptions of performance on individuals' trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? With this as the central research question, the study's main 
objective was to examine the significance of identity and performance variables in explaining 
citizens' trust attitudes in Zanzibar. The need to examine this question arised due to a research 
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gap in trust literature that has often overlooked the peculiarities of Zanzibar as a polity. Trust 
surveys and empirical studies have often examined Zanzibar within the Tanzania Union 
framework, hence making such a big confusion even with regard to the referent the observed 
trust could be attributed to because of the dual reference posed by the Union and Zanzibar 
governments structures. Above all, such analysis neglect the local political dynamics and 
historical trajectories within Zanzibar. Hence, given the contested scholarly interpretations of 
identities, history, and politics in Zanzibar (see for instance, Killian, 2008; Maliyamkono, 
2000; Bakari, 2001, 2011; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001), it was imperative that an 
independent analysis of trust attitudes of Zanzibaris be made. The study's mapping of the 
influence of identity and performance factors aimed to address this research gap. 
 
Towards that end, the study employed a mixed method approach to examine the influence of 
identity and performance on citizens trust. The approach was particularly important in this 
analysis as it helped to cross-check meanings, interrogate facts, compare findings, and clarify 
some interpretations made from the data. The study utilized rich and up to date sources of 
data including; (i) Afrobarometer Survey round 6 in Tanzania, the most recent survey 
conducted between August and October 2014, and its data-set was officially released for 
public consumption in November 2015, (ii) qualitative field data from 8 focus group 
discussions with ordinary citizens, (iii) 10 in-depth interviews with key informants, (iv) 
documentary review, and (v) direct field observation.  
 
In the light of the study problem, I particularly adopted the identity and institutional 
performance theories of trust that have been so commonly applied in trust studies in African 
context. The central research question was further broken into the following three specific 
questions to guide the analysis; 
1. What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in 
Zanzibar? 
2. Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public institutions 
in Zanzibar? 
3. What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? 
 
After a thorough review of both identity and performance theories of trust, with institutional 
trust as the dependent variable, the study derived two major set of independent variables. 
First; the identity variables, which consisted of 10 variables such as demographic attributes 
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(age, sex, and education), social group identities (ethnicity, location, region, and occupation), 
and common political identities (party affiliation, historical legacy, and national identity), 
and, second; the performance variables, which included 5 aspects, namely, economic 
performance (perception of national and individual's economic conditions), political 
performance (satisfaction with democracy and elections, perceptions of corruption, and 
perceptions of political stability), and performance in social service delivery (health care, 
clean water, electricity suppy, and road infrustructure). Based on the categorization of 
variables mentioned above, and informed by empirical trust studies, the following major 
hypothesis were formulated and tested by further observation; 
 
Hypothesis 1: Age, sex, and education may influence how an individual is inclined to assess 
  government performance and consequently his/her overall political trust. 
Hypothesis 2: Social and political identities may strongly influence one's political trust, or 
  influence significantly one's judgment of government performance, and his/her 
  overall political trust. 
Hypothesis 3: The more positively the citizens assess the performance of government  
  institutions and leaders, the more highly they will express political trust. 
 
The above hypotheses were broken down further for each specific variable as presented in the 
summary of key findings below. The major hypotheses were carefully formulated to reflect 
the interactive nature of variables as depicted in the conceptual framework of the study (see 
Figure 1). With a huge number of variables to examine, the study utilized the advantage of 
qualitative data to tap into citizen's own explanations, and feelings, and experts' opinions 
regarding the problem to arrive at  meaningful conclusions. 
 
7.2 Summary of Key Findings 
Below, I briefly present the key results for each of the specific research questions. The first 
two questions were directly related to the findings of specific variables, while the third was 
meant to provide critical concluding reflections of the findings on the two major independent 
variables in order to determine the one with the most strongest explanatory significance. 
 
1. What influence do social and political identities have on individuals' political trust in 
Zanzibar? 
The study added demographic variables in line with the social and political identities. As 
noted earlier, a total of 10 variables fall under the identity factors. They study's major 
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findings on identity was that common political identities in terms of party affiliation and 
historical legacies (particularly the post revolutionary legacies) were the two most important 
identity constructs in explaining trust in the government. Other variables found to have 
significant relationship to trust include demographic attributes of age and gender, as well as 
social group identities such as region, location, and occupation. However, the study found no 
evidence in support of the ethnic influence on political trust. It was also at the surprise of the 
researcher that education was not seen to be associated with citizens' trust contrary to the 
findings in most African settings. Further, the study could not establish the relationship 
between national identity and trust due to lack of enough data for meaningful analysis. 
 
Moreover, the results on identity variables depicted multiple interaction effects between 
identity variables themselves, and in relations to performance factors. This is consistent with 
theoretical frameowork of the study. It was further observed from the findings that, some of 
the identity variables such as historical legacies (especially the ideological legacies) are 
increasingly losing their influence on trust attitude. Therefore, an important remark from the 
findings is that identities matter for political trust in Zanzibar, and this means a certain level 
of particularized trust exist. 
  
2. Do perceptions of government performance influence citizens' trust in public institutions 
in Zanzibar? 
The study analyzed several aspects of performance variables including economic 
performance, political performance, and social service delivery. It also tried to examine 
overall central government and local government performance. The findings show that 
political performance (in terms of perceptions of corruption, satisfaction with democracy 
and elections), as well as performance in social service delivery had the strongest impact on 
citizens trust attitudes. The findings also reveal that perceptions of political stability 
influenced trust significant, while no evidence was found on the influence of economic 
performance, both at the national economy and individuals' living conditions on trust. 
Similarly, the study found evaluation of performance of local government councils did not 
have strong influence on trust. 
 
Moreover, the fact that citizens evaluated public institutions extremely negative, as shown 
from both quantitative as well as qualitative data sources, regardless of their identity 
attachment means government performance is closely scrutinized by citizens. However, the 
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perplexing findings showing that despite highly negative evaluation, citizens trust expression 
was not so much skewed to that effect, signify that other factors come into play. In general, 
the findings show that the overall central government performance was correlated to trust 
attitudes, whereby positive evaluation resulted into higher trust level and negative evaluation 
resulted into lower trust levels.  
 
Further, the findings suggest the prominence of performance consideration over identity 
factors, which signifies the presence and increasing levels of institutional generalized trust 
which is important for economic development, democratic stability, and cooperation (see 
Rosthstein & Stolle, 2002). 
 
In conclusion, in this section I have addressed the three major hypotheses mentioned in line 
with the two specific research questions above. The summary of results for all the specific 
variables are listed in Table 20 below. Next, I address the last research question. 
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Table 20: Summary of Results for specific hypotheses 
Independent variables Specific Hypotheses Results 
Age Youth were the more likely to express less trust compared to their old counterparts Partly supported 
Gender Men are much likely to be critical of the government and thus less likely to express trust compared to women Supported 
Education The more educated individuals become, the more likely to express low trust in the government compared to the 
less educated ones 
Not supported 
Location Rural dwellers are more likely to show higher trust in government than their urban counterparts Supported 
Occupation Those working in the government sector and formal organizations of the state are more likely to express 
higher trust level compared to those working in the private sector, NGOs, and self-employed 
Supported 
Region Regional identity may have significant influence on individual's trust level, whereby people from Pemba are 
less likely to express support in government institutions compared to their Unguja counterparts 
Partly supported 
Ethnicity  Ethnicity is positively related to expression of trust, whereby people of Arab orgin are less likely to express 
trust compared to Africans of Mainland origin 
Not supported 




Historical legacies Attachment to historical legacies of pre-independence incline an individual to trust the government more, 
while identification with post revolutionary legacies erodes institutional trust. 
Strongly 
supported 
National Identity Identification with national identity is likely to to decerease trust in government as it is likely to prioritize 




The more positively citizens evaluate government economic performance, especially in sectors related to 





- Improvement in democracy impacts trust positively, while poor democratic performance influence trust 
negatively. 
- The more citizens are satisfied with the conduct of elections the more likely they will express trust in the 







Citizens' perceptions of increase in corruption will likely influence their trust negatively, while positive 
performance in combating corruption would increase trust. 
Strongly 
supported 
Perceptions of political 
stability 
The more people are satisfied with the security situation, the more they would trust the government more, but 
a sense of insecurity affects institutional trust negatively 
Supported 
Satisfaction with social 
service delivery 
The more positively the citizens evaluate social service delivery the more they would express high level of trust 





Expected that evaluation of performance of local councils would be key explanation to trust attributed to it Not supported 
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3. What are the most important factors in explaining patterns of popular trust in public 
institutions in Zanzibar? 
This final research question was meant to provide an overall analysis of the strengths of 
influence between identity and performance. The question was also posed consistently with 
the conceptual framework of the study in order to examine if there was merit in treating the 
two theories of identity and institutional performance as complementary rather than rival 
approaches in understanding institutional trust in Zanzibar. When participants in focus group 
discussions were asked to rank which one between identity and performance had the most 
strong influence on their trust attitudes, there was majority support for performance factors. 
They raised issues in relation to several aspects of performance, such as democracy and 
election, justice system and rule of law, issues of corruption and mismanagement of resources 
and office, and economic factors. But there were also acknowledgment about the effect of 
identity among people particularly political party affiliation and historical legacies. 
 
Similar question was posed during interviews with key respondents. Again, opinions of 
performance considerations received major support. However, and this is most importantly, 9 
out of 10 key informants thought trust attitudes in Zanzibar cannot be explained by a single 
factor and proposed a mixture of identity and performance factors, at the same time 
highlighting the increasing effect of performance factors. A key informant from the 
University of Dar es Salaam explained his view on this, he argued, 
"Now here we have to make a difference in the expression of trust. For example if you are talking of 
electoral behavior, it is very much guided by identity (by party affiliation) not performance, may be 
government performance is secondary. So its different I would say. But if you are talking of trust broadly I 
think I would take into account both because Zanzibar is a highly politicized society and you wouldn't say 
they take into account performance rather than identity (identity not in terms of racial identity but identity in 
terms of political affiliation)"  
 
Another key informant held similar opinion, he observed, 
I think it is becoming complex now because the political affiliation and historical factors that sort of 
combine. That is being pushed as part of the propaganda. But the people now are beginning to look at their 
own conditions and are behaving differently contrary to what the political elite wants to them to behave. So 
the fact is that they don’t see the improvement in their lives, and that is changing their political attitudes. 
 
The above findings are indeed consistent with the conceptual framework of the study. The 
study conclude that none of the individual's identities or performance criteria alone could be 
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said to have a solitary influence on individual's judgments. Similar argument is advanced by 
Bratton (2011) who hold that researcher need to be cautious with single-factor explanations. 
 
However, it is important to stress that the findings have shown high hopes that in Zanzibar, 
performance factors are increasingly gaining prominence. Even the Afrobarometer survey 
results show that when respondents were asked to explain what was the difference between 
the opposition and the ruling party, most of respondents thought that 'the honesty or integrity 
of party leaders' (40%), and 'their economic and development policies' (37%), while only 3 
percent and 2 percent mentioned religion of party leaders and ethnicity of party leaders, 
respectively. Similarly, the findings also show that identities citizens were not made blind by 
their identities such as party affiliation. For example, when participants were asked if it was 
important to obey the government in power no matter who one has voted for, or whether it 
was necessary to obey the government only if one had voted for it, an overwhelming majority 
of respondents (97%) supported the statement that it was necessary to obey the government 
regardless of who one has voted for. 
7.3 Revisiting the Theoretical Framework in the light of key findings 
The study employed the identity and performance approaches with great effectiveness to 
understand citizens' trust attitudes in Zanzibar. Both theories proved relevant in explaining 
institutional trust in Zanzibar. On the one hand, the identity theory, which claim that people's 
identities are key consideration in their expression of trust was useful in explaining trust 
among Zanzibaris as party affinitities and historical legacies were found to have strong 
significance. Other identities such as regional identity, rural-urban location, and occupation 
as well as demographic attributes of age and gender were similarly important, although 
identities such as ethnicity, education, and national identity were not relevant in 
understanding political trust in Zanzibar. This shows that the identity theory was partly able 
to explain why some Zanzibaris express political trust the way they do, and in turn suggest 
the presence of some levels of particularized institutional trust. 
 
On the other hand, the institutional performance perspective, which views political trust as 
the outcome of the institutional performance (or non performance) in terms of policy output, 
and the conduct of political leadership, was also strongly applicable. The findings revealed 
that people's perceptions and satisfaction with political performance in terms of satisfaction 
with democracy and elections, perceptions of corruption, and perceptions of political 
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stability, as well as satisfaction with the provision of social services were key in explaining 
institutional trust in Zanzibar. This implies also that generalized institutional trust is present 
in Zanzibar, and its co-existence with particularized trust boards well with the theoretical 
design of this study. 
 
A very critical theoretical implication derived from the findings of the study is the powerful 
evidences for the interactions between identity and performance factors. Consistent with the 
study's conceptual framework emanating from the theoretical and empirical literature, 
identity and performance factors, and so the theories themselves, were found to influence 
each other significantly in explaining trust patterns in Zanzibar.  For example, evidences from 
the findings  revealed that regional identity, political affiliation, and identification with 
historical legacies (the post-revolutionary legacy in particular), were strongly shaped, 
influenced, and defined by performance factors such as discriminatory policies, violations of 
democratic rights, volatile politics, and policy failures in terms of poor social service delivery 
and worsening individual's economic conditions. Similarly, citizens' evaluation of 
performance were relatively influenced by some identity factors such as political affiliation 
and historical legacies. Hence the findings provide further support for the study's framework 
of analysis. Similar observation is made by Askvik (2008) who found both identity and 
performance factors significant, and recommended that the two theories "should be seen as 
complementing each other in understanding trust in the post-apartheid government of South 
Africa" (see also Askvik, 2010). The study's conceptual framework is further supported by 
Cho and Kirwin, (2007) who even found circular and vicious relationship between experience 
of corruption and trust, whereby citizens experience with corruption lowers trust, and lower 
levels of trust are likely to increase experience of corruption. The consideration of multiple 
interaction effect consideration serve the purpose of avoiding the third factor effect, by trying 
to uncover what Elster (2007) termed the 'causal chain' of a possible outcome. For instance, 
as Keefer (2010) pointed out, if ethnicity is exploited by politicians to exacerbate fear due to 
voters imperfect information, then the true cause could not be attributed to ethnicity, but 
rather the absence of information, or other features of the political environment. 
 
Another significant implication of the findings is that, increasingly the identity attachments 
are losing their explanatory significance, hence performance judgments becoming much 
stronger in citizens' trust attitudes. Similar findings was observed by Askvik (2008) who 
noted that the significance of racial identities was in decline in South Africa as apartheid 
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memories were fading. For Zanzibar, this implies that increasingly particularized trust is 
being replaced by generalized institutional trust, which is important for the flourishing of 
democratic institutions and economic development (see Rothstein and Stolle, 2002). 
7.4 Limitation of the Study 
The Afrobarometer data was collected using a standardized questionnaire for the whole of 
Tanzania. There was no tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar. This puts some limitations on the 
data in some respects. First, given the presence of two government structures, the Union 
government on the one hand and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ) on the 
other, it is not clear which of the two government is being assessed and attributed with the 
observed trust level. This is what I called the problem of double referents. As noted above, 
the government of Zanzibar is a fully functioning government with its own autonomous 
central and local government executive structures, the judiciary, and the House of 
representative (HoR). In fact, it is the SMZ which is responsible for the welfare of its people 
and day-to-day administration in Zanzibar, including provision of social services, 
management of the economy, and ensuring democratic rule and respect of the rule of law. In 
this regard therefore, when citizens of Zanzibar assess the performance of central government 





In connection to the above limitation, most of the assessed institutions referred in the survey 
were either limited to Mainland Tanzania in terms of jurisdiction, or had double reference, 
that is, similar institutions exist in Zanzibar and in Mainland autonomously and thus 
increasing the ambiguity of which one is being referred to. An example of an institution  
whose functions do not extend to Zanzibar is the PCCB, and its substitute is the Zanzibar 
Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Authority. Other institutions have limited authority 
only in relations to Union matters, these include TRA and NEC while alternative institutions 
with similar mandates for Zanzibar such as ZRB, and ZEC, were not included in the survey
17
. 
Also, an example of an institution that has double referents is the office of the president, 
                                                 
16
 There is an indication that the government of the United Republic was the referent of the assessment in the 
Afrobarometer Round 6 standadized questionnaire in Tanzania. For example, in question 68(B) respondents 
were asked to assess the job performance of the former president of the United republic, president Jakaya 
Kikwete, though it was not clear in all other questions. 
17
 The Zanzibar's autonomous legislative body known as the House of Representatives is another institution 
which deserved to be examined parallel with the parliament of the United Republic. 
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hence when citizens assess the office of the president it is not clear whether the referent is the 
president of Zanzibar or that of the United Republic. 
 
Perhaps it is also important to note that some variables could not be examined thoroughly due 
to lack of data from the survey. For example, the influence of historical identities (legacies), 
and perceptions of political instability lacked quantitative evidences from the Afrobarometer 
survey. This is again due to the use of standardized questionnaire throughout Tanzania 
instead of tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar. The intricate nature of identity is a peculiar 
feature of Zanzibar's politics, and the influence of such aspects are more pronounced. A 
tailored questionnaire for Zanzibar could improve the survey data in the future. 
 
Having pointed out the above limitations, however, the rational of this study is still intact. 
The study excluded the data of 5 regions of Zanzibar from the Tanzania data set. It was able 
to examine citizens' expression of trust in the lights of identity and institutional performance 
theories, that is, explaining how Zanzibaris' trust attitudes are formed by examining identity 
and performance factors. Indeed, having supplemented the survey data with qualitative 
evidences from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, documentary review, and direct 
observation, the findings revealed great consistency and similarities from both qualitative and 
quantitative sources. In particular, the qualitative data provided deeper insights from rich 
sources to allow the study to confirm, disconfirm, or corroborate the quantitative findings 
with more evidences. 
 
Another limitation was probably the timing of the study's data sources. On the one hand, the 
Afrobarometer survey data was collected between August and October 2014, when the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) was in place and the political relations were relatively 
very good. This could have a positive influence on the results against a background of 
decades of restrained political relations, conflicts and instabilities the isles has experienced. 
On the other hand, the qualitative data were collected between July and Septermber 2015 
closer to the October 2015 national elections, where there were clear signs that the GNU was 
falling apart. Probably, the political relations had started to be suspicious and somehow 
affected the findings. It was later noted that the October elections proved to be a turning point 
for the return of political conflicts in the isles as it was annulled, and a re-run of elections in 
March 2016 was boycotted by the main opposition party (CUF). The political standoff is yet 
to be resolved.  
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7.5 Contribution of the study and Suggestion for further research 
As pointed earlier, the study made some important contributions to the existing literature on 
trust research in African settings, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. First, the study 
attempted to fill the research gap in trust literature, which has overlooked Zanzibar's 
peculiarities from other countries
18
. The study has argued that treating Zanzibar within the 
Union framework in not only misleading, but is also an intellectual disregard of a rich case 
that is characteristically different from many of the Sub-Saharan countries because of its 
intricate, and volatile politics and historical trajectories that bring claims of identities into 
play. This study is probably one of the first of its kind to address trust in particular, but also 
supplement other existing studies on general political attitudes. 
 
The study also provides empirical evidences from a case study of Zanzibar to inform and 
enhance the explanatory strength of the identity and performance theories of trust. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) calls this 'theoretical generalization' role of a case study research. Similarly, Yin 
(2003:10) referred to this contribution as 'analytical generalization' whereby the case study 
goal is "to expand and generalize theories". More importantly, the study's findings show 
show that the two theories are complementary to each other for a better understanding of trust 
rather than being considered as competing or rival models of trust. 
 
Indeed, the study informs public policy by outlining important factors in building institutional 
trust. For a country like Zanzibar that has gone through decades of one party system where 
people's experience with suppression of freedom, the delivery of political goods is more 
important than in other places of different context. This was evident in the findings as 
political identities and political performance were found to be most important in citizens' 
institutional trust. Thus, by rutting out practices which are corrosive to political trust such as 
corruption, and improve democracy, as well as improve delivery of social service, the 
government will improve its popular legitimacy and increase citizens' voluntary compliance 
with the state (see also, Armah-Attoh, 2007). Also, by encouraging the growth of national 
identity (as other studies argued) will help mitigate the negative effects of historical legacies 
and party affiliation.  
 
                                                 
18
 The scholarly neglect of Zanzibar and analysis of Tanzania as a single unit of analysis is also noted by Killian 
(2008), who argue that such analysis "tends to ignore variations between the two partner states." 
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Since this study was basically mapping the influence or significance of several identity and 
performance factors, understandably it could not rigorously examine in expansive detail the 
causal relationship for each of the variables. Thus, deeper analyses to test the causal 
relationship and strength of some few variables found to be significant from this study, is one 
area for future research. Also, for variables that could not have been examined thoroughly 
such as national identity need to be explained. With high level identification with national 
identity in Zanzibar, national identity is likely to have strong influence. As evidences cited 
from several studies above, Robinson (2009; 2011; 2016) consistently found to relate 
significantly to institutional trust in Malawi and Zambia. Another suggestion is for the 
Afrobarometer, they should consider examining Zanzibar in a separate survey, because 
although it is not a sovereign state in terms of the conduct of foreign affairs and Union 
matters, arguably it enjoys an internal sovereignty over non-union matters, most of which are 
the central concern for trust research. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented a summary of the study on trust in public institutions in Zanzibar 
using identity and performance theories of trust. The chapter made a recap of key findings 
and its linkages to the study's research questions and theoretical framework. Also, the study's 
limitations were pointed out and its contribution to trust research highlighted. In summary, 
the study found identity as well as performance factors to be strongly associated with citizens' 
trust in Zanzibar. Another major finding of the study is the evidence that identity and 
performance theories are complementary to each other in explaining institutional trust. 
Further, the study found that performance consideration are increasingly become the most 
dominant criteria of judging public institutions and even identities are very much influenced 
by government performance. Also, the prominence of performance considerations and their 
strong influence on identity means that increasingly Zanzibaris are getting detached from 
negative historical influences. This provide hope for Zanzibar as identity factors, especially 
those that are considered divisive, such as ethnicity, were not found to be significant in 
citizens' trust attitudes. It implies that generalized institutional trust is in increase in Zanzibar, 
which is a positive phenomenon for national development and national integration. 
Therefore, in brief the study suggest that performance is the right button the government 
should press in order to enhance citizens' trust in public institutions and ultimately strengthen 
its legitimacy and public acceptance of its policies and programs. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: In-depth Interview Guide for Key Informants 
1. Recent Afrobarometer opinion surveys have shown that Zanzibaris show high awareness 
of political issues. What is your view on trust situation in Zanzibar?  
2.What is your view about racial and ethnic relations among citizens in Zanzibar? Would you    
   say harmonious, suspicious, or conflictual? Why? 
3. Party affiliation is said to have strong influence in forming political attitudes in Zanzibar. 
How strong is it compared to national/geographic identification as Zanzibaris or as 
Tanzanians? Is there any link between ethnic identity and party support in Zanzibar?  
4. What is the nature and cause of regional divide in Zanzibar between Pemba and Unguja? 
How does regionalism influence trust in public institutions in Zanzibar? 
5. In your opinion, has the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar represented a particular 
racial/political group at the expense of others or is it an inclusive government? What is 
your view before and after the formation of GNU?  
6. It is argued that most ruling parties in Africa have achieved great support from what they 
had done as liberators and freedom fighters. What is your opinion of the revolutionary 
government of Zanzibar having governed 51 years since the popular revolution? Is this 
history still lingering in people's minds? 
7. Do you think there is political instability in Zanzibar? If Yes, what are the triggers of the 
conflict? And how does the instability impact on citizens’ trust in their government? What 
is your view on general peace and security in Zanzibar?  
8. The period under the GNU (2010-2015) is said to be the most peaceful term in multiparty 
era. How do you assess the achievement of the GNU in building citizens' political trust?  
9. What is your opinion regarding the conduct of democracy and elections in Zanzibar and 
how has it strengthened or destroyed the trust and legitimacy of the government?  
10. What is your perception of corruption and governance in Zanzibar? 
11. How do you generally view the economic situation of Zanzibar?, the livelihood of an 
ordinary Zanzibari in comparison to Mainland and other regions, and the prospects of the 
Zanzibar national economy. 
12. How do you rate the government of Zanzibar in terms of social service provision? How 
does that situation impact on citizens' trust in government?  
13. Overall, what would you say is the most important factor that influence citizens' trust in 
government in Zanzibar? Is it identity (ethnic, political, regional, history) or government 
performance (economy, democracy, security, corruption, social service)? or both? Why?  
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Appendix 2: Focus Group Topic Guide for Political Trust 
Country Direction 
1. What is your view regarding the overall country direction?  
(a) Do you think the country is in the right or wrong direction? 
(b) What is your view of the future prospect of the country? 
Economy 
2. Let's talk about the economy, how well the government manages the economy? 
(a) The national economy, and your own individual living/economic conditions  
(b) Your assessment of economic conditions for the past 5 years 
(c) Prospect of the economy in the next 5 years 
Security 
3. What is you view of the security situation in the country? 
(a) Do you think the country is in peace and political stability 
(b) How well do you think the current government has done in managing security situation? 
(c) What has been the role of National security forces in maintaining peace and stability 
(d) Do you have experience of political violence for the past 10 years?  
Democracy and Elections 
4. What democracy mean to you? 
(a) What is your assessment of  multiparty democracy in the country 
(b) What is your assessment of democracy for the past 10 years 
(c) Are your satisfied with the exercise of democracy in the country 
(d) In your opinion, is there anything restricting the exercise of democracy? 
5. To what extent the 2010 elections reflected voters' genuine choice? 
(a) Right to vote and be voted 
(b) Was it free and fair? 
(c) To what extent elections improve legitimacy of elected leaders?  
Corruption 
6. What does corruption means to you? What is your opinion about corruption in Zanzibar? 
(a) How is corruption compared to 5 years ago? 
(b) Do you think corruption has any effect/impact in your life? 
(c) What effect corruption has to the country at large? 
(d) Has the government done enough in fighting corruption 
(e) To what extent newsmedia, courts of laws, and the government have played their roles in the 
fighting against corruption  
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Social Service Delivery 
7. Let's talk about social services; water, electricity, education, raod infrastructure, and health 
care provision. The government is responsible for providing social services to its citizens: 
(a) How well the it has done the job? 
(b) What are the priority problems you face in your residency area. 




8. There are so many social and political identities one could identify with such as race, a 
region where you live, nationality, occupation, ethnicity, party affiliation, and ideology. 
(a) Which of these you feel likely to identify yourself with and why? 
(b) Which one do you think most people in your area like to associate with and why? 
(c) Do you think the history of the government and leaders as liberators influence your trust 
attitudes to the government? 
(d) To what extent history influences your political attitudes 
Trust in Government 
9. What does trust in government mean to you?  
a) Overall, how do you rate your trust in the government?  
b) What motivates you to trust the government the way tyou do?  
c) What makes citizens lose trust in the government?  
d) What can government do to gain the trust of its citizens?  
 
Arising issues and any other Comments 
10. If you have any information that you need to share, or a question to ask me, you are 
welcome to do so.  
 
This marks the end of our group discussion. We appreciate your participation , contribution, 
and opinions on the topics.  
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Appendix 3: Research Clearance permit 
 
